The Prisioner’s Dilemma. A study of some aspects of the first tournament between computer programs by Axelrod

Authors

  • Antonio Benítez López Universidad Complutense de Madrid Spain

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v23i1.5460

Keywords:

Prisoner's dilemma, Axelrod, Computer Tournament, Experimental philosophy

Abstract

In 1981, Axelrod announced the approach and results of a tournament between computer programs by which he tried to fix what the best strategy for playing the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is. Each program encoded a strategy. The winning strategy, according to Axelrod, wasknown as Tit for Tat, encoded by the program submitted by Anatol Rapoport. As Axelrod’s work is experimental, it should be possible for anyone to repeat the experiment.This trial is a study of some aspects of that experiment. First, the concepts of «league tournament type» and «winner of a tournament league type». Third, the results of subjecting to analysis Table 2 of Axelrod.Perhaps the main conclusion of this study is that declaring a strategy (program) as winner should take into account not only the point of view of cooperation (minimizing mutual damage) but also the point of view of the confrontation (winning at all costs).

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Author Biography

Antonio Benítez López, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

 Antonio Benítez es profesor jubilado del Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Líneas de Investigación:

 Inteligencia Artificial, Estudios de los sistemas complejos, Filosofía la mente, Lógica

Publicaciones recientes:

(2016):  «Self-Reproduction of an Artificial Animal. Second Model», Journal of Communication and Computer, 8 (June). ISSN 1548-7709).

(2015): Lógicas no clásicas. Una introducción. Madrid: Escolar y Mayo editores, 2015. ISBN: 978-84-16020-25-6.

References

AXELROD, R. 1980: «Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma». The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 3-25.

AXELROD, R. 1980: «More Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma». The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 3 , pp. 379-403.

AXELROD, R. 1984: The Evolution of Cooperation. N. York: Basic Books Inc. Publisher.

AXELROD, R. 1997: The complexity of cooperation : agent-based models of competition and collaboration. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton University Press.

BINMORE, K. 2007: Game Theory. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford U. Press.

HO, T-H. 1996: «Finite automata play repeated prisoner’s dilemma with information processing costs». Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, pp. 173-207.

HOFSTADTER, D. R. 1983: «Computer tournaments of the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggest how cooperation evolves». Scientific American, Volume 248, Issue 5,

pp. 16–26.

MITCHELL, M. 2009: Complexity. A Guided Tour. N. York: Oxford University Press.

RUBINSTEIN, A. 1986: «Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma». Journal of Economic Theory 39, pp. 83-96.

DE SANTIAGO, R. y GARCÍA, J.A. 1994: «¿Es posible ganar a Toma-y-Daca? ». Anales de Estudios Económicos y Empresariales, Vol. 9, pp. 159-184.

SIMON, H. 1996: The Science of the Artificial. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.

Published

2019-01-08

How to Cite

Benítez López, A. (2019). The Prisioner’s Dilemma. A study of some aspects of the first tournament between computer programs by Axelrod. Contrastes. Revista Internacional De Filosofía, 23(1). https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v23i1.5460

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ARTICLES