The extensionalist dogma of truth-conditional approaches to meaning
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v22i2.3568Keywords:
Semantics, Reference, Meaning, Truth Conditions.Abstract
The truth-conditional conception of meaning is an explanation of representational relation of language as a relation between language and reality. The notion of truth conditions has been used to express a direct connection between the concepts of meaning as reference and truth, based on the assumption that natural languages behave as interpreted formal languages. Arguments will be presented about the impossibility of having a theory of reference that supports the truth-conditional explanation. The representational relation language-reality fails in the explanation of the meaning of natural language.Downloads
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