Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Metafísica y Persona, Año 15, No. 30, Julio-Diciembre 2023, es una publicación se-
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ISSN: 2007-9699
Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15 — Número 30
Julio-Diciembre 2023
Metafísica y Persona es una revista de difusión internacional y carácter académico, cuyo
objetivo principal es la transmisión y discusión de los resultados de las últimas investiga-
Pretende ser un lugar de encuentro y difusión de estudios que ahonden en las relacio-
-
las materias que abarca.
El eje central de la revista es la realidad de la persona. Los artículos publicados en
ella abordarán el estudio de la persona desde los distintos puntos de vista que permiten
conocerla mejor. El lector encontrará, por tanto, trabajos de Filosofía, Teología, Sociología,
Psicología, Psiquiatría, Neurociencia, Medicina y otros saberes centrados en el hombre.
en particular, a la Metafísica de la persona, pues son ellas las que dan sentido y sirven de
fundamento al resto de saberes sobre el ser humano.
Metafísica y Persona
mejorar el conocimiento de la persona, necesitado de una constante revisión y puesta al día.
No obstante, por las múltiples orientaciones que acoge, la Revista está también abierta
formación en los saberes acerca de la existencia humana, desean profundizar en el cono-
cimiento de la persona.
Las contribuciones enviadas a Metafísica y Persona han de ser inéditas en cualquier
idioma y no estar sujetas a revisión para ser publicadas en ninguna otra revista o publi-
cación, ni digital ni impresa. En principio, los artículos se publicarán en la lengua en que
hayan sido redactados, aunque en ocasiones, de acuerdo con el autor, podrán ser traduci-
dos al castellano o al inglés.
Los artículos y las notas son sometidos a un arbitraje doble-ciego. Para ser publicados,
los artículos han de obtener dos dictámenes favorables. Las notas, sin embargo, podrán
ser admitidas con un solo dictamen positivo y rechazadas con un solo dictamen negativo.
(edición, difusión, identicación y contacto)
Metafísica y Persona es coeditada entre la Universidad de Málaga (UMA) y la Univer-
sidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla (UPAEP). Nació como revista electrónica,
pero hoy se ofrece a los lectores tanto en formato digital como en papel.
En su versión impresa, la revista se distribuye, con alcance internacional, mediante
intercambio, donaciones e inscripciones (ver Suscripciones).
Título: Metafísica y Persona
Subtítulo: Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Carácter
Periodicidad: Semestral
Difusión: Internacional
ISSN en línea: 1989-4996
ISSN impreso: 2007-9699
• Málaga (España), Universidad de Málaga (Grupo PAI, Junta de Andalucía, HUM-495)
• Puebla (México), Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla (Facultad de
Filosofía y Humanidades, y Departamento de Investigación)
Año de fundación: 2009
• Livia Bastos Andrade
Facultad de Filosofía
Decanato de Artes y Humanidades
Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla
Calle 21 Sur No. 1103, Col. Santiago
72410 PUEBLA (México)
livia.bastos@upaep.mx
• Gabriel Martí Andrés
Departamento de Filosofía
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras
Universidad de Málaga
Campus de Teatinos
E-29071 MÁLAGA (España)
gmartian@uma.es
Director emérito: Melendo Granados, Tomás, Universidad de Málaga, España
Directora: Bastos Andrade, Livia, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado
de Puebla, México
Subdirector: Martí Andrés, Gabriel, Universidad de Málaga, España
Secretarios: García Martín, José, Universidad de Granada, España
Castro Manzano, José Martín, Universidad Popular Autónoma del
Estado de Puebla, México
Blancas Blancas, Noé, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
García González, Juan A., Universidad de Málaga, España
Jiménez, Pablo, Australian National University, Australia
Lynch, Sandra (emérito), University of Notre Dame, Australia
Porras Torres, Antonio, Universidad de Málaga, España
Rojas Jiménez, Alejandro, Universidad de Málaga, España
Villagrán Mora, Abigail, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
Arana Cañedo, Juan, Universidad de Sevilla, España
Brock, Stephen L., Università della Santa Croce, Italia
Caldera, Rafael T., Universidad Simón Bolívar, Venezuela
Casales García, Roberto, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
Clavell, Lluís (emérito), Università della Santa Croce, Italia
D’Agostino, Francesco, Università Tor Vergata, Italia
Donati, Pierpaolo, Università di Bologna, Italia
Falgueras Salinas, Ignacio, Universidad de Málaga, España
González García, Ángel L. (†), Universidad de Navarra, España
Grimaldi, Nicolás, Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Francia
Livi, Antonio (†), Università Lateranense, Italia
Llano Cifuentes, Carlos (†), Instituto Panamericano de Alta Dirección de Empresa, México
Medina Delgadillo, Jorge, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
Morán y Castellanos, Jorge (†), Universidad Panamericana, México
Pithod, Abelardo, Centro de Investigaciones Cuyo, Argentina
Peña Vial, Jorge, Universidad de los Andes, Chile
Ramsey, Hayden, Australian Catholic University, Australia
Redmond, Walter, University of Texas, U.S.A.
Sánchez Muñoz, Rubén, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
Vigo, Alejandro, Universidad de los Andes, Chile
Wippel, John F., Catholic University of America, U.S.A.
Zagal, Héctor, Universidad Panamericana, México
7
The “razón de fuerza mayor” and barbarism. Eduardo Nicol and Michel
Henry on the Technique
Stefano Santasilia ..............................................11
A critical reection on the Antikythera Mechanism from an idealist
perspective and its implications on technological development as a means
of understanding our Cosmos
Carlos Alberto Carbajal Constantine ..............................21
A natural articial intelligence? Some notes on the computational biomimicry
of human intelligence
Héctor Velázquez ..............................................31
What kind of “intelligence” is Articial Intelligence?
Paniel Reyes Cárdenas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Some remarks on Leibniz’s criticisms to mechanics
Roberto Casales García..........................................49
Del simbolismo a la alimentación: el nacimiento de una nueva identidad
bajo las virtudes teologales, la Virgen de Guadalupe, la trigarancia y los
chiles en nogada
David Sánchez Sánchez .........................................61
La primera propuesta de Martin Seligman acerca de la felicidad
Livia Bastos Andrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Tappolet, C., Philosophy of Emotion. A contemporary Introduction,
New York: Routledge, 2022, 255p.
María Soledad Paladino ........................................117
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
8
Panikkar, R., Ecosofía. La sabiduría de la Tierra, Barcelona: Fragmenta
Editorial, 2021, 93p.
Paulina Michelle Romero Tenorio, Iñigo Sánchez Trujillo,
Rubén Sánchez Muñoz.........................................121
Normas editoriales ..............................................125
11
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
razón de fuerza mayor
La “y la barbarie. Eduardo Nicol
y Michel Henry sobre la Técnica
Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, México
stefano.santasilia@uaslp.mx
-
porary philosophers. Among these, Eduardo Nicol and Michel Henry also took up the
theme to identify and underline those problematic articulations of technological develo-
-
que consists in a reduction of human existence to mere automatism, generating a loss of
the authentic meaning of life. Thus, for Nicol this is evidenced by the emergence of force
majeure, and for Henry by the resurgence of the dimension of barbarism.
Keywords: Eduardo Nicol, Michel Henry, barbarism, technique, philosophy of technology
-
sofos contemporáneos. Entre ellos, Eduardo Nicol y Michel Henry también abordaron
tecnológico que, según los dos pensadores, afectan negativamente a la subjetividad. De
hecho, a pesar de las diferencias - contextuales y de perspectiva - para ambos autores el
problema de la técnica consiste en una reducción de la existencia humana a mero auto-
matismo, generando una pérdida del auténtico sentido de la vida. Así, para Nicol esto
se evidencia en la aparición de la fuerza mayor, y para Henry en el resurgimiento de la
dimensión de la barbarie.
Palabras clave
tecnología.
1
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
12
The relationship between the technological dimension and that of philo-
of reason, and its direct applications in the world of nature, to the time of
-
-
opment, has made it possible to grasp with time the intimate contradictions
inherent in a conception too inclined to see in the technological dimension the
realization of the original form of the human.
2
Despite this, it is not possible
to consider the human being regardless of his indissoluble relationship with
the world around him, a relationship that implies the very transformation of
in its being praxis, the presence of an ethical plot that underwriters the same
conception of the Anthropos.
3
Within this context are placed the respective
-
cal practice: Eduardo Nicol
4
and Michel Henry.
5
his whole life in this country; the second, after a very short Vietnamese paren-
thesis, will spend his whole life in France. Nevertheless, both recognize each
2
, H., The imperative
of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985; , G., Die atomare Drohung. Radikale Überlegungen
and , G., Die Antiquiertheit der Menschen, Band I und II, Bd. I, Berlin: Beck, 2002.
3
, J., Teoría de la cultura-
ted to the axiological dimension of the cultural phenomenon and human action.
4
Eduardo Nicol was a Spanish thinker who emigrated to Mexico after the establishment of
thought of Eduardo Nicol, we allow ourselves to refer to , S., Tra metasica e storia.
L’idea dell’uomo in Eduardo Nicol, Firenze: Le Cáriti, 2010; and , R. (Ed.), Eduardo
Nicol (1907-2007). Homenaje, México: UNAM, 2009.
5
Michel Henry, phenomenologist and protagonist of what Dominique Janicaud called the
, D., Le tournant théologique de
la phénoménologie francaise-
his thinking cf. , C., La fenomenologia rovesciata. Percorsi tentati in Jean-Luc Marion, Mi-
chel Henry e Jean Luis Chrétien, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2004; and , G., Michel
Henry. Fenomenologia vita cristianesimo, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2006.
13
The razón de fuerza mayor and barbarism. Eduardo Nicol
and Michel Henry about the technique
both turn a glance at the question of technology seeking its deep meaning.
-
El
Porvenir de la losofía
6
is the text in which the thinker analyzes the problem in
detail. According to Nicol, the criticism of the technological dimension must
-
a set of men. It is a faceless enemy, a force that reduces the space of human
vocations. His victory will be manifested when the possible ceases to be so,
.7
For the philosopher, the immeasurable expansion of technological domi-
the possibility of a genuinely free and creative life would also be lost. Behind the
image of man capable of bending nature to his will, but above all of assuming
-
that empties the subject of any real will to reduce him to a servant of a reason
-
begin to struggle according to a reason of force majeure and not according
8
It is
replacement of theoretical reason with pragmatic reason.
9
Through such statements, the author wants to show how this process en-
6
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, México: FCE, 1972.
7
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, p. 24.
8
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, p. 71.
9
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, pp. 242, 243 and 354.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
14
recognizing a necessity that cannot be questioned, and what took the form
of a hypothetical choice takes on the face of an inevitable path. In this way,
according to Nicol, the orientation that recognizes the manifestation of the
of the data, of creativity to homologation. This reduction consists in concealing
knowledge which, messianic, will one day reveal all that is still shrouded in
mystery. About this concealment, Nicol emphasizes the slow disappearance of
can guarantee an understanding not spoiled by the result:
philia for the sophia has dis-
usefulness remains. Useful knowledge must be more rigorous the more it
depends on its success: practice does not forgive mistakes.
