About the Reversal of Platonism in Nietzsche and Heidegger

Abstract

After some considerations on the nature of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, the article traces the development of the thesis that Nietzsche’s philosophy is an inversion of Platonism, together with the question whether it leads or not to an abandonment of Platonism, making reference to the book published in 1961 as well as to the original lessons, the notes for the seminar on Nietzsche of 1937, and the Beiträge zur Philosophie. In this context the centrality of the question of truth for the whole interpretation of Heidegger is pointed out and a critical discussion of the related concepts of «appearance», «perspectivism» and «interpretation» is engaged. Subsequently, the article presents what Heidegger takes for the decisive step: the understanding of truth as «justice». In connection with the previous discussion, it finally describes the change operated in Heidegger’s own conception of truth