Hegel, Spinoza and Heidegger’s Critique of Onto-Theology Hegel, Spinoza y la crítica de Heidegger a la onto-teología

Abstract

According to a longstanding and still nowadays partially dominant historiographical approach, Hegel’s philosophy would be the full achievement and extension of Spinozism following its own principles: Hegel would then be a “consequential Spinozist”. Such a historiographical opinion can be brought back to the nineteenth century, and it is shared by, among others, Jacobi, Feuerbach and Nicolai Hartmann. Also Martin Heidegger, as shown in his famous interpretation of Hegel’s subjectivity as the highest expression of the distinguished Onto-Theology of Modern Metaphysics, reaches analogous results to the supporters of the “consequential Spinozism”. Hegel’s notion of concept would ultimately still amount to, also according to his interpretation, the unique and infinite substance of Spinoza – although in the “highest” form of absolute freedom and “immanent thinking”. In my contribution, I shall try to question, first of all, the main assumption on which these readings are based, i.e. that Hegel finds in Spinoza «the fully developed “standpoint of substance”», and then explain why Hegel’s philosophy, far from being a “refutation” of Spinozism still trapped within it, is actually a full alternative program, culminating in a re-evaluation of the same finite and differences, that Hegel saw evaded by the philosophy of Spinoza. in Spinoza «the fully developed “standpoint of substance”», and then explain why Hegel’s philosophy, far from being a “refutation” of Spinozism still trapped within it, is actually a full alternative program, culminating in a re-evaluation of the same finite and differences, that Hegel saw evaded by the philosophy of Spinoza.