10
The subjected reason for the useful is, clearly, an instrumental reason.
Now, according to Nicol, reason of force majeure (or instrumental reason)
and theoretical reason (dis-interested) constitute two levels inextricably
linked: theoretical reason needs the instrumental level because otherwise, it
could not develop, but it is precisely its development that allows understand-
ing the instrumental level as basic but reductive.
11
of a necessity imposed by a reality that demands the re-
duction of every possibility to a single and universal reading would corre-
would not be a question of exploitation due to subsistence, but of a reduc-
tion surreptitiously oriented by the conviction that a single interpretation can
give the reason for every aspect of reality:
The danger does not come from the success of technology nor from the au-
tonomy of the particular sciences. What threatens philosophy, and so science
in general, is the totalitarian dominance of utility. Science cannot serve two
masters. If all sciences are to be technicalized, that is, oriented in a univocal
way towards productivity, the result will not consist only in the disappear-
10
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, p. 19.
11
, E., Ética y mundo tecnológico, México: FCE, 2010; and , A.,
, R. (Ed.), Eduardo Nicol
(1907-2007). Homenaje, México: UNAM, 2009.
15
The razón de fuerza mayor and barbarism. Eduardo Nicol
and Michel Henry about the technique
ance of philosophy but of science itself. In fact, all sciences are constitutively
useless: it is precisely in this that their service is based.
12
The problem, therefore, does not lie in the practical use of reason but the
the fundamental criterion of human action. Technology itself belongs to the
human dimension so that it would be a mistake to consider it as something
negative a priori.
The danger lies in the assumption of this dimension as the only criterion
of truth: a condition of this kind can, according to Nicol, unleash violent and
underground forces aimed at standardizing praxis according to the convic-
tion that there is no alternative. Not only that: the following consequence
consists in the invasion of any other type of knowledge that is, thus, restruc-
-
the loss of understanding. Furthermore, with this, the possibility of the exact
-
son of force majeure is characterized by a dimension of anonymity for which
human action crosses. It is always achieved through human action but never
that this strength does not belong to any individual. According to the same
modality, it imposes something foreign to the human constitution: it is root-
ed in the human condition, but paradoxically, it is foreign. What Nicol is
highlighting is the very human possibility of generating the condition of his
self-destruction. This possibility corresponds to the degeneration of the very
possibilities of reason, and it is what shows the authentic face of the idolatry
of progress: the state of barbarism.
Moreover, precisely of barbarism speaks Michel Henry about the idolatry
of technology understood as the pure truth of human life. For the thinker
French, the barbarism understood as the give of a new condition, never con-
sidered before, which has upset the relationship of the subject with his own
-
12
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, p. 21.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
16
ture and knowledge. In La barbarie,
13
Henry recognizes culture as the capac-
ity of life to transform itself and recognize itself in that transformation. Life,
essence of which consists in making oneself capable of feeling and perceiving
14
In Henry’s conception of subjectivity,
15
the knowledge
is inescapably linked to life and its feeling itself.
From this perspective, the objectifying knowledge of natural science turns
out to be the result of a double abstraction: on the one hand, it disregards the
aspects of things susceptible of ideal determination in a geometric and math-
-
ty that feels itself. For this reason, according to Henry, although the natural
is to know about life, since life is both the subject and the object of culture,
then science does not belong to the culture because, by its essence, it abstracts
from authentic life.
Here is Henry’s thesis: science does not fail to know, but it constitutes a
also contrasting.
16
Now, the technique appears as the complete abstraction of
life, considering that it assumes the position even of the manipulator of life
17
In the technique, it is discernible
the inverse of an orientation always willing towards the maximum result,
the other forms of knowledge almost obliged to assume the same methodol-
ogy. Nevertheless, it is not just about this: its most dangerous potential lies in
13
, M., La barbarie, Paris: PUF, 2004.
14
, M., La barbarie, p. 16. Regarding the question of life in the context of Michel Hen-
, I., Dalla barbarie alla vita come auto-manifestazione. La
proposta fenomenologica di Michel Henry, Roma: Aracne, 2010.
15
, M., L’essenza della manifestazione
, C. (a cura di), Michel Henry. Narrare il pathos,
Macerata: Eum, 2007, pp. 155-172.
16
, M., La barbarie, pp. 43-70.
17
, M., La barbarie, p. 77.
17
The razón de fuerza mayor and barbarism. Eduardo Nicol
and Michel Henry about the technique
becoming an end in itself. According to Henry, it is a process that feeds itself,
and that has as its objective simply its self-empowerment:
the self-development of a network of processes based on the theoretical
knowledge of science, and left to themselves, playing with themselves and
for themselves, operating again on this knowledge, arousing and provoking
This is the essence of modern technique.
18
This means that techno-science does not already show technology as a
If, as Henry himself recognizes, in its original constitution, technology re-
fers to praxis
-
solved by the subordination of life itself to the external representation of itself.
In the dynamics implemented by modern technology, the categories of rational
thought overlap and replace those linked initially to the body and its action,
thus concealing the proper meaning and the concrete and accurate dimension
of human practice. Nevertheless, the culmination of the overthrow occurs
knowledge that updates the capacities of subjectivity. Now when technology
action is possible only in the context of subjectivity and, according to this, as
-
19
-
nity, which marks the passage from the kingdom of the human to the king-
20
What is achieved in the age of the full deployment of techno-science is,
for Henry, barbarism and implies the reorganization of all practices. If the
-
18
, M., La barbarie, pp. 78-79.
19
, M., La barbarie, p. 86.
20
, M., La barbarie, p. 85.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
18
is the radical revolution that has subverted the humanity of man by hang-
21
This condition is nothing more than the separation between knowledge
and authentic action: everything is reduced to the measurable data, and
its meaning is conferred starting from the possible reconstruction that the
data allows. In this context, life in its fundamental originality, and its most
authentic meaning, are lost.
In conclusion, it seems to us that we can recognize, in both authors, the de-
-
sion and, at the same time, ambivalent: capable of manifesting the remarkable
abilities of the human but, precisely for this reason, also capable of opening
progress in any way but try to show the dark side that has completely assumed
-
described by Henry, and both refer to an obscure dialectical game between his
own and the stranger about the human subject. Nevertheless, there is a way out
for both of them, which consists of recovering a certain level of humanity: an
-
self and, above all, of its instrumental self-degeneration. After all, both authors’
philosophical cry is only an appeal not to give way to the impersonal.
, G., Die atomare Drohung. Radikale Überlegungen
, G., Die Antiquiertheit der Menschen, Band I und II, Bd. I, Berlin: Beck, 2002.
, C., La fenomenologia rovesciata. Percorsi tentati in Jean-Luc Marion, Michel
Henry e Jean Luis Chrétien, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2004.
, M., La barbarie, Paris: PUF, 2004.
, M., L’essenza della manifestazione
21
, M., La barbarie, pp. 88-89.
19
The razón de fuerza mayor and barbarism. Eduardo Nicol
and Michel Henry about the technique
, R. (Ed.), Eduardo Nicol (1907-2007). Homenaje, México: UNAM, 2009.
, D., Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie francaise, Combas: L’eclat, 1991.
, H., The imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological
Age, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
, I., Dalla barbarie alla vita come auto-manifestazione. La proposta fenomeno-
logica di Michel Henry, Roma: Aracne, 2010.
, E., Ética y mundo tecnológico, México: FCE, 2010.
, E., El porvenir de la losofía, México: FCE, 1972.
, J., Teoría de la cultura, Madrid: Síntesis, 1999.
, R. (Ed.), Eduardo Nicol (1907-2007). Homenaje, México: UNAM,
2009, pp. 121-139.
, G., Michel Henry. Fenomenologia vita cristianesimo, Brescia: Morcelli-
ana, 2006.
, C. (a cura di),
Michel Henry. Narrare il pathos, Macerata: Eum, 2007, pp. 155-172.
, S., Tra metasica e storia. L’idea dell’uomo in Eduardo Nicol, Firenze: Le
Cáriti, 2010.
21
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
Una reexión crítica sobre el Mecanismo de Antikythera desde una
perspectiva idealista y sus implicaciones en el desarrollo tecnológico
como medio para entender nuestro Cosmos
The Churchill School and College
carlos.carbajal@churchill.edu.mx
Technology can be an insight into how humanities’ needs have changed along the centuries
and how science has been applied in order to solve these conundrums, to make the world our
own and understand it to learn about what surrounds, what is true, and what is unchangeable.
The Antikythera Mechanism’s complexity and recent discoveries allow the academy to know
its functions and how exact it was, as a new model has been proposed that shows that it was a
device to unravel one of the biggest mysteries of antiquity: The Cosmos and the Stars. Along
with the help of the perspective of Collingwood’s sense II and sense III, this paper aims to
-
chanism, by looking into what is says about the old world and how it contrasts with the new.
Keywords: Antikythera Mechanism, Epistemology, Methodology, Idealism, Collin-
gwood, Minimum Space, Minimum Time, Parmenides Proposition, Metaphysics, Astro-
nomy, Theodore of Smyrna, Thinking and Being.
La tecnología muestra una mirada perspicaz hacia cómo las necesidades de la humani-
dad han cambiado a lo largo de los siglos, y cómo la ciencia ha sido aplicada para resolver
estos acertijos, para hacer el mundo nuestro y entenderlo para aprender lo que rodea,
lo que es cierto y lo que es inmutable. La complejidad del mecanismo de Antikythera y
1
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
22
recientes descubrimientos permiten a la academia saber sus funciones y qué tan exacto
era, ya que un nuevo modelo ha sido propuesto que muestra que era un dispositivo para
Con la ayuda de la perspectiva del sentido II y el sentido III de Collingwood, este artículo
Antikythera, al estudiar lo que dice del viejo mundo y cómo contrasta con el nuevo.
Palabras clave: Mecanismo Antikythera, Epistemología, Metodología, Idealismo, Co-
llingwood, Espacio mínimo, Tiempo mínimo, Proposition de Parménides, Metafísica, As-
tronomía, Teodoro de Esmirna, Pensamiento y Ser.
This paper will explore the historical device and the mathematical and an-
thropological research done upon it, particular the work done by the University
College London team headed by Tony Freeth; having presented a mostly nar-
-
wood’s propositions on natural science whilst touching on some related con-
cepts in philosophy of nature as found in the thought of Theodore of Smyrna.
past twenty years. And not only because there is no signature, dating, or pos-
sible provenance, but because it was incomplete and what was recovered was
a mechanical marvel too formidable to unravel.
very recently that a team from University College London
2
pieced together
-
essary, as the ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM, was broken up into 82 pieces
forming 3 distinct bodies) digital rendering of the working of the mechanism.
view this from Robin Collingwood’s idea of causation and minimum time
and space as applied to the ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM.
-
er in the XXI century and analog computing devices. The ANTIKYTHERA
2
23
A critical reection on the Antikythera Mechanism from an idealist perspective and its
implications on thechnological development as a means of understanding our Cosmos
time, actually bridging humanity’s ability to use minimum space to describe
cosmic spatial and temporal notions.
The aforementioned UCL team describes the mathematical principle be-
hind the ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM as that delineated by Plato in Par-
menides 154 b-155b.
