El problema de marco y dos programas rivales en psicología cognitiva

Rodrigo Moro; María Inés Silenzi

doi:10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v22i1.3418

Authors

Rodrigo Moro Universidad Nacional del Sur Argentina
María Inés Silenzi Universidad Nacional del Sur Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v22i1.3418

Keywords:

FRAME PROBLEM, HEURISTICS, HEURISTICS AND BIASES PROGRAM, FAST AND FRUGAL HEURISTICS PROGRAM

Abstract

The frame problem is a central problem in Cognitive Sciences. In philosophy, researchers have discussed whether the use of heuristics would solve such a problem. Here we focus on the psychological research on this issue. The problem is that there is not a unique research program on heuristics but two: the Heuristics and Biases Program and the Fast and Frugal Heuristics Program. We analyze, thus, the relative abilities of both programs to provide a solution to the frame problem. We argue that the Fast and Frugal Heuristic Program seems to be more adequate for this purpose.

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Author Biographies

Rodrigo Moro, Universidad Nacional del Sur

Rodrigo Moro es profesor Adjunto del Departamento de Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (Argentina) e Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS-CONICET). Líneas de Investigación: Filosofía de la Ciencia; Cuestiones metodológicas en psicología cognitiva y economía conductual Publicaciones recientes: MORO, R., FREIDIN, E., y TOHMÉ, F. (2015): «Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game», Cuadernos de Economía 34(65), pp. 261-278. HASRUN, H., FREIDIN, E. y MORO, R. (2015): «Las normas sociales en los experimentos de coima: la necesidad de explicitar el estatus normativo y los deberes de cada rol», Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento 7(2), pp. 41-58.

María Inés Silenzi, Universidad Nacional del Sur

María Inés Silenzi es asistente de Docencia del Departamento de Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (Argentina) e Investigadora del Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS-CONICET). Líneas de Investigación: Problema de marco; Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas Publicaciones recientes: SILENZI, M. I. y MORO, R. (2015): «Sobre el uso de heurísticas como posible solución del problema de marco», Crítica 47 (140), pp. 65-91. (2015): «La dualidad del problema de marco: Sobre interpretaciones y resoluciones», Tópicos 47, pp, 89-112.

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