Perception of Colours: a Conceptualist Response to the Circularity Criticisms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2017.v0i17.3729Keywords:
perceptual experience, categorization, conceptual content, non-conceptual content, subpersonal mechanisms .Abstract
In this paper I give a conceptualist answer to Peacocke’s circularity objection regarding the acquisition and possession of observational concepts . Such answer consists in the proposal of a subpersonal categorization process capable of making observational concepts available for the subject before perceptual experience takes place. Then, I offer empirical support for such answer based on experimental results from cognitive science, regarding the perception of color. These experiments show a linguistic and conceptual influence on the early stages of perceptual processing .4 Lastly, and after discussing possible objections, I conclude that there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to support a conceptualist answer to the circularity objection .
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