This model, described by Fowler as the Parmenides’ Proposition,
3
details
the ratios between temporal coordinates which translate into spatial ones in
the ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM. According to Plato, two temporal co-
added or subtracted to them. This ratio considers the numbers as relative
between them, the marginal error decreases as the relative amounts also are
fractioned. This is expressed as p:q < (p + r):(q+s) < r :s. As Fowler accurate-
constant relative values that can then be applied to points in space and time,
namely, orbital positions.
The orbital positions of the planets in the ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM
are calculated as being relative one to another according to the constraints
of minimum space and time as dictated by gear ratios. These follow a very
be determined by the same homogenous ratio that follows Parmenides’
Proposition.
4
This discussion will be developed further, but for the time being, it is im-
perative that we explain the theoretical basis for a minimum space and mini-
mum time, and for that, we will refer to two works by Robin George Colling-
wood, ie, An Essay on Metaphysics and The Idea of Nature.
In An Essay on Metaphysics,
5
Collingwood ventures forth the concept of
-
pertain most closely to the study of the cosmos and the application of mathe-
matical principles to astronomical observation. To be succinct, sense II is that
of relativistic causation, that is, when an event in nature can derive its cause
from the observation carried out from the point of view of humans. Now, one
3
, D., The mathematics of Plato’s Academy (2
nd
-
versity Press, 1999, p. 41.
4
, D., The mathematics of Plato’s Academy, p. 42.
5
, R., An essay on metaphysics (2
nd
ed.), Lanham, Md: Univ. Pr. of America, 1984, p. 314.
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24
might argue that this is not the case for orbital paths of planets as they were
there millions of years before humans and they will inexorably continue their
paths around the Sun and Milky Way whether we are there to measure and
observe them or not. However, the measurement of orbital paths that corre-
spond to mathematical propositions does tell us one thing about mathemat-
ical science, ie: principles are as much derived from Nature as explanatory of
nature.
Which leads to Sense III as Collingwood applies it to theoretical sciences,
of which astronomy was until not too long ago one of the most prominent. It
is not so anymore as it is squarely set within the realm of applied sciences, but
we will address this topic at length further on.
Sense III for Collingwood is that contrary to the contingency of the observ-
er-observation synergy required in Sense III, these are necessary events both
6
Let us rephrase this as a positive statement: the conditions
must always be there for its existence and operation.
But which conditions are these if the necessary inference is that they can-
chronologically but also ontologically simultaneous. As applied to the orbits
of the planets in the Greek and also our modern Cosmos, the orbits and plan-
ets are both chronologically and ontologically simultaneous, necessary one
for the other in what Collingwood calls a one-to-one tight relationship.
The ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM, as a computational device for such
orbital paths, is then a product of Sense III in which Collingwood describes
allow the smallest number of related gears within the mechanism to explain
more than one orbital path. These two interrelated concepts interestingly are
part of Collingwood’s Sense II, inasmuch as there was a volitional and condi-
tional aspect in generating the physical body of the Mechanism. How so? The
calendar count used for this was the ever-so-popular in the Ancient World Me-
tonic Calendar, developed fully in its Lunar synodical observation by Meton of
Athens, but widespread amongst the Hebrews and Babylonians, from whence
the count for the Antikythera Mechanism was devised. The volitional aspect,
association of Prime Numbers and the very idea of a compact astronomical
6
, R., An essay on metaphysics, p. 317.
25
A critical reection on the Antikythera Mechanism from an idealist perspective and its
implications on thechnological development as a means of understanding our Cosmos
mathematics, over against the derivational view as seen in Sense III.
This seems elegant, albeit being incomplete, as something else was re-
quired to be able to apply the Metonic Calendar, the factorisation using
Parmenides’ Proposition to the orbital paths of the known planets, and the
calculation of exacting periods for multiple celestial bodies using a lim-
itedphysical space. And it is exactly that, what Collingwood describes as
Minimum Space and Minimum Time.
7
For Collingwood, the advent of contemporary physics, as he draws a dis-
tinct line from Newton to Whitehead, has brought back a most important idea
that he seems to draw from Pythagoreanism, mainly, that the quantitative
and qualitative notions of physical reality are tied in together at the most
or time and space. As he states, the mathematics behind modern physics is a
as he is, with the metaphysics behind it. We cannot help but see here Aristo-
telian principles at work. In Physics II (154b-d), Aristotle already established
-
However, it is our suspicion that Collingwood, whilst not mentioning this
notion by name, is closer to Theodore of Smyrna’s supposition of a dynamic
a Byzantine commentator of Aristotle’s and one of his original insights is that
Theodore to separate place and motion, that is motion requires space, but
If we look at the combined elements that make up the Antikythera Mecha-
nism, we see that these three elements are at play: in having a Metonic Cycle
ruling the basic calculations alongside Parmenides’ Proposition, we have the
in Prime Numbers which in turn gives us the gearing required to establish the
This is most important as it is through a secondary place, devoid of vacuum
7
, R., The idea of nature (1
st
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26
making it clear that only in our modern Copenhagen Interpretation and thank
to the General Theory of Relativity can we understand this vacuum proper-
necessary, and we come full circle with our third Sense of Causation in the
dynamics of astronomical observation.
Collingwood, of course, was for the most part laying out a historical argu-
ment from the metaphysics of science. We merely complement it with some
elements from Theodore, but it is the application of such principles to the
study of the Antikythera Mechanism that are our focus.
The Antikythera Mechanism was built, as we have shown, with the pre-
suppositions of the physical science available at the time, which includes the
aforementioned metaphysical implications of time, space, motion, and place.
Perhaps we should explain this point further. Not only did Aristotle and his
commentators explain these topics at length for they were ultimately trying
to understand what Collingwood sees as one of the pivotal points in astrono-
my, that is: the relation between force and motion. This cannot be understated,
as it is a central aspect of both Newton’s and Kepler’s models for planetary
motion but one that, given the context from Theodore, we can see was also
paramount for Greek Cosmology.
energy and activity. It is always forceful. So, for Theodore’s and Colling-
wood’s dynamic cosmos, movement and so space- time will be dynamic, that
is, there is a positive activity, a drive that is intrinsic, a priori, and necessary
to the cosmos. So, inasmuch as the cosmos exists and we can perform
derivative mathematics from it, it is so because of this dynamism which, as
Collingwood explains, is not only a physical quality but a metaphysical real-
ity that underlies the material properties of space and that ultimately allows
for an understanding of the cosmos. So, we can establish with certainty that
this ontological realm grants epistemic quality to the cosmos which allows for
mathematical principles to be derived and explained. The Antikythera Mech-
that calculates and measures dynamic relations of orbital planes and cycles.
We must clarify once more, lest the reader think that Collingwood was
Greek Cosmology, that this is a personal insight from this author and one that
should be taken with a moderate view as Byzantine sources are scarce and
Greek and modern understanding of cosmology that is valuable and unique
as it allows for a more thorough understanding of the metaphysical under-
pinnings of this venture.
27
A critical reection on the Antikythera Mechanism from an idealist perspective and its
implications on thechnological development as a means of understanding our Cosmos
Having established a theoretical foundation for this discussion, let us cen-
The Mechanism is comprised of a central dome representing the Earth.
The discussion on Heliocentrism vs Geocentrism is an interesting one, but it
will not concern us so long as the metaphysical principles established from
Collingwood and Theodore remain true for either and all systems.
Adjacent and tied into the Geodome is a sphere to mark out the lunar
phases and its Zodiac position. The gears that are interlinked with the Me-
tonic Cycle according to the mathematical principles described above are, in
order: Mercury, Venus true Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Uranus and Nep-
tune would not be a part of the cosmic array until 1781 by Herschel and 1846
-
lations for a reason. As discussed above, one of the main concerns with the
theory behind orbital location was that of gravity as a force. We now know
8
9
as the Suns, so, as long as Jupiter accounts as a bridge in its ratio between Mars
and Saturn, all of the planetary locations and secondary locations can be more
or less accurately pinpointed as the prime factorisation will make Jupiter’s
calculation of its synodic and Metonic cycle the most accurate. The outer-
most disc marks the date, as well as the oppositions that will mark Lunar
and Solar Eclipses. The mechanisation process that was required to build the
mechanism is truly remarkable, as the authors of the article mention, as it al-
the philosophical value of analysing this mechanism.
What can we learn about the epistemic need to understand Nature, how are
we able to do so; what are our metaphysical presuppositions when approach-
ing the study of nature, and where does this lead in our contemporary society?
The metaphysical presuppositions have been discussed at length; howev-
er we can say more about the epistemic requirements and motivations.
And we point to both Collingwood and Harvard Professor Irad Kimhi
to give us a satisfying explanation of this. In Thinking and Being, Profes-
Parmenidean conundrum of the thought and the thinker being intrinsically
8
9
.
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28
linked as the category of thought can only be a category for the thinker.
10
And we would do well to recall Sense II that Collingwood proposes. The
actual computation and usage of a machine to determine relative positions
that this anthropocentrism might have to do with some utilitarian means to
brings up a radical question or rather, series of questions. They’re radical inas-
much as it can only be answered by speculation, one that must bridge almost
of the Antikythera Mechanism? Well, to study the cosmos. Yes, to what pur-
pose? What was in store for the designer of the Antikythera Mechanism?
Why go to such lengths to put together such a complex machine that involved
studying all the ancient cosmological theories and charts and piecing togeth-
er mathematical principles from logical views of the natural world?
Perhaps Collingwood wasn’t wrong in ascribing not only an anthropocen-
able to understand the movement of the cosmos would grant the wielder a
power that was quite terrible. Indeed, that of being able to establish not only
astrological data that was important for the religious and social life of a soci-
reaping and sowing of harvests.
festivals tied into the seasonal changes are the bloodline of civilisation. The
cosmos thus becomes an icon or iconographic representation of our own vo-
litions. And not because as humans we are able to control planetary motion
in any way, shape or form. Rather, that in understanding the structure of the
cosmos that surrounds us, we can make use of that cosmos to our advan-
tage, to pursue the ultimate Aristotelian goal in life: happiness. Now, it
is not our intention to leap into an ethical conclusion, nor do we think it is
the scope of this piece. Rather, we wish to show how an understanding of the
physical and metaphysical principles of the cosmos is both an epistemic and
moral activity for man. Ultimately, knowing when to reap and sow will pro-
vide sustenance for the anthropocentric gods and for ourselves, so there is
always a utilitarian bend on things. Seeing the cosmos as an icon, or as The-
10
, I., Thinking and being (1
st
2018, p. 14.
29
A critical reection on the Antikythera Mechanism from an idealist perspective and its
implications on thechnological development as a means of understanding our Cosmos
as a wheel within a wheel, takes us to the ultimate question on the nature of
-
mos? Saint Maximos tells us that the universe has a multiplicity of parts and
places that share in a single substance. In trying to understand this is that we
see causality as a priori to the cosmos, allowing for us to intervene and derive
principles from it.
And this leads us to analysing the implications on technological devel-
wonder, especially in the art of observing the cosmos. We no longer need
the Antikythera Mechanism to help us estimate planetary positions: we have
Hubble, Cassini, Huygens, Voyagers 1 and 2, New Horizons; we have SETI
and the International Space Station; and now we even have eyes and ears on
Mars with Perseverance and Zhurong.
