The relevance of the presentism/eternalism debate in ethics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.30.1.2025.17781Keywords:
presentism, eternalism, longtermism, theories of well-being, personal identityAbstract
According to metaphysical presentism, only the present exists. Contrary to this, eternalism holds that the past and the future are as real as the present, and that the universe has a timeless nature. However, it has sometimes been argued that the whole debate is actually empty, and that it makes no difference to our understanding of the world or to our attitudes towards it. There are, nevertheless, several issues in moral philosophy for which the choice between one of these views may make a relevant difference.
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