La responsabilidad moral como una forma de narrativa

Rodrigo Laera

doi:10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi28.14653

Authors

Rodrigo Laera CONICET University of Barcelona Argentina https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5132-7631

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2022.vi28.14653

Keywords:

moral responsibility, compatibilism, determinism, narrative

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explain that moral responsibility is subordinate to a variety of narrative related to the attribution context. If the context is not demanding enough, such that theoretical reflection goes in search of the ultimate foundation of our actions, then the agent may be responsible for his actions. Thus, the attribution of moral responsibility will depend on whether rational explanations refer to actions as being intentional. Thus, the narrative character of the judgments about moral responsibility helps to understand how it is possible that such responsibility is compatible with naturalism, without thinking that it is sustained by some miraculous power. In short, the proposal of this paper does not lie in the fact that moral responsibility depends on whether there is an absence of control, but rather that it rests on whether one can rationally construct a narrative from which the agent is capable of both forging his future actions, and to reflect on past actions.

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