Firstly, we must poise the question about the Third Sense of causation in
-
nus, Neptune, Pluto, and most recently the recognition of Ceres as a dwarf
planet
11
wouldn’t? To put it more bluntly, does our Solar System function without
us? As philosophers trying to unravel not only the substance of the natural
world but also the minds that wish to comprehend it, we must not be coy in
seeing a transition of Astronomy from being a purely theoretical science to an
applied one in Collingwood’s sense. Ever more we are not only seeking to
understand the planetary bodies that surround us but are claiming them by
human will for human gain under a human lens. Perseverance and Zhurong
-
pability of Martian soil and atmosphere; the Israeli Beresheet lander was there
to test Lunar minerals that might work towards cleaner energy on Earth;
the Parker Solar Probe was designed to study radio-magnetic interference
-
communications. We have here a most interesting transition from seeing
the cosmos as an icon of an ontological reality to an icon of our own needs.
In that sense, we have become the primary looker towards the secondary
place that Theodore was so concerned was a purely metaphysical exercise.
In doing so, we are learning to manipulate the cosmos as we manipulate
lens, we see a most noble avocation in seeking to understand the immensity
11
.
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30
but rather, a historical reality that shifts according to human needs. And hu-
mans need to comprehend the cosmos in such a way that it may become an
asset, and no longer a vast expanse of mathematical wonder.
, Physics, McKeon & Reeve (18
th
ed.), New York: Random House, 2014,
pp. 192a10-200b5.
, R., The idea of nature (1
st
, R., An essay on metaphysics (2
nd
ed.), Lanham, Md: Univ. Pr. of
America, 1984.
et
al
, D., The mathematics of Plato’s Academy (2
nd
-
Scientic Reports
021-84310-w
, I., Thinking and being (1
st
-
versity Press, 2018.
, Complete Works, ed. John Cooper, Parmenides (1
st
ed.), Indianapolis: Hack-
31
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¿Una inteligencia articial natural? Algunas notas sobre la
biomímesis computacional de la inteligencia humana
Centro de Bioética, Universidad del Desarrollo, Chile
hv_mx@yahoo.com.mx
This article introduces the case that it does not seem plausible that AI can come to
be presented as interchangeable with human intellect, as if its processes could pass as
natural, as much as our intellectual exercise of understanding reality is. The paper shows
that even though AI reproduces the structure of human knowledge yet misses subjec-
tivity. And in that sense, strong AI could not overcome human knowledge, because it is
not able to see itself as an active spectator of itself, nor protagonist or responsible for its
actions. Though some think that the human being’s own lies in a dynamic combination
interdependent sociability. It is of no interest to AI to imitate our biographical temporal
vulnerability, although it would be interested in imitating rational autonomy; and it does
not need interdependent sociability either.
Keywords
Este artículo introduce el caso de que no parece plausible que la IA pueda llegar a pre-
sentarse como intercambiable con el intelecto humano, como si sus procesos pudieran pa-
sar tan naturales como lo es nuestro ejercicio intelectual de comprensión de la realidad. El
documento muestra que, aunque la IA reproduce la estructura del conocimiento humano,
aún pierde la subjetividad. Y en ese sentido, la IA fuerte no podría superar al conocimien-
to humano, porque no es capaz de verse a sí misma como espectadora activa de sí misma,
ni protagonista ni responsable de sus actos. Aunque algunos piensan que la propia del ser
humano radica en una combinación dinámica de diferentes características como la corpo-
reidad vulnerable, la racionalidad autónoma y la sociabilidad interdependiente. A la IA
1
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32
imitar la autonomía racional; y tampoco necesita la sociabilidad interdependiente.
Palabras clave
-
sesses the principle of movement and rest in itself versus
tries to imitate the natural, sometimes it tries only to reproduce the natural,
but other times it tries to complete or perfect it.
refer to result.
achieve the synthesis of the active ingredient that triggers a natural reaction
-
with something natural, the limits of the natural and its potentialities estab-
they would not cut, but we can grow ears or aortic valves on the skin of a ro-
dent because for this it is only necessary to grow tissue within another tissue.
-
man cognitive abilities through its imitation, it focused its mimesis on the
operations of calculation and logical deduction, with the intention of making
encompasses all the advances that AI has introduced into our daily lives) and
33
A natural articial intelligence? Some notes on the
computational biomimicry of human intelligence
-
nition of what is meant by intelligence.
AI refers, beyond an imitation of human calculation processes, the study
and imitation of the way in which human solve problems through processes
of symbolic information.
2
AI does not include non-symbolic numerical infor-
mation processing systems but implies the ability to address and solve prob-
AI awakened the expectation of reproducing intelligent processes according
were strategy games, and later resolution of logarithmic problems, logical rea-
soning, simultaneous translation of languages and automatic reading of texts,
3
great indisputable goals, especially in expert systems and its ability to make
-
ent criteria for information processing are used. Today expert systems have
multiplied their functionality: they are able to diagnose, monitor, plan and
interpret information. In other areas such as speech recognition, simultane-
sought. That is weak IA. But strong AI implies the development of intelligent
machines with scopes like or greater than those of human intelligence, but
without understanding the operations and processes it executes. AI could
pose as natural intelligence, but, to this day, hardware has only been able to
emulate cognitive structure, while software emulates the process.
4
natural
placed on the distance between AI and human intelligence rather than com-
2
(Eds.), Diccionario
Interdisciplinar Austral
3
A. (Ed.), Historia Universal del Pens-
amiento Filosóco
4
, G., Dizionario Interdisciplinare di Sci-
enza e Fede, Urbaniana University Press, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 771, 768.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
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34
us is the nature of the exercise of our intellect; that is, there is a qualitative
-
monstrative reasoning from universal mathematics and the assumption that
human rationality was but part of that mathematics, such that the automation
of calculus would only have to reproduce those rational processes to emulate
and eventually supplant natural intelligence. This suggested that any problem
or logical approach could be calculated or reduced to a computable algorithm.
With the miniaturization of electronics, logic machines emerged over
arithmetic calculators. With feedback and self-organized systems, computers
in their modern form made their way as logical-symbolic operators. Subse-
quently, expert systems surprised by their ability to emulate humans special-
ized in a certain subject and became able to solve all kinds of problems by jus-
tifying the resolution process: they managed to acquire information based on
theories and accumulated experiences. There were able not only to acquire,
process, and store information quickly, but also to select and discriminate the
the context of the problem and its elements and through the understanding
of the symbolic language. That is communication.
5
them, but from trial and error and the analysis of the particularity of each
case, the system was able to solve problems in a human way. That is, learn
and assume failures in the process of acquisition, management or increase of
knowledge, etc. Gödel’s theorem stated that there were truths that the ma-
chine could not reach while human intelligence yes could. But identifying
how IA imitate human does not mean having found a way to be intelligent
in a human way. The limitations can also occur in humans. It is therefore
is possible that it is imitated by AI so that it can seem natural. That is, if the
machine can really think and not just acquire, store and process information;
abilities in which they are indisputably superior to humans.
If we notice how the human neural network operates, we will notice that
it adjusts its semantics through learning: from children the human explores,
plays, rehearses, corrects by contrasting his body with the environment that
5
, T., Homo Cybersapiens. La inteligencia articial y lo humano, Pamplona: EUNSA,
2002, p. 39.
35
A natural articial intelligence? Some notes on the
computational biomimicry of human intelligence
surrounds him, facing another everything: it reveals a joyful, irritable, dissat-
-
pears, with its words and symbols, contact with reality is not carried out di-
rectly, through the external senses; neither only in a sentimental or emotional
way, but through formal signs and symbols, which only have the semantics
and feelings that we assign to them.
In that sense, both the human being and a computer manipulate symbols,
although the human knows that he only deals with signs and symbols. When
their action because if they tried they would put their survival at risk. In hu-
ideas we formulate on a particular issue are the right ones, and if not, what is
the way to adjust them.
-
ness of our ideas, we warn that information is only information. And when
that happens, the signs and symbols of language and communication are
shown as a reality that refers to something external (intentionality). When
the human being asks a question, he knows that the questions are only ques-
tions, that he will have to adjust, correct, or suspend them because he knows
that what has been achieved through the answers is not all the information
to be acquired, and this can only be achieved by an exercise of consciousness.
Machines and animals are intentional and require and acquire informa-
tion. While in the human intellect there is much more than that. In animal
intentionality the fundamental thing is to adapt to reality; he can only do
what comes to his mind, to ensure survival.
But human intelligence goes beyond that. It does not stop at conclusions.
If it only prompted answers and not new questions it would fail in an anthro-
pological sense because asking is a healthy sign of knowing how to put in pa-
ability by which we possess, master, or direct our information (and we know
that it is only information), is combined with curiosity that leads us to new
questions about each reality and the set of realities.
6
Human intelligence does not just solve problems: it creates them and gets
into more trouble; not because it wants to complicate existence, but as a way of
recognizing the complexity of the world around it in all its aspects. The human
6
, T., Homo Cybersapiens... pp. 133, 175.
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36
carrying out projects, considering new possibilities, because when discovering
that ideas are only ideas, the human being warns that there is more reality than
thought. If AI did the same thing, it would have to be called natural.
and meaningful interactions with the intention of contributing, enriching, in-
creasing, or varying the understanding of real interactions.
In this sense, it does not seem that computer neural networks operate in
-
there is; they operate what there is and according to what there is, without
further questioning.
requiring thought: and AI seems to be primarily concerned with the imitation
The modes of reasoning, i.e., rational skills, are methods of knowledge,
but not of thinking. Asking questions about the known goes beyond ratio-
nal skill itself, which is what computer science and cybernetics all about are.
Asking myself questions about these methods of acquiring and processing
information, leads me to a meta-science, a meta-logic, a meta-mathematical,
which allows me to possess and direct reason (always instrumental) and its
results. Reason requires to be directed, while the intellect directs and allows
to act well or to run well. That is, to think wisely, sensibly, with the increase
in the capacity to understand what this entails.
-
and makes our intelligence ready to know and understand the world in front of it.
That turns our mind into a free intelligence that invents, dominates, har-
monizes, directs, rational skills, and turns them not only into skills for obtain-
ing information but into a source of understanding. Therein lies our pecu-
liarity, in our ability and interest to understand, not just to learn to conclude.
The social character intrinsic to our nature implies not only the mutual de-
pendence between humans to communicate but also for the mastery and en-
richment of our cognitive operations, which are not achieved in solitude and
37
A natural articial intelligence? Some notes on the
computational biomimicry of human intelligence
without dialogue, which is only achieved with the development of culture.
a man lies in our ability to cultivate dialogue as a basis for acquiring intellec-
tual habits that allow us to conquer the freedom of thought; because rational
machines do not actually possess the knowledge they imitate and reproduce,
nor do they have the freedom to know.
AI reproduces the structure of human knowledge but misses subjectivity.
And in that sense, strong AI could not overcome human knowledge, because
it is not able to see itself as an active spectator of itself, nor protagonist or
responsible for its actions.
