The radical anti-fundamentalism of post-analytic neo-dualism. Through von Wright and Apel

Abstract

Subsequently to the theory of the games of language by the latest Wittgenstein, post-analytic neo-dualism attributed a radically anti-fundamentalistic attitude to Russell, the first Wittgenstein and Popper, based on three reasons, at least according to von Wright and Apel: The inductive dogmatic foundation of the logical positivism of the two first cases; the permanent hypothetical re-foundation of the critical rationalism of Popper; and, finally, the explanatory-understanding foundation defended in a melioristic way by the semantic pragmatism of the latter. But not withstanding this basic agreement, von Wright and Apel disagreed about the merely pragmatic, or rather pragmatic transcendental sense that, in spite of everything, should be awarded to the notion of foundation in the followers of these new tendencies of post-analytic neo-dualism.