The evolutionary explanation: The limits of desire theories of unpleasantness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v23i3.6597Keywords:
DESIRE, UNPLEASANTNESS, EUTHYPHRO, MOTIVATION, INSTRUMENTAL, JUSTIFICATIONAbstract
Several theorists have defended that unpleasantness can be explained by appealing to (intrinsic, simultaneous, de re) desires for certain experiences not to be occurring. In a nutshell, experiences are unpleasant because we do not want them, and not vice versa. A common criticism for this approach takes the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. Even if there is a solution for this criticism, I argue that this type of approach is limited in two important ways. It cannot provide an explanation for: i) the motivation, from a psychological conscious point of view, nor ii) a non-instrumental justification, for having the relevant desires. The lack of these explanations is relevant since these are precisely the type clarifications that we would expect from a theory about unpleasantness.Downloads
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