Some think that the human being’s own lies in a dynamic combination of
-
ity, and interdependent sociability. It is of no interest to AI to imitate our bi-
ographical temporal vulnerability, although it would be interested in imitating
rational autonomy; and it does not need interdependent sociability either.
natural
It has been suggested throughout this text that it does not seem plausible
that AI can come to be presented as interchangeable with human intellect, as
if its processes could pass as natural, as much as our intellectual exercise of
understanding reality is.
-
ity of acquisition, processing, and increase of information, called rationality
(which would be imitable and widely surpass able by rational machines),
with respect to the intellectual skills that are exercised to understand reality,
not just go from one premise to another syllogistically, because AI does not
require understanding to compute, manage or optimize the information that
is generated in its processes.
7
Perhaps we have come to think about the possibility of strong AI by iden-
brain operability of the human being is carried out from the perspective of
the third person; while the most intimate of our mental operation, that which
is only self-transparent to the subject in which it occurs, belong to the per-
7
¿Qué tan natural es la inteligencia articial? Sobre los límites y alcances de la
biomímesis computacionalNaturaleza y libertad, núm. 12, 2019, pp. 245-256.
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38
we notice that we know we exist, we know who we are and what we do. This
is not in the AI scenario because to work it does not require a biographical
singularity of the information processing it produces. The same can be said
others, we coexist and penetrate the intimacy of the other and manifest the
intimacy that constitutes us from within. This knowledge is reached from
the perspective of the second person.
When AI seeks to emulate, overcome, and supplant the unique character
of the human being, it reduces those two perspectives to one through the
naturalization of knowledge. It is a reductionism of human wealth from the
perspective of the third person.
And when we forget the individual, unique, unrepeatable character of
each of us, we are facing a reductionism of the second person, which is in-
tended to be possible in the latest developments of AI.
-
ously fruit of intellectual operability) is that we have blurred the scope, limits,
and realistic expectations of the variants of AI. Understanding this (not only
inferring it), calibrating it, weighing it, can help us avoid false reductionisms,
but also unwarranted fears. AI will continue to give us tools to not depend on
our limited discursive capacity, but it will still be at our disposal to be taken
in its true social, cultural, and technological dimension, and for this, there is
no biological mimesis that is enough.
(Eds.), Diccionario Interdisciplinar Austral
, T., Homo Cybersapiens. La inteligencia articial y lo humano, Pamplona:
EUNSA, 2002.
, G., Dizionario Interdisci-
plinare di Scienza e Fede, Urbaniana University Press, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 767-781.
A. (Ed.), Historia Univer-
sal del Pensamiento Filosóco
Naturaleza y libertad, núm. 12,
2019, pp. 245-256.
39
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
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¿Qué tipo de “inteligencia” es la Inteligencia Articial?
panielosberto.reyes@upaep.mx
In this article I carry a study of some comparative terms that aim to help narrowing down
-
ing the acts of a kind of agent, a mind that interprets and knows itself while knowing, and as
-
tegrated view of intelligence emerges, and hence sheds light about what kind of intelligence is
and psychological conceptions of intelligence, and hence we have been able to interpret to what
Keywords
Philosophy of Mind.
En este artículo realizo un estudio de algunos términos comparativos que buscan acotar
-
para la integración de los actos de un cierto tipo de agente, una mente que interpreta y se
conoce a sí misma mientras conoce las cosas. La inteligencia también emerge como el con-
junto de operaciones y funciones que tienen los seres inteligentes. Con tales aspectos de la
inteligencia se construye una visión más integrada y apropiada del término y así se adquiere
es un punto de partida necesario para entender los problemas de las visiones reduccionistas
puramente psicologistas o funcionales de la inteligencia, y desde allí se juzga hasta dónde
Palabras clave
1
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40
describing the senses in which the concept has been understood and its gener-
alisations present in the inter-sectional and trans-disciplinary character of the
from knowing the origins and theories of intelligence that were advanced by
the great minds of the past, this will reveal both the limitations as well as the
-
we will pursue their understanding. In addition, it is also the case that our time
has produced a renewed inquiry over the varieties of human intelligence and
in our time on the role that emotions play in our conscious and intellectual
intelligence to construct a more integrated view of AI: we aim for an enriched
view that will include metaphysical aspects of intelligence, epistemological
aspects of our knowledge of intelligent beings, as well as psychological traits.
technological, theoretical and practical challenges demand.
-
to the composite origin of the term we ought to follow St. Thomas Aquinas,
-
interpreter is an intelligence that captures the sense or meaning of the inter-
pretation. The doctrine of intelligence, that Aristotle introduced in his famous
On the Soul) is examined by St. Thomas and incorporat-
ed to a metaphysical theory of intelligence and being. In his treatment he dis-
41
What kind “intelligence” is Artificial Intelligence?
that concerns human intelligence. Broadly introduced, Thomas Aquinas tells
us that the intellect in general can be conceived from the metaphysical theory
of modes of being of act and potency, leading us to see that there are poten-
contemplates the intellectual concepts by which we can think, while the in-
tellect in act (intellect agency) carries mental operations while is conscious of
them. In this way, the medieval theory of intelligence, particularly the Aristo-
-
ing to its functional properties, but its contents too and, furthermore, includes
2
Going even further back in time, for thinkers as St. Augustine, who is one
of the main sources for the understanding of the history of the concept of
intelligence in the Middle Ages, Intelligence (mens) is a faculty that is above
the simple ability to reason logically; it also includes the ability to remember,
to think, to judge and to deliberate and decide meaningfully. This antecedent
was important for St. Thomas and later Aristotelians like John Duns Scotus.
of the two intellects explained above. For St. Thomas, as it has been stated,
means, in the interpretation provided by Peter Geach
3
-
tively thought. Saint Thomas also not only understands intelligence as an
activity (act) but as a habit, he tells us that intelligence is a habitus principiorum
(habit of principles), a continuous activity that happens according to princi-
ples. The relevance of these ideas is that they tell us what is the fundamental
metaphysical nature of intelligence: intelligence is a mode of being, not only
a set of operations and functions.
Early Medieval Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina (known in the Latin
Medieval West as Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (known in the Latin Medieval
West as Averroes) used the concept of intelligence in order to make sense
-
terpreted. In doing their contribution to the topic of intelligence the Islamic
philosophers explained intelligence as the ability to follow laws of thought
that belong to a logic. The knowledge that an intelligence develops over a
2
Cf. , S., I, q. 14, a 1, q. 55, a. 1, q. 79, a. 2; y Coment. In De An.; L. III, c. 2, lec. 2; c.4, lec. 7
y 9, c. 5, lec. 10; c. 7, lec. 12; c. 8, lec. 3, etc.
3
, God and the Soul, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
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42
given topic depends on the logic in which that topic falls: an intelligence is a
and develops habits about such operations.
some proper traits of intelligent lives are not only the functions and opera-
tions. In our own time and grounded on the above tradition, philosophers
-
views of S-AI because they reduce intelligence to an ability of perform op-
erations that forgets about the meaning and consciousness of them. In other
words and following Searle’s reasoning, it is not only about describing the
logical syntax of language, but to make sense of how can we have a con-
-
An American polymath and philosopher of the 19th Century, Charles
Sanders Peirce, reminds us of thought as the using of signs; a sign can only
and, therefore, underlies the importance of understanding how signs work.
Should we wanted to understand the nature of thought, we need to under-
stand the nature of signs. Peirce formed a rigorous science of signs to give
interpretation is an essential aspect of the sign-relation: each sign needs in-
terpretation in order to be a sign of something. There are there basic kinds of
signs from the view point of the interpretant (the way of interpretation that
we might have of it): icons, indices, and symbols. Each kind of sign involves
three characteristics:
1.
2. That of what the sign is about, i.e., the object of the sign (for example,
a speed limit, road works ahead, etc.)
3. -
expect for a driver after seeing the sign).
According to Peirce, even the interpretant itself (z) is meant to become a fur-
ther sign. As such, the interpretant must be interpreted by a further inter-
pretant that is wider in scope, which in turn is interpreted for another… and
so on. Therefore, there is no limit to the process of interpretation. Inasmuch
as there is an intelligence, an intelligence will be so manifested as a capacity
43
What kind “intelligence” is Artificial Intelligence?
which the convergence of interpreting minds will approach in their converg-
ing interpretations.
Since Peirce holds that interpretants are themselves signs and, hence, they
must be interpreted, he thinks that the interpretation of signs must be a com-
-
volves generations of communities of interpretation. Intelligence is, therefore,
at least to a minimal sense, the ability to interpret signs in a self-conscious and
self-controlled way, not only performing some functional operations.
similar or related concepts such as understanding, intellect, reason. Ferrater
Mora rightly points out that in our time there is a pervasive use of the term
4
In such a case, intelligence can be interpreted
by some organisms to adapt to new situations using for such a purpose the
5
Thus, there are many famous experiments in which it is shown how an-
imals show and exhibit this kind of intelligence in the sense of being a psy-
chological function of adaptation. In this sense of intelligence, W. Köhler’s
experiments on chimps and their behaviour are presented to the reader as
-
ed by such primates.
There is certainly no doubt that the contributions to psychology are valu-
able to contribute to an enrichment on the understanding of what kind of be-
haviours intelligent beings exhibit, and these are important to qualify distinct
intelligent behaviours. However, these ways of talking about intelligence
might hamper rather than help an inquiry into what is the meaning of intel-
ligence, since already take for granted that intelligence is adaptation, such
4
, Diccionario de losoa, Madrid: Alianza, 1990, p. 1873.
5
, Diccionario de losoa, p. 1873.
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44
with these kind of viewpoints is the total absence of fundamental metaphys-
ical and epistemological aspects of intelligence: a mind that interprets has to
be a very particular kind of being, not only one that functionally responds
to some operative expectations. This kind of reductionism about the concept
of intelligence has been the main obstacle to overcome some views of intel-
ligence that exaggerate the value of some technological achievements in the
-
-
-
standing, living beings will exhibit certain functions that are acknowledged
as intelligent. Ferrater Mora tells us in his famous dictionary of philosophy
in the course of which calculations are carried, problems (mathematical and
otherwise) are solved, games are played (e.g., a Chess game), learning is hap-
6
Hence AI is more frequently understood as the ability to programme an
However, even as of today, machines function with a kind of programming
-
technology has made great advances at an accelerated rate, and even in the
use of programming that does not necessarily depend on the logic mentioned
above, but trying fuzzy logics, multi-valued logics, even quantum logic that
-
ics. But these advancements, though very impressive, still do not mean that
the systems that perform these highly sophisticated tasks are conscious.
According to a number of thinkers that follow the ideas of Alan Turing, if
a machine could develop in such a way that its operations and the linguistic
expression of these were indistinguishable from the ones of a human being
that is behaving rationally then this will entail the judgement that this AI is
-
6
, Diccionario de losoa, 1875.
