The Growth in Virtue in Aristotelian-Thomistic Thought (I): The Passions of the Soul

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2010.v0i4.2803

Keywords:

Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, second nature of the soul, habits, virtues, passions

Abstract

Habits are the second nature of the soul; hence, the importance of growing in virtue for human formation, life and freedom. Now, the proximate matter of most moral virtues —and particularly, temperance, fortitude and their potential parts— are the passions. Passions are the acts of the sensitive appetite, a vis in genere made up by two faculties, the irascible and the concupiscible appetites, which include different passions —both primary and secondary. These affections, if not subjecto to reason and will, make the practice of the good very hard; but, if well directed by reason, they may be an invaluable help in moral development.

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Author Biography

Gabriel Martí Andrés, University of Malaga

Catedrático de filosofía (metafísica)

Director de los estudios universitarios en ciencias para la familia

Departamento de filosofía

Universidad de Málaga

Published

2017-05-30

How to Cite

Martí Andrés, G. (2017). The Growth in Virtue in Aristotelian-Thomistic Thought (I): The Passions of the Soul . Metafísica Y Persona, (4). https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2010.v0i4.2803

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Articles