La relación mente-materia y el monismo neutral

Rafael Andrés Alemañ Berenguer

doi:10.24310/nyl.v1i1.3973

Autores/as

Rafael Andrés Alemañ Berenguer

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/nyl.v1i1.3973

Palabras clave:

Mente, materia, cerebro, monismo, neutral, relación,

Resumen

Resumen: El problema de las relaciones ontológicas y gnoseológicas entre la mente y la materia (y en concreto, de la mente y el cerebro), parece haberse saldado en los últimos años con la victoria del materialismo monista. En el presente artículo se pretende reivindicar la teoría del monismo neutral como una alternativa viable, capaz de incorporar algunas de las ventajas del materialismo emergentista y tomando la noción de relación como elemento neutral básico.

Palabras clave: Mente, materia, cerebro, monismo, neutral, relación.

Summary: The problem of mind-matter (and specifically mind-brain) ontologic and gnoseologic relations seems to have come finally to an end with the victory of the monist materialism. This paper, on the contrary, aims to plead for the theory of neutral monism as a plausible alternative, which is able to embody some advantages of emergentist materialism, taking the notion of relation as a basic neutral entity.

Keywords: Mind, matter, brain, monism, neutral, relation.

Recibido: 25/07/2011 Aprobado: 17/01/2012

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