45
What kind “intelligence” is Artificial Intelligence?
and operations that were thought only in the scope of intelligent human be-
However, American philosopher of ordinary language John Searle has
-
ing’s ideas. Indeed, Searle articulated a famous thought-experiment known
argument of the Chinese room pictures a digital computer that executes a
behaviour of an intelligent human being a computer is, still does not mean
Behavioural and Brain Sciences in 1980 in the article
The argument is clearly addressed against the philosophical views that
understand intelligence through a computational or functional theory (i.e.,
they already presuppose a reductionist approach to intelligence). Most spe-
with correct inputs and outputs of information would have in virtue of that a
7
Searle’s thought experiment begins with this hypothetical premise: suppose
that some research on AI has been successful in construction a computer that
behaves as if could understand the Chinese language (let us say, Cantonese).
The programme assumes the Chinese characters and symbols in the input slot
and, following the instructions of a computational programme that describes
-
pose that in the same way this computer carries its tasks so convincingly that
without a problem outstandingly passes the Turing test, consequently con-
vincing the Cantonese speakers that the program is a living speaker of Can-
tonese. Thus, to every relevant question that a person does, the output slot
of Cantonese is convinced that inside the room there is another human being
that actually understands the language. Finally, then, the question that Searle
7
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, núm. 3, 198, p. 1.
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46
Searle then, supposes that he himself is the one that is in the closed room
and has a book with an English version of the interactive, he also has papers,
pencils, erasers and a lot of information in relevant shelves. Searle could be
receiving Cantonese characters through the slot in the door, he could process
such characters with the book of instructions, and producing new pieces of
paper as answers. If the computer has passed the test of Turing in this way
it will necessarily follow that Searle did too, but they are only following the
manual of instructions, neither Searle nor the computer understand what the
whole thing means.
in the sense in which we think when we understand, we cannot then adscribe
a mind to the machine in the usual sense of the term. In consequence, Searle
the Turing test. However, even if Searle’s overall argument is perfectly sound
(as it really shows that there is a missing key aspect of intelligence, our con-
sciousness of experience), many computer scientists might claim that the colos-
al amount of computational networks has grown exponentially on the capacity
of predicting human behaviour, concluding that computers know ourselves
-
er massive the amount of information could be recombined, this still does not
mean consciousness. This keeps being a qualitatively syntactic and functional
aspect of the operations, and it does not become what David Chalmers has
from a great syntactical web, it is needed to navigate willingly in the network
of meanings and experiences that the web might represent: it is the interpretant
missing in the sheer representation.
-
sition between a rational life and emotions, as though intelligence in order
47
What kind “intelligence” is Artificial Intelligence?
authors such as Daniel Goleman
8
have vindicated the Intelligent character of
the integration of emotions and the psychological life of the mind. However,
of the value of emotions to the intellectual life: thus, just to invoke an appeal-
ing example, there are interesting texts such as Brady.
9
Unfortunately, these
important developments have been struggling with a prejudiced view that
revokes emotions as fundamentally irrational. Contemporary philosophy of
emotions, as opposed to the negative assessment of emotions, values a positive
role in moral emotions in the formation of a mature and autonomous moral
character. Philosophy of emotion has even discovered that the sheer desire of
knowledge and the unrestricted search for truth is endorsed by an intellectual
emotion: even the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is in tune with
this belief that intelligence starts with the desire for truth and knowledge. If we
examine our intellectual lives we discover that our consciousness and aware-
other words: a fuller sense of awareness and consciousness emerges from the
integration of our intelligence of our emotional states. In Hegel’s philosophy,
for instance, particularly in his Phenomenology of the Spirit
10
he introduces us
to a gradual growth of consciousness that allows us the understanding of our
experience and the intelligence of it not as a monolithic or uniform phenom-
-
ence. Thus, far from expelling emotions from our consciousness, we become
more capable of evaluate our life as intelligent if we take on account the value
This clearly goes far beyond a purely functional aspect of intelligence.
In this article I have introduced some comparative terms that aim to help
-
dition that actually produced the term itself, acknowledging that it is a term
that has been suitable for integrating the acts of a kind of agent, a mind that
interprets and knows itself while knowing, and as the operations and func-
8
, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Maer More Than IQ, New York: Bantam Books,
1995; , Working with Emotional Intelligence, New York: Bantam Books, 1998.
9
, Emotion: the basics, London: Routledge, 2019.
10
, G. W. F., Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Terry Pinkard, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017.
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view of intelligence emerges. This view is a cornerstone to understanding the
problems of purely functional and psychological conceptions of intelligence,
and hence we have been able to interpret to what extend we can properly
-
sidered that there is a growing realisation of the emotional component of
intelligence and therefore questions the functional reductionism. Consider-
conscious life goes beyond consciousness of thought: it is also consciousness
of feelings and the awareness of realities that are meaningful to us. An issue
that still remains open here, however, is the explanation of how the intelli-
gent life includes the consciousness of emotional experience as well as the
moral experience and the aesthetic experience. This has to be emphasised in
future explorations to avoid reductionists accounts of intelligence, but not
only that, we also need to open the discussion to a greater deepening on the
intelligence, but it will be wrong to mistake one for another.
, Emotion: the basics, London: Routledge, 2019
Diccionario de losoa, Madrid: Alianza, 1990.
, God and the Soul, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Maer More Than IQ, New
York: Bantam Books, 1995.
, Working with Emotional Intelligence, New York: Bantam Books, 1998.
, G. W. F., Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Terry Pinkard, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
and,
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1965.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, núm.
3, 198, pp. 417-57.
49
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
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Algunas observaciones sobre las críticas de Leibniz a la mecánica
UPAEP, Universidad
roberto.casales@upaep.mx
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze some of Leibniz’s critics of mechanics in
order to understand its limitations, particularly those that help to clarify the distinction
between the machines made by human beings and machines of nature. To understand
Leibniz’s critics of mechanics, we divided them into three kinds: 1. critics of the Cartesian
conception of extension; 2. Leibniz´s mill argument; and 3. the irreducibility of living be-
ing too simple machines or artifacts.
Keywords: force, mechanics, machine of nature, perception, body.
El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar algunas de las críticas de Leibniz al
mecanicismo, con la intención de comprender sus limitaciones, particularmente aquellas
que nos ayudan a esclarecer la distinción entre las máquinas fabricadas por los seres hu-
manos y las máquinas de la naturaleza. Para entender las críticas de Leibniz al mecanicis-
mo, las hemos dividido en tres: 1. las críticas a la concepción cartesiana de extensión; 2.
el argumento leibniziano del molino; y 3. la irreductibilidad de los seres vivos a simples
máquinas o artefactos.
Palabras clave: fuerza, mecanicismo, máquina de la naturaleza, percepción, cuerpo.
In a famous letter to Nicolas Remond, dated on January 10
th
of 1714,
Leibniz mentioned that, after studying some modern philosophers and
1
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50
thinkers at the age of fifteen, he went to the Rosetal to deliberate whether
to preserve substantial forms or not. Even when he chooses mechanics
over metaphysics at that moment, his further investigations on the ulti-
mate grounds of mechanics and the laws of motion lead him to conclude
2
A statement that can also be found in his New
System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, where he
argues that
after trying to explore the principles of mechanics itself in order to account
for the laws of nature which we learn from experience, I perceived that the
sole consideration of extended mass was not enough but that it was necessary,
in addition, to use the concept of force
of metaphysics.
3
These biographical notes let us see that his adscription to mechanics was
ambiguous since he, on one side, state that every natural phenomena could
-
cally, since they depend on more sublime principles which show the wisdom
4
Even when Leibniz is considered as a relevant precursor for computing
5
especially for his improvements in mathemat-
ics and logic, his developments for the mines of Harz, and his calculator,
his ambiguous adscription to mechanics reveals some of the limits not only
of this account of nature but also of our technological improvements. The
main purpose of this paper is to analyze some of Leibniz’s critics of me-
chanics in order to understand these limitations, particularly those that
help to clarify the distinction between the machines made by human beings
and machines of nature. To understand Leibniz’s critics of mechanics, we
divided these into three kinds: 1. critics of the Cartesian conception of ex-
tension; 2. Leibniz´s mill argument; and 3. the irreducibility of living being
too simple machines or artifacts.
2
Loemker, 655. All references from Leibniz and Descartes will be quoted according to the
canonical style of citation.
3
Loemker, 454; GP IV, 478.
4
Tentamen anagogicum, Loemecker, 478; GP VII, 272; see also: Extrait d’une leer de M. de Leibniz
sur la question, si l’essence du corps consiste dans l’Etendue, Lamarra 204-205.
5
, A., Leibniz. Máquinas inteligentes, multicultura-
lismo y ética de la vida, Granada: Comares (Nova Leibniz Latina 2), pp. 5-28.
51
Some remarks about Leibniz’s critics to mechanics
Descartes notion of extension is quite relevant for mechanics not only be-
cause he sustains that extension constitutes the true nature or essence of all
bodies,
6
but also because, as Gilson noticed, it allows him to develop a form of
7
If the essence of all
bodies consists in extension, then we can measure and describe every natural
phenomena through the lengths of a mathematical equation. Even when Leib-
niz accepts that every natural phenomena can be explained mechanically, and
thus by mathematical means, he clearly sustain in a brief text of 1677 that this
account of nature only correspond to our cognitive limitations:
First of all, I take it to be certain that all things come about through certain
intelligible causes, or causes which we could perceive if some angel wished
to reveal them to us. And since we may perceive nothing accurately except
to be explained through these four. But because we are now speaking of those
things which seem to take place without perception, such as the reactions of
liquids, the precipitations of salts, etc., we have no means of explaining them
8
According to Leibniz, extension and mechanics only correspond to how
we can represent the external and phenomenical world through perception:
every natural phenomena can be explained mechanically, through mathe-
matical means, only because, as we can see in his correspondence with De
in things, like the rainbow or the mock-sun, and all reality belongs only to
9
By giving a phenomenical character to all bodies, Leibniz is not
saying that they lack of reality, but only that it is grounded in something
else and, therefore, that the true essence or nature of bodies cannot consist
only in extension. What Leibniz is denying is the substantial character of ex-
-
into plurality, continuity and coexistence or the existence of parts at one and
10
As a property of things, according to Leibniz, extension is
6
Treatise on light, Ariew 37; AT XI, 36.
7
The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950, p. 133.
8
De modo perveniendi ad veram corporum analysin et resum naturalium causas, Loemker,
173; GP VII, 265.
9
Leer from Leibniz to De Volder from June 30th of 1704, Loemker, 536; GP II, 270.
10
Leer from Leibniz to De Volder from march 24
th
of 1699, Loemker, 516; GP II, 169.
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11
In a second argument to deny the substantiality of extension, as we can see
in a brief text from 1691, Leibniz state that if the true essence of bodies consists
in extension, extension alone should be enough to explain every property of
bodies.
12
Extension, as Laura Herrera noticed,
13
is not enough to explain the
transmission of movement that happens in the collision of two or more bodies,
would be, at most, explained by the mere geometric composition of move-
ments, without explaining the ultimate causes of movement.
14
Another reason
-
cannot make up a complete entity, no action or change can be deduced from it,
it expresses only a present state, not at all the future and past as the concept of a
15
16
Both reasons to deny the substantial character of extension aim to the
-
plies that if we need to
change the point of view from foronomics to dynamics. Alternatively, if de-
sired, to pass from describing movement with exactitude to explain it. The
distinction between describing and explaining seem unequivocal, as it can
be seen when we confront rough descriptions and explanations that lead us
to the ultimate causes.
