El problema de marco y dos programas rivales en psicología cognitiva
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El problema de marco es un problema central de las Ciencias Cognitivas. En el ámbito filosófico, se ha discutido si el uso de heurísticas permitiría solucionar dicho problema. Aquí nos enfocamos en las investigaciones psicológicas sobre el tema. El problema es que no hay un único programa de investigación sobre heurísticas sino dos: el programa de Heurísticas y Sesgos y el programa de Heurísticas Rápidas y Frugales. Analizamos, así, las capacidades relativas de ambos programas para promover una solución al problema de marco. Argumentamos que el programa de Heurísticas Rápidas y Frugales parece ser más adecuado para ese propósito.
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