A Damasian Philosophy of Biology?
Of reason, the Somatic Marker and Developmental Systems Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.29.3.2024.20226Keywords:
Philosophy of Biology, evolutionary epistemology, developmental systems theory, mirror neurons, emotional empathyAbstract
The Damasian concept of emotion and the self fits within the emotivist tradition, viewing mind and reason as embodied realities linked to the body and its social and natural interactions. Emotion, for Damásio, creates the context for reason to operate effectively, aligning with anti-Cartesian ideas. Due to the role of emotions, this may be used to suggest that living beings are not just skin-bound entities but processes integrating body and environment. Therefore, we examine both his relevance to contemporary philosophy of mind and self, and his possible contribution to naturalized metaphysics, particularly within Developmental Systems Theory.
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