La Relevancia de las Medidas Contables de Desempeño para Empresas Familiares Cotizadas. Un Estudio a la Luz de las Hipótesis de Alineamiento y Atrincheramiento
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/ejfbejfb.v10i2.7397Palabras clave:
Empresas familiares, Ganancias contables, Relevancia del valor, Teoría de la agencia, Hipótesis de alineación, Hipótesis de afianzamientoResumen
La literatura sobre empresas familiares muestra que las empresas familiares y no fa-miliares difieren con respecto a sus decisiones de información financiera. Sin embargo, aunque la literatura sobre información financiera en empresas familiares se ha desarrollado en los últimos diez años, está mayoritariamente orientada a temas de gestión de resultados y control de gestión. Dadas las características específicas de las empresas familiares en financiación y gobernanza, ¿sus datos contables publicados tienen menos relevancia de valor para los inversores públicos que en el caso de las empresas no familiares? ¿En qué se diferencian las empresas familiares en este tema? Si bien se han utilizado diferentes perspectivas teóricas para abordar este problema, dos tesis principales basadas en la teoría de la agencia han sido las más utilizadas. Este artículo examina si las empresas familiares muestran ganancias contables más o menos relevantes que las empresas no familiares. En segundo lugar, busca estudiar la heterogeneidad de las empresas familiares en términos de la relevancia de las cifras de ingresos considerando el alcance del control familiar y la participación de un director general de la familia como mecanismos que conducen a la alineación o el atrincheramiento. Los resultados muestran que las empresas familiares exhiben una mayor relevancia de valor de las ganancias que las empresas no familiares. Además, cuando el control de las familias propietarias se vuelve alto, la relevancia del valor de los ingresos empeora, lo que sugiere un posible efecto de atrincheramiento en nombre de las familias controladoras.
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