When you know more, do you know more about how much you know?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/espsiescpsi.vi4.13452Keywords:
probability judgments, calibration, risk, individual differencesAbstract
lnvestigated the relationship between knowledge and several measures of probability judgment accuracy. After answering a 20 true-false ítem exam, students were asked to estimate the subjective probability that each ítem was true. Knowledge was measured by the grades in the exam (right minus wrong answers). The overall accuracy measure improved (Brier Score decreased) with knowledge. This overall accuracy measure can be decomposed in various dimensions: discrimination, calibration and noisiness. Discrimination measures increased with knowledge. This could be explained by the fact that the ability to differentiate true and false ítems works on both variables. At the same time, the more you know a matter, the better calibration or, in other words, the better you know how much you know. These findings support the mathematical model developed by Bjorkman (1992). Four groups of knowledge were formed to draw calibration and covariance graphs
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