Escepticismo, falibilismo y verosimilitud

Ilkka Niiniluoto

doi:10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i3.11574

Autores/as

Ilkka Niiniluoto Universidad de Helsinki Finlandia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i3.11574

Palabras clave:

falibilismo epistémico, historia del escepticismo, variedades del escepticismo, verosimilitud

Resumen

En la epistemología moderna, el falibilismo es una vía media entre el dogmatismo y el escepticismo. Su origen histórico se encuentra en una rama de la antigua escuela del escepticismo académico. Ya que la diferencia entre las formas fuerte y débil del falibilismo, así como la distinción entre probabilidad epistémica y verosimilitud, sólo han sido comprendidas en las últimas dos décadas, no podemos esperar encontrar formulaciones claras de dichas doctrinas entre los filósofos griegos y romanos. Pero hemos mostrado que las dos ideas centrales del falibilismo –el grado de certeza y el grado de cercanía a la verdad– están presentes en la tradición escéptica al menos desde los tiempos de Cicerón.

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