The perception of the irreplaceable character of the person
A qualitative study with focal groups
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.30.1.2025.17751Keywords:
PERSONAL IDENTITY, EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, SIMPLE VIEW, INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, INDIVIDUALITYAbstract
We explore the understanding of the irreplaceability of the personal self in adults through a qualitative study with focus group. The subjects had watched an episode of Black Mirror in which a person replaces her deceased partner with an android. Following the guidelines of Grounded Theory, these categories were constructed: negative or shock; unreality; temporality; spontaneity; a whole; something else; irreplaceability. The reference to something fundamental in the person, not understood in its qualities, emerged. The study is preceded by a reflection on the relevance of qualitative studies in the so-called experimental philosophy.
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