17
Even when we can explain everything mechanically, mechanics only rep-
resents one form to approach to nature, especially when we want to under-
stand the realm of living beings, as we will see in Leibniz’s mill argument
against mechanical materialism.
11
Nullum quidem librum contra philosohpian Cartesianam
12
Extrait d’une leer de M. de Leibniz sur la question, si l’essence du corps consiste dans l’Etendue,
Lamarra, 203.
13
, S. &
, M. (Eds.), Leibniz en la losofía y la ciencia modernas, Granada: Comares,
2010, p. 284.
14
Extrait d’une leer de M. de Leibniz sur la question, si l’essence du corps consiste dans l’Etendue,
Lamarra, 203.
15
Draft of a leer from Leibniz to Arnauld, Mason, 88; Finster, 186.
16
Draft of ‘New System for the Explaining the Nature of Substances and the Communication between
them, as well as the Union of the Soul with the Body, Woolhouse, 25; GP IV, 476.
17
Juan Arana 2013: 63.
53
Some remarks about Leibniz’s critics to mechanics
Beyond the Cartesian conception of extension and its applications to nat-
measured and, therefore, described through a mathematical equation, but
also that we can explain every single natural change by understanding two
things: the parts that constitute the machine, i.e., the gears that make this ma-
chine work, and the way that these parts interact.
18
Leibniz believes that we
can only apply this mechanical criterion to explain the interaction of bodies,
19
since bodies, according to §79 of his Monadology,
20
Howev-
er, he also states that we cannot apply the same criterion to explain the inner
21
since their
inner actions, as he states in §2 of his Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on
Reasonperceptions
appetitions
-
22
By grounding mechanics in his dynamics and not only in
-
New Essays in Human Understanding
23
or, as he claims in the §1 of his Principles of Nature and of Grace,
Based on Reasonsubstance
24
while in bodies or
compounds their activity consist in motion, the activity of monads consist in
perception and appetite, two inner activities of this soul-like entities.
When Leibniz state that each body or compound is not one substance but
an aggregate of substances,
25
he is also saying that the force that explains mo-
tion, considered as a derivative force, proceeds from an inner primitive force
26
According to this approach, as we can see
18
, H., ¿Qué es la naturaleza? Introducción losóca a la historia de la
ciencia, México: Porrúa, 2007, p. 87.
19
Considerations on vital Principles and Plastic Natures, Loemker, 587; GP VI, 541.
20
Loemker, 651; GP VI, 620.
21
Monadology, Loemker, 643; GP VI, 607.
22
Loemker, 636; Robinet I, 29.
23
AA VI, 6, 53.
24
Loemker, 636; Robinet I, 27.
25
Communicata ex disputationibus cum Fardella, de serie rerum, corporibus et substantiis, et de praede-
terminatione, AA VI, 4B, 1668.
26
Leer from Leibniz to De Volder from June 20th of 1703, Loemker, 530; GP II, 251.
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in §11 of his On Nature Itself-
force of resistance that he locates in prime maer-
27
Since action and motion
are not something that can be derived from this prime maer or mass, Leibniz
concludes that we need to presuppose something else in bodies that explain
-
stance a primary entelechyprôton dektikòn) of activity, that is,
a primitive motive force which, superadded to extension, or what is merely
geometrical, and mass, or what is merely material, always acts indeed and
28
As we can see
in §11 of his New System, these primary entelechies constitute the
real unities absolutely devoid of parts, that can be the sources of actions, and
ultimate elements in the analysis of sunstances…they have something of the
nature of life and a kind of perception.
29
Even when we can explain every corporal movement by mechanical means,
as the result of the impact of another body, this movement can be described,
in Leibniz’s opinion, as an external expression of the inner force of things,
something that depends on the existence of monads. This soul-like entities,
internal principle
30
The inner action of
monads, as we already state, consist in perception and appetite: while per-
etail in that which changes
31
which
express or represent what is outside (the external world) from the inside,
32
as
33
Since monads are
always acting, we can infer that they are always perceiving and passing from
one perception to another, even when they are not aware of their own per-
ceptions, as we can see in the Preface of his New Essays, when he introduced
-
soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either too
27
Loemker, 503; GP IV, 510.
28
On Nature Itself, Loemker, 503; GP IV, 511.
29
Woolhouse, 16; GP IV, 482-483.
30
Monadology, Loemker, 643-644; GP VI, 608.
31
Monadology, Loemker, 644; GP VI, 608.
32
Leer to R.C. Wagner from June 4th of 1710, GP VII, 329-330.
33
Monadology, Loemker, 644; GP VI, 609.
55
Some remarks about Leibniz’s critics to mechanics
-
34
Monads always perceive something, even
those monads whose perceptions cannot reach the level of sensation.
35
All of
this allow us to understand the ontological background of his mill argument
against mechanical materialism, as we can see in §17 of his Monadology:
It must be confessed, moreover, that perception and what depends on it are
inexplicable by mechanical reasons-
tend that there is a machine whose structure enables it to think, feel, and
have perception, one could think of it as enlarged yet preserving its same
proportions, so that one could enter it as one does a mill. If we did this, we
never see anything which would explain a perception. So it is in the simple
substance, and not in the composite substance or machine, that perception
and their changes- that can be found in simple substance. It is in this alone
that the internal actions of simple substances can consist.
36
As Paul Lodge noticed, the key to understand Leibniz’s mill argument is
-
poreal being is a mechanical system and, therefore, that material things are
entities whose behavior can be accurately and exhaustively explained by ad-
verting to nothing other than the sizes and shapes of impenetrable particles
that have the power to receive motion from other particles through impact or
as a result of the direct activity of immaterial entities upon them.
37
will see that Leibniz agrees with mechanical materialists in saying that every
corporeal natural phenomenon is prone to a mechanical explanation, some-
thing that, however, cannot apply to perception and appetite, the inner ac-
tivity of monads, since they do not depend on any corporeal or geometrical
thing. Mental states like perception and appetite, even when they could be
related with sensation and, in this way, with the impressions that we receive
through some of our organs, cannot be explained in mechanical terms since
38
By understanding
the parts that constitute our body, conceived as a natural machine, and the
34
AA VI, 6, 53.
35
Monadology, Loemker, 644; GP VI, 610.
36
Monadology, Loemker, 644; GP VI, 609.
37
Ergo, vol. 1,
num. 3, 2014, p. 81.
38
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
56
way they interact, i.e., the way that they behave, we would never see some-
thing that explains our mental states:
sentient or thinking being is not a mechanical thing like a watch or a mill: one
cannot conceive of sizes and shapes and motions combining mechanically to
there was nothing of the kind.
39
As we can see at the end of §2 of his New System, Leibniz’s concerns about
mechanics are not only related to the Cartesian notion of extension but also
-
40
Leibniz also makes this critic to Descartes when he explains, in
§2 of his Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason, the distinction be-
stating that all our perceptions are apperceived, i.e., that every mental state
is conscious,
41
that there is no soul in beast, still less other principles of life
42
In this way,
Leibniz not only recognize that animals have souls but also that every living
being have one, including plants, since they have perceptions and appetites:
43
All of
this means that even when Leibniz accepts a mechanical account of bodies,
44
The reason
not only that living beings have a soul that guarantees the unity of the entire
organism, since bodies without a soul can only be considered as mere aggre-
gates of beings without any further vinculum
45
-
39
New Essays, AA VI, 6, 66-67.
40
Woolhouse, 11; GP IV, 478.
41
AT, VIII, 160.
42
Loemker, 637; Robinet I, 37.
43
New Essays, AA VI, 6, 139.
44
Machines of Nature and
Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York: Springer, 2011, p. 65.
45
Nullum quidem librum contra philosohpian Cartesianam, GP IV, 395-396.
57
Some remarks about Leibniz’s critics to mechanics
46
but also because their complex structure, which make them quite
Monadology:
So each organic body belonging to a living being is a kind of divine machine
-
chine made by human art is not a machine in each of its parts; for example,
far as we are concerned, and which do not have the character of a machine,
divine art and ours.
47
Even when Leibniz describes the structure of an organism in terms of a
mechanism, as he asserts in his New Essays about the bodies of plants and
animals,
48
49
This program can
-
50
51
number of organs or machines but rather the very structure of a natural ma-
ad innitum
52
something that helps us to understand in which sense Leibniz
53
and, on the
itself indestructible but also the animal itself, although its machine may often
54
In this
way, as he states in his correspondence with De Volder,
-
chines, I think it must be added at the same time that it forms one machine
46
Leibniz a Foucher, GP I, 391.
47
Loemker, 649; GP VI, 618.
48
AA VI, 6, 139.
49
, J.E. & Machines of
Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York: Spring-
er, 2011, p. 2.
50
Nullum quidem librum contra philosohpian Cartesianam, GP IV, 396.
51
New System, Woolhouse, 16; GP IV, 482.
52
53
Monadology, Loemker, 650; GP VI, 619.
54
Monadology, Loemker, 651; GP VI, 620.
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Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
58
composed of these machines and that it is actuated, besides, by one entele-
chy, without which it would contain no principle of true unity.
55
-
of things that are not always artifacts at the same time, smaller machines or
-
-
56
Each part of a living being, in this
sense, is a smaller living being that is also composed of other even smaller
living beings, conforming an aggregate of machines of nature that are inte-
grated by virtue of an intrinsic teleological organization.
57
, A., Leibniz. Máquinas
inteligentes, multiculturalismo y ética de la vida, Granada: Comares (Nova Leib-
niz Latina 2), pp. 5-28.
Oeuvres de Descartes, Adam, Ch. & Tannery, P. (Eds.), Paris: J. Vrin,
11 vols, 1964-1986.
Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, Ariew, R. (ed.), Indianapo-
The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1950.
-
, S. & , M. (Eds.), Leibniz en la losofía y la ciencia mod-
ernas, Granada: Comares, 2010, pp. 281-296.
Der Briefwechsel mit Antoine Arnauld (Franzosisch-deutsch), Fin-
ster, R. (Ed.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1997.
Die Philosophischen Schriften, herausgegeben von C.I. Gerhardt,
Hildesheim, 1965.
Essais scientiques et philosophiques. Les articles publiés dans les jour-
naux savants
55
Leer from Leibniz to De Volder from June 20
th
of 1703, Loemker, 529; GP II, 250.
56
Machines of Na-
ture and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York: Springer,
2011, p. 41.
57
Animadversiones, Dutens II-2, 144.
59
Some remarks about Leibniz’s critics to mechanics
, G.W., Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii… Opera Omnia, Dutens, L. (Ed.), 6
vols. Geneva: De Tournes, 1768.
, G.W., Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts, Woolhouse,
, G.W., New Essays on Human Understanding
(Eds.). Glasgow: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
, G.W., Philosophical Papers and Leers, Loemker, L.E. (Ed.), Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
, G.W., Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison. Principles de la
philosophie ou monadologie
par Robinet, A., París, 1954.
, G.W., Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Von der Deutschen Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Darmstadt (1923 y ss.), Leipzig (1938 y ss.), Berlín
(1950 y ss.).
, G.W., The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, Mason, H.T. (Ed.), New York:
Manchester University Press, 1967.
