False Beliefs With a Purpose and Optimistic Bias

Paniel Reyes Cárdenas

doi:10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi27.14205

Autores/as

Paniel Reyes Cárdenas UPAEP México https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4430-0991

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi27.14205

Palabras clave:

sesgo optimista, virtud epistémica, creencias falsas, William James

Resumen

En su perspicaz trabajo sobre las falsas creencias y el sesgo optimista, Anneli Jefferson y Lisa Borttolotti (2017, 2018) y otros colaboradores de su proyecto, nos presentan fascinantes estudios interdisciplinarios contemporáneos que arrojan evidencia sobre el uso social y psicológico del sesgo optimista. El tono de esta nota crítica va a ser bastante favorable al entendimiento de que las creencias intencionales son epistémicamente valiosas -un punto no siempre fácil de defender, pero ofrecerá algunos comentarios sobre por qué el optimismo podría ser considerado como una virtud epistémica, después de reflexionar cómo William James trató este tipo de formación de las creencias.

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