The Identity Principle in the Foundation of the Doctrine of Science in Fichte
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2020.v0i23.6430Keywords:
Fichte, Aristotle, identity principle, inference license.Abstract
The purpose of this work is to clarify Fichte’s interpretation of the Identity Principle in the Jena version of his Wissenschaftslehre, assuming his epistemological constructi-vism, and contrasting it with Aristotle’s classic interpretation. The focus is on the first section of the first part of the text, in which he sets forth his Absolutely Unconditioned Principle, as it is there where he first introduces the Identity Principle. First, Fichte’s exposition of his fundamental first principle is followed, explaining the use of the Iden-tity Principle in his argumentation. Second, an analysis is made of his treatment of this principle. Third, this treatment is contrasted with the epistemic nature of the principle in the classic interpretation. Finally, some similarities and differences between both inter-pretations are highlighted.
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Fichte, J. Fundamento de Toda la Doctrina de la Ciencia (1794). (trad. Juan Cruz Cruz). Pamplona: (ed.) Juan Cruz Cruz (2005)
Pinkard, T. German Philosophy 1760-1860. The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”, última modificación el 6 de Febrero de 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/johann-fichte/
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Morán, J. “Los Primeros Principios: Interpretación de Polo de Aristóteles”. Anuario Filosófico 29 (1996): 787-803.
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