Perception and movement. The Merleau-Ponty’smodel of embodied cognition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v21i1.2306Keywords:
Phenomenology, Body, Ontological Turn, Epistemological TurnAbstract
This article addresses Merleau-Ponty ?s conception of embodied cognition in two moments of his work, in the context of Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible. The central aim of this article consists in describing the epistemological consequences of the ontological turn given by merleau-pontian later thought. The study of the close relationship between perception and movement would shed light on the model of embodied cognition proposed by Merleau-Ponty and could contribute to understand the central role of the body in cognition.Downloads
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