Ergo, vol. 1, num. 3, 2014, pp. 79-99.
(Eds.), Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Hei-
delberg-London-New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 61-80.
Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Heidel-
berg-London-New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 39-60.
, J.E. &
(Eds.), Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz, Dordrecht-Hei-
delberg-London-New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 1-9.
-
toria de la ciencia, México: Porrúa, 2007.
61
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
From symbolism to food: the birth of a new identity
under the theological virtues, the Virgin of Guadalupe,
the trigarancia and chiles en nogada
1
UPAEP, Universidad, México
david.sanchez@upaep.mx
En México y hacia el mundo, Puebla y los chiles en nogada son una dualidad en sí mis-
ma pensada como maravillosa unidad, una unidad mestiza que gestó un correlato simbó-
lico, una casa común y un alimento sagrado, con múltiples lecturas reiteradas cada año,
no siempre acertadas, pero con una misma realidad original, la de tener el reconocimiento
mundial de pertenecer a una de las jerarquías culinarias más excelsas de la faz de la tierra,
que desde su Historia, desde los textos sagrados, las fértiles tierras, los sublimes manjares,
las rutas comerciales, las herencias culturales, las sabias manos de años de entrega, desde
el pensamiento simbólico y desde las cocinas tradicionales y regionales… crearon un cal-
ante las virtudes teologales y hacia el Ejército Trigarante de una nueva y preciada realidad
independiente llamada Imperio Mexicano.
Palabras clave: Puebla, Chiles en nogada, virtudes teologales, Nueva España, Virgen de
Guadalupe, Independencia, Insurgencia, Trigarancia, Agustín de Iturbide.
In Mexico and towards the world, Puebla and the chiles en nogada are a duality in itself
thought of as a marvelous unit, a mestizo unit where together they formed a symbolic co-
rrelate, a common house and a sacred food, with multiple repeated readings every year, not
always successful, but with the same original reality, that of having the worldwide recognition
of belonging to one of the most sublime culinary hierarchies on the face of the earth, which
1
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
62
from its History, from the sacred texts, the fertile lands, the sublime delicacies , trade routes,
cultural heritage, the wise hands of years of dedication, from symbolic thought and from tra-
ditional and regional cuisines... created a breeding ground where the chiles en nogada knew
how to interact, identify and express themselves before the theological virtues and towards
the Triguarantor Army of a new and precious independent reality called the Mexican Empire.
Keywords: Puebla, Chiles en nogada, theological virtues, New Spain, Virgen de Guadalu-
pe Independence, Insurgency ,Trigarance, Agustín de Iturbide,
lista representativa del Patrimonio Cultural Inmaterial de la Humanidad.
Dicha inclusión, aunque menciona un caso de estudio, se hizo extensiva a
la totalidad de la cultura culinaria mexicana:
La cocina tradicional mejicana es un modelo cultural completo que compren-
de actividades agrarias, prácticas rituales, conocimientos prácticos antiguos,
técnicas culinarias y costumbres y modos de comportamiento comunitarios
-
tidad comunitaria y permiten fortalecer los vínculos sociales y consolidar el
sentimiento de identidad a nivel nacional, regional y local.
2
El concepto de patrimonio se abre en este caso a lo inmaterial:
-
tura inmaterial, que considera los aspectos del estilo de vida local, como lo es
3
Son en estos espacios donde se mimetizan mitos con tradiciones reales sin
escandalizarnos por la existencia de dichos testimonios, a veces confusos, en
nuestro imaginario. Efectivamente debemos desmentir los mitos, pero quizás
se han incorporado al imaginario popular siguiendo un canal identitario que
2
Cultural Inmaterial. La cocina tradicional mexicana, cultura comunitaria, ancestral y viva - El
-
dicional-mexicana-cultura-comunitaria-ancestral-y-viva-el-paradigma-de-michoacan-00400,
consultado el 26 de mayo de 2023.
3
Ciudad histórica como destino turístico, Barcelona: Ed. Ariel, 2002.
63
Del simbolismo a la alimentación: el nacimiento de una nueva identidad bajo las
virtudes teologales, la Virgen de Guadalupe, la trigarancia y los chiles en nogada
los hace partícipes reales de una tradición. Los chiles en nogada forman parte
del Patrimonio Inmaterial de la Humanidad, pero con una destacada y singular
pertinencia que, en la ciudad de Puebla, México, brilla como singular y excelsa
estrella. En su excelencia, los chiles en nogada han llegado a formar parte del
concepto de plato nacional, de plato simbólico representativo de una destacada
herencia que se revaloriza desde los fogones individuales hacia una participa-
ción colectiva que trasciende a la propia receta original y al individuo para ser
símbolo de una destacada identidad cultural, dentro y fuera de sus fronteras,
con origen reconocido y valorado. Los acontecimientos históricos
4
han guiado
estos procesos de creación gastronómica con mayor singularidad desde la pro-
ducción autóctona de sus más destacados alimentos, los conocimientos de nues-
tros ancestros, las rutas comerciales y las herencias culturales, desde nuestras
cocinas en sus materialidades, desde los sazones y los condimentos, desde las
prácticas particulares de cada región… Los saberes, los aromas, los sabores,
las texturas y los colores conforman una plena identidad gastronómica:
-
ticas y conocimientos en la producción que requieren dichos alimentos así
como la producción de recetas propias de un lugar y consumo de las mismas
que contienen importancia simbólica, cultural e identitaria para determina-
catalogadas como platos típicos, que tienen una historia tras sus ingredien-
tes, utilizando técnicas culinarias, recetas y formas de preparar que vienen
a ser el aporte cultural; forman las bases de la identidad de la gastronomía.
No solo se hace relación a la elaboración de platos tradicionales o bebidas tradi-
cionales, sino también, a los productos de los cuales se alimentan los miembros
-
ductos nativos con los que se prepara la comida junto con ciertos condimentos
o aromatizantes, permiten que este producto adquiera una textura, sabor y olor
característico, que se convierte en una costumbre en especial al momento de la
preparación que se convierte en tradición de la gente que habita y es participe
para ser transmitidos de generación en generación para elaborar un plato.
5
Dentro de estos conceptos nos centraremos en el presente análisis en el
simbolismo y la historicidad de los colores de los chiles en nogada hasta con-
formar dicha identidad gastronómica en nuestro presente y hacia el futuro:
4
Sabor a comida, sabor a libertad. Incursiones en la comida, la cultura y el pasado, Mé-
xico: Ediciones de la Reina Roja, 2003.
5
licenciatura, Universidad Técnica de Ambato, Ecuador, 2016.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 15, Núm. 30, Julio-Diciembre, 2023, ISSN: 2007-9699
64
la emoción que provocan
6
por encima de otras consideraciones, a la existencia de sistemas culinarios
distintos y a la proliferación de cocinas a partir de esos sistemas culinarios.
7
Pocas recetas gastronómicas, con tanto valor identitario y patrimonial,
8
han pasado a la Historia con tanta relevancia cultural a la par que con tan-
-
través de ellos una huella cromática identitaria y espiritual como patrimonio
inmaterial? Viajemos al pasado para comprenderlo.
En la Primera Carta del Apóstol San Pablo a los Corintios 13:13 se cita:
Esta referencia habla de que tres son las virtudes teologales de la cosmo-
visión católica: la fe, la esperanza y la caridad. Dichas virtudes teologales son
recibidas en el bautismo:
Las virtudes humanas se arraigan en las virtudes teologales que adaptan
las facultades del hombre a la participación de la naturaleza divina (cf 2 P
cristianos a vivir en relación con la Santísima Trinidad. Tienen como origen,
motivo y objeto a Dios Uno y Trino.
Las virtudes teologales fundan, animan y caracterizan el obrar moral del
suyos y merecer la vida eterna. Son la garantía de la presencia y la acción del
Espíritu Santo en las facultades del ser humano.
9
6
Rev. Esp. Nutr. Comunitaria, 2019.
7
, Los mapas culinarios y la recreación del color, IEMed, Universidad de Sevi-
lla, España, 1997.
8
Trace. Travaux et Recherches dans les Amériques du
Centre
consultado el 26 de mayo de 2023.
9
65
Del simbolismo a la alimentación: el nacimiento de una nueva identidad bajo las
virtudes teologales, la Virgen de Guadalupe, la trigarancia y los chiles en nogada
Estas virtudes teologales disponen al cristiano en su relación con la divini-
dad. El orden de las virtudes teologales según el teólogo Pedro Cantor
10
se da
-
11
prudencia, fortaleza, justicia y templanza. Dichas virtudes serán expresadas
por San Ambrosio de Milán (siglo IV) inspirado a su vez en la República de Pla-
-
atributos y colores. Se crearon por tanto alegorías
12
de dichas virtudes teologa-
les. La descripción de las virtudes como personajes en lucha contra los vicios se
remonta a etapas tempranas como las referencias de Tertuliano en el s.II:
buena fe, la crueldad derrotada por la compasión, el orgullo vencido por
la humildad: tales son los certámenes en los que nosotros, cristianos, reci-
bimos coronas.
13
El alma se planteó como un campo de batalla frente a la cierta armonía
defendida por los clásicos. Clemente de Alejandría (siglo III) llamó a las vir-
tudes teologales la santa tríada.
14
El origen de la iconografía de las virtudes
teologales se expande en la Edad Media europea vinculado al arte románico
y al arte gótico
15
espejo moral. Se tomó
por inspiración la narración de la Psicomaquia de Prudencio (s.IV), la batalla
dentro del alma del hombre, en dicha pugna entre vicios y virtudes. Desde el
s.XIII, en su representación y descripción, esa lucha fue dejando paso a un pe-
riodo donde las virtudes supuestamente triunfaron sobre los vicios y por tan-
Pietro Cavallini realizó el Mosaico de la Anunciación (1291) en la Basílica de
Santa María in Trastévere de Roma, donde podemos apreciar que el croma-
tismo de las alas del ángel atienden a los colores rojo, blanco y verde.
10
, Verbum Abbreviatum. Opus Morale
consultado el 26 de mayo de 2023.
11
, Cristianismo, sociedad y cultura en la Edad Media: Una visión contextual, Plaza
y Valdés, 2008.
12
13
., El arte religioso del siglo XIII en Francia. El gótico, traducción de Abundio Rodríguez,
14
Stromata IV 7. Stromata IV-V (Fuentes Patrísticas, sección textos), Editorial
Ciudad Nueva, 2003.
15
El arte religioso del s.XIII en Francia. El gótico.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
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66
Mosaico de la Anunciación, obra de Pietro Cavallini (1291), Basílica de Santa María
in Trastevere de Roma. Fuente: The Yorck Project (2002) 10.000 Meisterwerke der
Es aquí donde debemos citar la importante obra La Divina Comedia de
Dante Alighieri (1307-1314), en su canto vigesimonono (XXIX) cita las tres
Tres mujeres danzantes van girando
a la derecha, y una tan rojiza
La otra, verde esmeralda simboliza,
en sus huesos y carne; y la tercera
cual nieve que al caer se cristaliza.
16
16
, La Divina Comedia, Versión en verso castellano de Bartolomé Mitre, La-
tivm: Buenos Aires, 1921, p. 377.