Know to cohabit: a proposal starting from Henri Bergson
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2023.vi29.14611Keywords:
duration, vital impulse, sign, solids, cohabitation, sensitivity, sympathyAbstract
We know reality from representation, from what Henri Bergson called a sign. Due
to this we have privileged a useful, transforming, technical and rigid knowledge that
conceives reality as something immobile, fragmented and categorized. The result has
been a partial vision that privileges structures and has broken the link between us and
life. That has led us to the devastation of our environment and ourselves. For this reason,
here we reflect on the purpose of knowledge based on the nature of reality and
our position in it. This is done through dialogue with Henri Bergson’s philosophical
proposal, mainly with some of his concepts (vital impulse, duration, sign and sympathy).
It is proposed that knowledge is to establish intimate links with reality that allow
us to cohabit in and with life.
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