El rendimiento de las empresas familiares durante los períodos de crisis: El caso de Grecia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/ejfbejfb.v12i1.13020Palabras clave:
CEO, Consejo de administración, Crisis financiera, Desempeño de la empresa familiar, PropiedadResumen
Este trabajo examina el efecto de la implicación familiar en los resultados de las empresas griegas que cotizan en bolsa, durante la crisis financiera griega. La participación de la familia en la propiedad, la gestión y el gobierno de la empresa, junto con la edad de la misma, constituyen el marco unificado que describe la influencia de la familia en la empresa. La principal contribución de este trabajo es la investigación de un periodo de investigación en el que Grecia se enfrentó a una crisis económica sin precedentes de nueve años que afectó a todos los sectores de la economía. Durante este período de crisis disminuyeron un 72% los ingresos de las empresas griegas cotizadas y la capitalización total de la Bolsa griega se redujo en un 70%. Ningún estudio anterior ha incorporado datos sobre el rendimiento de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa durante una crisis financiera correspondiente con grandes fluctuaciones en todos los indicadores de rendimiento y una gran volatilidad en la economía nacional. La muestra de la investigación incluye 80
empresas familiares que cotizan en la Bolsa griega. Los resultados ilustran un mejor rendimiento de las empresas familiares con menor propiedad familiar y demuestran un mayor rendimiento en las empresas familiares más jóvenes. Los resultados del estudio no confirman la implicación positiva de los miembros de la familia, a través de los puestos de dirección (CEO) y de gobierno (BoD) en el rendimiento de la empresa familiar.
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