On Crane, Brentano and Intentional Objects
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2023.vi29.15330Keywords:
Intentionality, representation, intentional object, fictional object, Meinongism.Abstract
According to Tim Crane, his theory on intentional objects can be understood as a phenomenology inasmuch as it is a theory of apparences. In this paper, I analiyze whether this statement is correct. Although abolishing ontological commitments leads to a non-standard type of Meinongism, I believe that Crane’s theory does not necessarily lead to a phenomenology. First, I will analize some of its main concepts such as intentionality, representation and intentional object. Then, I will present in a very general way the meaning that these concepts have in the tradition of the act-object psychology started by Brentano.
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