From Leibniz's mill to Levine’s gap

On minds, brains, and machines

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/nyl.18.2024.15073

Keywords:

Mind, matter, neutral monism, materialism, qualia

Abstract

Leibniz's famous windmill metaphor posed a problem that much later Levine named the "explanatory gap" due to the apparent disjunction between the mental and material aspects of reality. In this regard, neutral monism happens to be a worthy rival to materialist monism by accepting the irreducible subjectivity of qualia. This thesis somehow separates psychology from physics and, if we add an additional hypothesis to it, banishes the possibility of thinking machines

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Published

2024-07-02

How to Cite

Alemañ Berenger, R. A. (2024). From Leibniz’s mill to Levine’s gap: On minds, brains, and machines. Nature & Freedom. Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, (18). https://doi.org/10.24310/nyl.18.2024.15073

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