Agentes humanos, ficciones y homúnculos: En defensa de un enfoque no homuncular de la agencia

María Ayelén Sánchez

doi:10.24310/Metyper.2017.v0i18.4735

Authors

María Ayelén Sánchez National University of the South Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2017.v0i18.4735

Keywords:

Agency, homunculus, executive control, normativism.

Abstract

The general topic of this paper is human agency. Specifically, I will address a problem related to the agent ?s ontological status: the problem of the homunculus. First, I will expose the general argument against the postulation of homunculus and the difficulties faced by it. Secondly, I will present a critical analysis of this argument, which will be focused on the link between the concept of “homunculus” and the concept of “agency”. The general hypothesis that I will defend is that there are ways to recognize the existence of the agency in which such recognition doesn ?t imply an ontological commitment to a homuncular unit included in the person. Finally, I will expose the bases of the normativist approach, which allows to think of a non-homuncular concept of agent.

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