The ontological status of moral reasons
A critical assessment of Charles Larmore’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/metyper.32.2024.19429Keywords:
Normative reasons, agent-neutrality, agent-relativity, relativity, reflectiveness, Strawson, mind-dependenceAbstract
In Morality and Metaphysics, Larmore outlines a metaphysical conception of normative reasons in general, and moral reasons in particular, that he defines as “platonistic”. In accordance with this conception, all reasons for thought and action would belong to an ontologically objective domain, insofar as their mode of existence would be, in Searle’s words, independent of any perceiver or mental state. The main objective of the present paper is to criticize this conception. To this end, it will be argued, on the one hand, that Larmore’s conception is totally inadequate to deal with a specific kind of normative reasons, namely agent-relative reasons; and, on the other, that even if it recognizes the reflective stance as an inseparable aspect of morality, it tends to underestimate what this means ontologically speaking. As will become apparent in a clear Strawsonian vein, morality’s normative force would rest to a great extent on some fundamental attitudes and dispositions we cannot do without as human beings.
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