Modularizando y desmodularizando la cognición social: el caso de la detección de trampa

Paola Hernandez-Chavez; Jonatan García-Campos; Jonatan García-Campos

doi:10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i2.7483

Autores/as

Paola Hernandez-Chavez Center for Philosophy of Science. University of Pittsburgh. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México Estados Unidos
Jonatan García-Campos Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México México
Jonatan García-Campos Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i2.7483

Palabras clave:

cognición social, modularidad, modularidad masiva, especialización cerebral, detección de trampa.

Resumen

En este trabajo, revisamos la literatura clásica en modularidad cognitiva. Ofrecemos una descripción cognitiva neuronal de la modularidad, que incluye: patrones de disfunción específicos, la doble disociación, una actividad cerebral asociada, y un proceso de especialización funcional. Posteriormente, analizamos un módulo de cognición social, i.e., el módulo de detección de tramposos. Compilamos las objeciones clásicas a este módulo, y ofrecemos algunas nuevas, para posteriormente contrastarlas con las primeras. En la última parte, ofrecemos algunas implicaciones y direcciones futuras para los estudios actuales sobre cognición social.

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Biografía del autor/a

Paola Hernandez-Chavez, Center for Philosophy of Science. University of Pittsburgh. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México

Center for Philosophy of Science. University of Pittsburgh. Fellow
Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México. Profesor Investigador

Jonatan García-Campos, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México

Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México. Profesor Investigador

Jonatan García-Campos, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México

Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango-México. Profesor Investigador

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