In which sense (if any) can it be said
that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
¿En qué sentido (si lo hay) se puede decir que la lógica
de Hegel es formal?
Universidad Iberoamericana, México
empty, never the less, there are some texts in Hegelian Opus, which suggests that Hegel
In this paper I propose that it must be realized that the
Keywords:
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mal está vacía, sin embargo, hay algunos textos en el Opus hegeliano, lo que sugiere que
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en cuenta que el término “formal” ha tenido varios sentidos a lo largo de la historia de la
Palabras clave:
1. Introduction
According to several commentators, Hegel’s scholars as well as historians
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However, it seems that what Hegel calls “logic” is rather metaphysics or
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tic because many philosophers hold that formality is one of the features that
; but also
that that thing which is called “Hegel’s logic”, is logic in the current sense
several places, particularly in the Wissenschaft der Logik
the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, in which Hegel complai-
Nevertheless, there are a number of places in his Opus, in which Hegel says
is removed if we realized the fact that “formal” has been said in many ways
On the one hand, this diversity of meanings bounded to “formal” can be
discussion about the formal nature of logic turns out to be an issue about na-
On the other hand, can formal be understood as a diversity of substanti-
ve theses about the nature of logic in general, and about the formal character
of logic in particular? I believe Hegel’s claim is that logic is formal according
to one of these meanings, but also that this claim is a substantive one, in the
very sense that only according to such meaning, the feature of formality can
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2. The dierent ways in which logic is said to be formal
1
distinguished three senses according
to which the term “formal” must be understood in order to get a demarcation
2
introduced at least eight di-
1
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2
History and
Philosophy of Logic,
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
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vaes’s approach, on her own part, is descriptive, in the sense that she only wants
with logic, without having in mind any external agenda, as that of the demar-
3
following Dutilh Novaes to
According to Dulith Novaes, the mentioned eight conceptions of ‘formal’
-
-
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cause it has to do with doings and actions, but no qua objects, but insofar as
It is in this sense, because has to do
Under substantial formalism we have:
In turn, 1 is divided in:
Formal as schematic, and
And 2 in:
3
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About dynamic formalism or formalism as pertaining to rules we have:
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namic perspective […] any algorithmic process is included naturally in the
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-
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logic, because, says Peña, given that the system is dynamic “doesn’t remain in
acceptability […] Every phase of the system contains its own logic, its own infe-
10
11
any formal system
12
, that of the Logic may have properties which surprise its ori-
13
that one of the main purposes of Hegel’s logic consists in giving an account
Pragmatism’s Advantage,
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía,
10
Fundamentos de ontología dialéctica
11
Hegels Analytische Philosophie. Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische
Theorie der Bedeutung
12
13
Hegel,
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
relations depends upon formal features, Hegel tells us:
In my Science of Logic, -
dge in detail.
heterogeneous sort of the subject, we may neglect to highlight, in every
turn, the logical derivation [die logische Fortleitung
aspect [the logical aspect] were mainly the one considered and judged in
this treatise, because in this treatise we are dealing with a science, but in the
form.
With regards to the thesis according to which Hegel’s logic is material,
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ly, that Hegel is a harsh denouncer of the formal logic, and after that, that the
Hegel’s critique lies in
all content, of all meaning. It is for this
Hegel, it is true,
holds that some philosophers argue that “logic must abstract from every con-
critique of one of the senses according to which it can be said that logical is
because logic is
formal, then it becomes impossible to justify why the logical constants of some
Vorlesungen über Philosophie der Religion
Der Begri des Logischen und die Notwendigkeit universell-substantieller Vernunft, Aa-
Der Begri des Logischen...,
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pends upon the fact that there is certain logical constants, but it is not proved
Probably, Rojas’s argument goes as fo-
llows: First of all, he supposes that logical consequence relation depends on
then, he assumes that logic which is formal, it
-
-
And therefo-
shouldn’t be formal, because it is possible to adopt the view according to
which logic is formal in sense 1 and simultaneously trying to give an account
It is clear enough that Hegel has the Kantian philosophy as target when
Hegel would had thought that logic is not formal in the Kantian sense, but
3. The Kantian sense of ‘formal’
Logik des
allgemeinen] and the logic of particular uses of the understanding [Logik
des besondern Verstandesgebrauchts
20
logica utens, and the former that what themselves called logica docens. Logica
utenslogica docens is a scien-
Der Begri des Logischen...,
Der Begri des Logischen...,
Philosophical Logic,
20
Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
21
Insofar as logica docens is a
science whose domain
every particular element, and since every content of understanding is parti-
