Condiciones de posibilidad de las  atribuciones mentales en la díada  humano-inteligencia artificial

José Miguel Biscaia Fernández

doi:10.24310/crf.16.2.2024.19290

Authors

José Miguel Biscaia Fernández Universidad Europea de Madrid Spain

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/crf.16.2.2024.19290

Keywords:

Artificial intelligence, mental atribution, psychological perspective, theory of mind (ToM), transhumanism

Abstract

This essay discusses the limits of mental attribution between humans and intelligent machines. Starting from the ontological presuppositions of functionalism and technological transhumanism that a strong Artificial Intelligence (strong-AI) with mental states could be feasible, I analyse the conditions of possibility of mental attribution in first, second and third person perspective between both agents. I conclude that, despite the enormous conceptual debate and the considerable technical difficulties of this undertaking, in case there was a strong-AI with cognitive abilities similar to ours there would be no nomological limits that prevent some kind of bidirectional, asymmetric and gradual mental attribution.

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