A Typology of Asymmetrical Ethics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v27i1.10906Keywords:
assymetry, monism, pluralism, lexicality, weighed viewsAbstract
Both in value theory and in normative theory it is usually considered that negative things and positive things have the same relevance. Some reject this idea and consider negative things more important. Here I will argue in favor of the asymmetry. Afterwards, I will examine the different asymmetrical positions we may hold. I will analyze their features and their strong and weak points. Lastly, I will claim that we have no reasons to believe that an specific asymmetrical view is superior to the others.
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