Kant’s point is that, according to Copernican revolution, when we propose
domainthinking or un-
at all, in the sense that it cannot be something
-
every
with sensibility, that we could have certain judgements whose truth is neces-
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is the case, but not that this should be so necessarily, and not in another way”
(A 1), and given that there is not any intellectual intuition, therefore it could be
In other words, Kant gambles for the Copernican revolution, that is to say for
the idea according to which the philosopher should put the subject, but not the
-
tive faculty, the subject of understanding, is the empirical self - that is to say the
understanding should be itself a possible object of understanding, which entails
that the self, the subject of understanding, should be multiple, at least because it
22
namely a transcendental-
Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner
21
22
100
named inner sense empirical apperception [empirische Appercep-
necessarily to be represented as numerically identical
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-
23
In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded accordingly that, in Kant’s opi-
nion, logic, inasmuch as it deals with understanding in all its generality cannot
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sion “formal” in order to distinguish the transcendental character of the unity of
In this same
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cludes logic must be formal in the sense that it abstracts entirely from the semantic
of Kantian philosophy than me, rebuilds Kant’s argument in the following way:
“Concepts can be used only in judgments”, “Judgment essentially involves
the subsumption of an object or objects given in intuition under a concept”,
concludes that a concept has semantical content only insofar as it is applied
to some object that could be given by sensitive intuition, and therefore that
logic of generality must be formal, in the sense that it must abstract entirely
Even if Frege rejects Kantian thesis about the formality of logic, which is
worth emphasizing it because shows that it is possible to refuse logic is formal,
for instance in a Kantian sense, without entailing the outright rejection of logic’s
is that logical positivism accepts the thesis, according to which the formality of
logic lies in the fact that logic must abstract entirely from intentional content,
Another feature of Kant’s view is that his conception of formality applied
23
M
101
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
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norms:
Kant, in this sense, holds the following:
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unity of the rule determine all the manifold, and restricts it to condi-
requires a concept, but a concept is always, as regards its form, something
-
form”.
that logic is formal as pertaining to rules or as dynamic formal, as much as abs-
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30
31
32
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30
31
32
Reason in Philosophy
102
4. Metaphysical meaning of logic
First of all, we must stress the fact that, according to Hegel himself, the
33
What is this metaphysical
meaning? As I have said above, Kant is concerned that his transcendental
instance, as the objective structure of the mind itself, in as much as the mind is
an entity, but as a set of rules or norms which govern how the particular mind
courses, Hegel taught:
is
are ripe, and so on ad innitum. Or, in a higher degree of
From a very naïve perspective someone could challenge the Kantian stan-
these norms are
that concepts such as reality or being cannot be used outside the realm of
experience, that is to say, that all those concepts can only be used as much as
are or
not, but only if they are worth
intentional content of the sentence by which the norm is expressed, because
33
Hegelian Metaphysics
103
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
there is no such thing: normative sentences have not denotata
Nevertheless, Kant says not only that these norms govern the use of reason,
rules constitute the reason in such or such way, this very holding is not a rule or
Kritik of reinen Ver-
nunft -
“it
raises […] the question of the status of Kant’s own inquiry”, faced to the fact that:
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of the world, it would seem that he cannot account for those modal claims
using the same manoeuvre, so that in the end, the Kantian story is explana-
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Hegelian argument is philosophically as powerful as to be addressed to another
logic,
entity,
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have poin-
According to this
theory, the unity of the object not depends upon the synthesis of a manifold
bare subs-
tratum
synthesizing activity, but on being an irreducible substance, whose irreduci-
Hegelian Metaphysics
Hegel’s Epistemological Realism
Dianoia
Kant and the Structure of the Object,
Tópicos
bility is explained by the fact of being the manifestation or realization of an
which is very plausibly, because Hegel praised Aristotle much than any other
Hegel, says, for instance, that Aristotle “was one of
Hegelian realist conception of the unity of the object, as any conception of
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tion is exactly that what Hegel uses in order to give an account of the formal
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5. Mereological logical hylomorphism
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besides, added that such distinction, among this tradition, is used for demar-
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Kant and the Structure of the Object
La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l’ontologie
Scholastic Metaphysics. A Contemporany Introduction, Heussentam, Germany:
Thinking about logic
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
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to say, there are some restrictions for the possible substitutions, and “[t]his
