El Efecto de la Composición del Consejo en los Dividendos: El Caso de Empresas Familiares Brasileñas y Chilenas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/ejfbejfb.v10i2.10177Palabras clave:
Política de dividendos, Empresas familiares, Composición de la junta directiva, América latina, Teoría de la agenciaResumen
Basado en la teoría de la agencia, este trabajo analiza si las empresas familiares pagan más dividendos en comparación con las empresas no familiares e identifica si la composición del consejo de administración incide la política de dividendos. Brasil y Chile han establecido a los dividendos como mandatorios, retienen menos efectivo y pagan mayores dividendos en comparación con otros mercados de la región. La muestra del estudio se conforma por 853 observaciones (49 empresas brasileñas y 32 chilenas) las de mayor cotización bursátil en términos de capitalización de mercado durante el período de 2004 a 2014. A través de un panel de panel no balanceado, los resultados indican que las empresas controladas por la familia distribuyen más dividendos y la composición del consejo; particularmente, el tamaño y la participación de mujeres en el consejo tienen un impacto significativo y positivo en la política de dividendos de la empresa. Por el contrario, la dualidad COB-CEO afecta negativamente esta relación. En este contexto, la política de dividendos constituye un mecanismo de gobierno corporativo eficaz para mitigar la expropiación de los accionistas minoritarios por parte de la propiedad en manos de la familia.
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