The «One over Many» Argument for Propositions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v28i1.13979Keywords:
MEANINGS, PROPOSITIONS, PLATONISM, ONE-OVER-MANY, NATURALISMAbstract
The meanings of utterances and thoughts are commonly regarded in philosophical semantics as abstract objects, called «propositions», which account for how different utterances and thoughts can be synonymous and which constitute the primary truth-bearers. I argue that meanings are instead natural properties that play causal roles in the world, that the kind of «One over Many» thinking underlying the characterization of shared meanings as abstract objects is misguided and that utterances and thoughts having truth-values in virtue of their meanings does not entail that meanings themselves are truth-bearers.
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