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Rafael Andrés Alemañ Berenguer
Universidad de Alicante
España
Núm. 2 (2013): Monismo, dualismo, pluralismo, Estudios
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24310/nyl.v2i1.3987
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Resumen. Una de las más arraigadas tradiciones de la filosofía occidental distingue mente y materia como dos categorías contrapuestas de la realidad. Incluso cuando dichas cate­gorías conceden preponderancia a una de ellas, sus identidades se mantienen netamente separadas. Por el contrario, el monismo neutral sostiene que esa distinción es engañosa y se basa en una visión de la naturaleza que los nuevos avances en microfísica y psicofisio­logía van disipando gradualmente. Mente y materia no serían más que dos acepciones para la misma realidad subyacente cuya estructura puede organizarse en dos modalidades alter­nativas.

 

Palabras clave: Mente, materia, monismo neutral, percepción, estructura.

 

Abstract: The most deeply rooted tradition in western philosophiy distinguishes mind and matter as two opposing categories of reality. Even when that tradition gives prepon­derance to one of them, their identities are always kept neatly separadas. By contrast, neutral monism contends that this difference is basicly misleading and is based on a view of nature that new developments in microphysics and psychophysiology are gradually dis­sipating. Mind and matter are no more than two meanings for the same underlying reality whose structure can be organized into two alternative modalities.

 

Keywords: Mind, matter, neutral monism, percepction, structure.

 

Recibido: 5/09/2012 Aprobado: 18/04/2013

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Referencias

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