Artificial Intelligence, the Negative Way and the Computational Status of Persons
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2015.v0i13.2718Keywords:
Artificial intelligence, person, Church-Turing Thesis, Turing machine, hypermachine.Abstract
One of the most interesting questions that artificial intelligence and philosophy of computing have generated is the question about the computational status of human persons. In this paper we discuss the computational status of human persons by showing Bringsjord’s negative way argumentation in order to justify that we are sui generis computational entities. As a means to discuss the computational status we review the concept of “artificial intelligence” and its relation with the Church-Turing Thesis. Then we comment on the Lucas vs Bringsjord discussion for the purpose of concluding why it is said that we are hypermachines.
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