Persons as Basic Particulars in Strawson’s Descriptive Metaphysics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2014.v0i12.2726Keywords:
Strawson, person, material object, mind, connective conceptual analysisAbstract
In this paper I expound Strawson’s ideas on the notion of person in the framework of his project of descriptive metaphysics (or connexive conceptual analysis) to answer the problem of the possibility of experience. I present Strawson’s reasons to consider the concept of body or material object as basic and his ideas on persons as basic individuals since they are sui generis material objects. Finally, I point out some problems and loose-ends in Strawson’s proposal, as well as some research lines from it.
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