On Children’s Moral Status: Beyond the Notion of Moral Agency

Mar Cabezas

doi:10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335

Authors

Mar Cabezas University of Salamanca
Spain

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335

Keywords:

rationality, moral awareness, dualism, responsability

Abstract

This article explores the moral status of children and the ethical implications of recognizing children some sort of agency in light of the recognition in the 1989 UN CRC of children as subjects of rights, and not only as objects of protection. First, I defend that children fulfill the conditions to be considered moral agents, not just moral patients. To do so, I combine psychology studies on children’s moral development and philosophical argumentation on how children meet the conditions of moral awareness, self-awareness, and rationality to be categorized as moral agents. Second, I analyze the conceptual and normative challenges that would arise from expanding the moral status of children from patients to agents. Thus, I analyze and respond to counterarguments, firstly concerning the criterion of rationality and the possible erasure of the boundary between adulthood and childhood, and secondly, in a normative sense, I respond to the possible challenges related to the demand for moral responsibility of children and the justification of protection of them if they are considered moral agents. Finally, I conclude that adapting their moral status to their real capacities does not imply the adultization of childhood, nor should it erase the boundary with adulthood, nor should it be understood as an excuse to reduce responsibilities and duties of protection towards children.

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