restriction is contained within the notion of form”,
which means that only
the expressions whose substitution is not allowed, arranged in certain way,
expressions, which will be called “logic constants” and which should remain
“mereological hylomorphism”,
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phism is to provide a criterion by which someone can tell which of the ex-
(perhaps all) of the substantive philosophical conceptions of the problem of
search for a characterization of the intended set of logical expressions […]
Dutilh Novaes suggests that this problem, as such, is probably owing to
the fact that mereological hylemorphism hinges on certain assumptions, such
-
-
meta-
physical hylomorphism into logical
Thinking about logic
Thinking about logic
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tants”, in Syn-these
only want to do, when says logic is formal, is to point out that logicians are
concerned with argument schemata exclusively, but not so with its particular
uses schemata, does not follow
-
If someone refuses to face out
the problem of logical constants, then the use of “formal” devices, such as
In this sense, Dutilh Novaes writes:
My proposal is thus not to get rid of the schematic-substitutional technique
this technique by itself can resolve deeper philosophical issues such as the
that this cannot be done by simply isolating a particular subset of notions or
concepts as quintessentially logical by means of a (sharp, principled) parti-
Furthermore, Dutilh Novaes holds something that I deem worth mentio-
ning, because concerns especially to Hegelian logical project:
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ticular, the non-mereological, functionalist
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
6. Hegel on hylomorphism
I have shown above, by texts, that Hegel explicitly holds that logic is
Hegel complains about the formalism of logic, this is because “formal” is
that Kant conceives the formal in a defective way, namely such that it pro-
embraces the Aristotelian concept of form, as much as this concept plays
instance, on the one hand, Hegel argues that in a mechanical view of phys-
ics “the form, -
glutinates them into an unity, is an external [außerliche
but on the other hand, from a holistic point of view “it’s
determinateness is essentially distinct from a mere […] external cohesion of
parts […] it is an immanent form
, a self-determining principle, in which the
Hegel holds something that refers to Aristotle very clearly: “Form deals
adopts an anti-nominalist realist position, then would not be easy to atone his
view with that, according to which, logical form depends on an unprincipled
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form can have whether it is assumed the pluralistic ontology that underlie
Hegelian Metaphysics
object is constituted as a “compound of more fundamental and independent-
ly existing separable elements: that is, it is reducible to a plurality of intrin-
sically unrelated individual components out of which […] the whole is con-
Hegel answer is: whole and
part
subsis-
tences [existierende
also [das
-
ment, it should be realized that as much as the unity expressed by “the also”
is one, then is opposed to other ones, also anymore, but therefore
the form is characterized in such a way that this characterization gives rise
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the essence role should rest sometimes in one of the parts of the objects, but
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gedankenlose
In the realm of philosophy of logic, the previous issue could be articulat-
while the form as a sort of unity factor devoided of semantical or intentional
as there is certain speech about
of modal claims, then the form itself is endowed with semantical and onto-
be argued that choosing the parts of the language that constitute the logical
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Right away, Hegel argues that some philosophers as Herder have tried to
Nevertheless, the very
Hegelian Metaphysics
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
concept of force is empty, says Hegel,
as much as it is conceived under the
an assumption, then for every force turns out that it and its manifestation are
exactly the same,
While it is supposed that
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less, since force itself is something, and therefore endowed with unity and
content, it is the case that such an unity and content seems to be nothing more
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or the form is the whole and the part simultaneously, which is contradic-
unintelligent
a model according to which the object is “an irreducible substance […whose]
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stance, if it is supposed that a whole, say water, is compounded by hydrogen
as the parts of the former, from an Aristotelian-Hegelian perspective, instead,
the water is conceived as an irreducible substance, in which hydrogen and
actually present in the water, as they were in the original
samples of hydrogen and oxygen? Well, if the water contained actual hydro-
course the response is that the oxygen and hydrogen are bounded in water
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Kant and the Structure of the Object
110
absence of
virtually present in
the water in the sense that some (but not all) of the powers of hydrogen and
oxygen are present in the water […] and these elements can be recovered from
In the same way, Edward Feser argues:
One implication of this is that contrary to deniers of the unicity of substan-
In water, for example, there is only the substantial form of water, and the
Philosophy of Nature of the Enzyklopädie:
-
sics which prevails in both chemistry and physics, namely thoughts or rather
sterile representations of the immutability of substances
and categories such as composition and subsistence, on the strength of which
that chemical substances in combination lose the properties they show in
