Eugen Fink´s Ontogonic Metaphysics as Meontic Philosophy of the Absolute

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to make an approach into Eugen Fink’s ontogonic metaphysics notion. The first step will be an approximation to the context and conditions from which this notion arises, that’s because in Fink we find a disengage from the intrinsic lines regards to transcendental subjectivity in Husserl and the fundamental ontology in Heidegger. This will result in the need to conduct an analysis of the constitutive fundamental processes in order to realize the perspective that addresses their origin, which implies putting the ontic nature of reality in relation to their non-being. This is why for Fink all the concepts that try to give a description of the way in which the ontification processes are given must be presented from a meontic perspective. This is the way that the fundamental philosophical task is related to the process of meontification of every constitution process within the world. The conclusion is that for Fink the perspective of the of meontic intelligibility is where the characterizations of the limits of transcendental origination can properly addressed; limits that highlight the nature of the meontic origination itself as the relationship between Absolute and Nothing.