La imposible travesía del naturalismo entre el dualismo y la irrelevancia de lo mental
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/nyl.v2i1.3994Keywords:
naturalismo, mente, cerebro, dualismo, escepticismo, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers,Abstract
Resumen: En este artículo se defiende la tesis de que la concepción naturalista de la mente es un planteamiento inestable, que tiende a derivar en uno de estos dos extremos opuestos e indeseados por el pensador naturalista: dualismo y escepticismo. Cuanto más se esfuerza un autor por evitar el epifenomenalismo de lo mental, con más sustantividad —y, por ende, autonomía frente al cerebro— nos presenta la mente; cuanto más se esfuerza por evitar el dualismo, tanto más superfluo e irrelevante se convierte el ámbito del pensamiento. Este resultado arroja serias dudas sobre la viabilidad de la concepción naturalista de la mente.
Palabras clave: naturalismo, mente, cerebro, dualismo, escepticismo, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers
Abstract: This article defends the thesis that the naturalistic approach to mind is an unstable approach, which tends to lead to one of two opposite views: dualism or scepticism. (But both views are “abhorrent” for the naturalistic thinker). The more an author strives to avoid the epiphenomenalism of the mental, the more substantivity must be given to the mind. Thus the mind becomes more and more autonomous from the brain. On the other hand, the more he strives to avoid dualism, the more superfluous and irrelevant becomes the realm of thought. This result casts serious doubt on the viability of the naturalistic approach to mind.
Keywords: naturalism, mind, brain, dualism, skepticism, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers
Recibido: 02/11/2012 Aprobado: 18/04/2013
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