Social Dilemmas and Indirect Reciprocity: A systematic review
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/espsiescpsi.v7i2.13253Keywords:
Indirect Reciprocity, Social Dilemmas, Cooperation, ReputationAbstract
Indirect reciprocity is an evolutionary theory of altruism and cooperation in social dilemmas. Its explanation of cooperation incorporates information on the reputation people hold of other people regarding whether they are cooperative or not. This study systematically reviewed the current empirical literature on indirect reciprocity in social dilemma situations. The following databases were consulted: ScienceDirect, EBSCO, and OVID, using has key words "indirect reciprocity" AND "dilemma" OR "cooperation" OR "charity". Twenty-three articles were selected which met the inclusion criteria (papers written in English and studies whose methodology was based on experimental games) and the theories, objectives, the main types of samples used, and main results were analyzed. The results show that the games used were the indirect reciprocity and public goods games, which may vary according to the objectives. It was found that reputation is a key variable that helps to promote cooperation. In turn, information on previous cooperation helps to build reputation, which is subsequently involved in the decision to cooperate with others. Finally, we highlight the need for more experimental studies that incorporate other explanatory variables and evaluate them in new contexts.
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Los artículos incluidos en la revisión son marcados con asterisco (*).
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