Defense of non conservative deflationism

Authors

  • Bruno Muntaabski a:1:{s:5:"es_ES";s:35:"Universidad de Buenos Aires - SADAF";} Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v27i1.11711

Keywords:

Deflationism, truth, conservativity, formal theories, natural language

Abstract

Deflationism about truth holds that a complete theory of this concept should not attend to it’s supposed underlying nature, but to the use of it in actual practice. Nevertheless, this philosophical stand on truth has been put into question by the so-called “conservativeness argument” (Murzi y Rossi, 2020), advanced originally by Shapiro (1998). A response is given to this argument in terms of the defense of a deflationism compatible with a non-conservative formal theory of truth.

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References

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Published

2022-03-07

How to Cite

Muntaabski, B. (2022). Defense of non conservative deflationism. Contrastes. Revista Internacional De Filosofía, 27(1), 117–134. https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v27i1.11711

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ARTICLES