Anticipatory Resolution and Temporality: The Primary Horizon of the Selfhood in Being and Time (§§ 61-66)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i2.7482Keywords:
PHENOMENOLOGY, TEMPORALITY, RESOLUTION, SELFHOODAbstract
This paper tries to explore a methodical and thematic relationship between two existentials: Selfhood and Temporality, as they are brought to light through the existential anlysis of Dasein in Martin Heidegger’s complex and radical work Being and Time. The goal of this paper is to grasp in a radical way that only the phenomenological approach makes possible the comprehensive unity of the being of Dasein. Dasein is the only being that is characterized, unlike any other being, by the existence of an extreme and ontological mode. The conclusion will aim to support the existential analysis in a prime experience of the selfDownloads
Metrics
References
Blattner, W. (1999). Heidegger’s temporal Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Corti, A. (2006). Zeitproblematik bei M. Heidegger und Agustinus. Würzburg: Ko?nigshausen & Neumann.
Gelven, M. (1989). A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time: New York: Northern Illinois University Press.
Greisch, J. (1994). Ontologie et temporalitè: Esquisse d’une interpre?tation inte?grale de Sein und Zeit. Paris: PUF.
Heidegger, M. (2006). Ser y Tiempo. Trad. Jorge Eduardo Rivera. Madrid: Trotta.
Heidegger, M. (2002). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. (1979). Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. II. Abteilung, Band 26. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
Opilik, K. (1993). Transzendez und Vereinzelung. Zur Fragwürdigkeit des Transzendentalen Ansatzes im Umfreis von Heideggers “Sein und Zeit”. Freiburg: Karl Alber.
Pasqua, H. (1993). Introduction aà la lectura de Être et temps de M. Heidegger. Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme.
Másmela, C. (2000). Martin Heidegger: el tiempo del ser. Madrid: Trotta.
Zahavi, D. (2013). Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This journal provides immediate free access to its content under the principle of making research freely available to the public. All content published in Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, are subject to the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 license whose full text can be found at <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0>
It is the responsibility of the authors to obtain the necessary permissions of the images that are subject to copyright.
Authors whose contributions are accepted for publication in this journal will retain the non-exclusive right to use their contributions for academic, research and educational purposes, including self-archiving or repository in open access repositories of any kind.
The electronic edition of this magazine is edited by the Editorial Service of the University of Malaga (Uma Editorial), being necessary to cite the origin in any partial or total reproduction.
5.png)
