False Beliefs With a Purpose and Optimistic Bias

Paniel Reyes Cárdenas

doi:10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi27.14205

Authors

Paniel Reyes Cárdenas UPAEP Mexico https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4430-0991

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi27.14205

Keywords:

optimistic bias, epistemic virtue, false belief, belief-formation, William James

Abstract

In their insightful work on False beliefs and their relationship to optimistic bias, Anneli Jefferson and Lisa Bortolotti (2007, 2018) and other members of their research team have been interested in introducing trans-disciplinary understandings of the epistemology behind the social use and the psychological mechanism of optimistic bias and thereby show their useful functions. In this critical note I will reflect on the epistemic value of such phenomena by establishing a dialogue with some of William James' ideas about the place of optimism and the possibility of reading it not so much as a bias but even, in some cases, as an epistemic virtue.

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