La alteridad mal explicada: Una visión alternativa sobre el problema de las otras mentes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/NATyLIB.2016.v0i7.6354Keywords:
alteridad, conciencia, Juan Arana, ciencia cognitiva,Abstract
Tomando como punto de partida la tesis de Arana en La conciencia inexplicada (de que la conciencia es inexplicable por métodos naturalistas), la ponencia defiende una visión de la capacidad de alteridad en el ser humano como acoplamiento de dos componentes: la conciencia primordial e inexplicable que Arana analiza, y la capacidad estructural innata del ser humano para la mutualidad. La ponencia critica las explicaciones que la ciencia cognitiva ha dado a la cuestión de la alteridad, para posteriormente proponer una explicación alternativa, proporcionando evidencias empíricas y soporte teórico.Downloads
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