“The table penholders the book” Nonsense?

The traditional reading and the austere reading of nonsense in Wittgenstein.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the wide problem of Bertrand Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. Firstly, we will explain the fundamental ideas of that theory, which postulates that judgment is a relationship between the subject and a multiplicity of entities, and these appear in the judgment as mere objects. Then, we will analyze the traditional reading of the wide problem or the criticism of nonsense that Wittgenstein makes of said theory, whose core is synthesized in the idea that under the theory of judgment as a multiple relationship it is possible to judge nonsense, because nothing regulates that entities can be replaced by other entities of the incorrect logical genus. Finally, we will analyze what Wittgenstein raises about nonsense in the Tractatus. Based on this, we will conclude that there are two interpretations of the criticism of nonsense: the traditional reading, and the austere reading of nonsense.