La conciencia y el problema mente-cerebro. Un camino de acercamiento entre la ciencia y la reflexión filosófica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/NATyLIB.2017.v0i8.6286Keywords:
conciencia, autoconciencia, problema mente-cuerpo, método científico,Abstract
Tanto la ciencia como la filosofía han abordado este problema a lo largo de la historia del pensamiento desde perspectivas epistémicas muy diversas. La primera construyendo hipótesis con objeto de validar modelos teóricos, y la segunda extendiendo su comprensión sistémica al conjunto de lo real, lo que incluye a la actividad científica. La respuesta al problema mente-cuerpo podría ser factible desde una ciencia fundamentada filosóficamente. El postulado ontológico del materialismo emergentista afirma que la mente es una propiedad emergente del cerebro. El postulado epistemológico del realismo científico sostiene que la neurociencia posee legitimidad epistémica para acometer el estudio del proceso mental más genuinamente humano: la consciencia. La complejidad del problema exige un vínculo de conexión entre ambas disciplinas. Se revisan ambos presupuestos (ontológico y epistemológico), y para acotar el presente ensayo dirigimos el arsenal onto-epistemológico al objeto de estudio más apasionante y complejo del cerebro humano: la conciencia. Concluimos que, aunque coherentes, no explican completamente el problema.Downloads
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