separation, and yet some imagine that they are the same things without these
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ties bound to pluralistic logic hylomorphism, the reason should reach a very
important concept, namely “Wirklichkeit”, which is used by Hegel as a trans-
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From “Wirklichkeit” as
actuality, Hegel reaches the concept of possibility, as much as actuality is the
Real Essentialism,
Scholastic Metaphysics
La logique de Hegel
111
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
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About the former, Hegel holds that “substance is
the last unity of essence and being”,
which means that substance is an con-
something that exists only as much as it is instantiated, but being that by
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Macht der
Substanz]”
“the acting capacities of substance [die der Substanz
“there is something in the very nature of potency that requires actualization by
Or as Hegel expresses it: “An entity is actual as an
7. What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational
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the exposition of God as He is in his eternal
essence before the creation of nature and a nite spirit”,
and at the beginning of
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ed, as Hegel himself does, that God is pure actuality, then we may should infer
In this sense, as much as formal means actual, then formality serves as de-
MacFarlane holds that according to Kantian view, the substantial thesis
about the distinctive formal character of logic, such as it is understood by
-
-
Hegelian Metaphysics
God and the Soul, South Bend
Scholastic Metaphysics
112
-
very beginning of the Enzyklopädie, that “Philosophy misses an advantage
enjoyed by other sciences, namely it cannot presuppose the existence of its
object as given to representation, nor its method of cognition, either for start-
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tegories at the outset of philosophy or assume (with Kant) that concepts are
assume that thought should be governed by the rules of Aristotelian logic or
that the law of noncontradiction holds, or that thought is regulated by any
is not to say that we ourselves assume that the principles of Aristotelian (or
assume at the outset that such principles are clearly correct and determine in
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As we will see below, this sort of project forces to face up a big philosophi-
Furthermore, Houlgate adds:
Logic is thus not to adduce alter-
native arguments against which to test Hegel’s own but to follow the course
The Opening of Hegel’s Logic
113
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
of and “advance together with” (mitfortschreiten) what is immanent in each
draw out the evident implication
of a category or moves from one category
to another on the basis of extraneous considerations (such as metaphorical
as a logician in Frege’s tradition,
as much as he would consider the logic as
In any case, I
suspect that Houlgate fails to realise an important issue in Hegel’s philosophy,
namely that someone “not only may, but even must presuppose some acquain-
tance [Bekannschaft
prima
facie cognitive abilities and terminology must be granted in order to have a
also certain history bounded to this use and to the interest generated by the
sense to worry about the fact that a belief hinges on an unfounded presupposi-
-
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stands on one side, and that thought on the other, but as much as thought
Hegel’s Epistemological Realism
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ception of thought, which should be examined beforehand, and which is inco-
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theless, Hegel holds, as we have seen, not only that Kant understands some-
the name “logic”, but that those that Kant considers to be the meaning of
deal with something real, and therefore, that whatever thought as such is, it
Maybe the thought were a part of reality
could give away the name “logic”, but nevertheless there would remain a
research domain outside the boundaries of psychology, which it has been
Otherwise, Hegel’s stance is that a pressupositionless philosophy of logic
shouldn’t assume as granted any conception of thought, except those that
pressupositionless philosophy, paradoxically, should presuppose, namely
much as thought appears bounded to truth, but on such a way that thought
representation of truth with which pressupositionless philosophy must pre-
suppose some acquaintance is that according to which “God and He only is
One of the typically misunderstood topical issues of Hegel’s philosophy is
Hegel tenía razón,
In which sense (if any) can it be said that Hegel’s Logic is formal?
[…] Many of the classical misunderstandings of his interpreters stem out of
what it is believe to be his theory of truth […] Hegel advanced ideas on truth
the case of correction we are presented with a relationship across statements
the whole story for truth: for grasping truth means the process of achieving
In Hegel own words:
know how something is
this, truth in the deeper sense means that objectivity is identical with the
concept […which means that] an object is true when it is what it ought
Hegel, therefore, holds that, from a pressupositionless point of view, truth
should be predicated of reality or being in general, and not only of sentential
ítems, or of sentential ítems only as much as this are real-
reference to God as the only truth suggests Hegel believes that philosophy
must deal with degrees of truth, which are bounded to degree in which so-
References
Frege’s Conception of Logic,
Reason in Philosophy,
La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l’ontologie,
History and Philosophy of Logic,
constants”, in Synthese
Hegel and Aristotle,
Scholastic Metaphysics. A Contemporany Introduction, Heussentam, Ger-
God and the Soul,
Bulletin of Symbolic
Logic,
Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator: An ultimate Presupposition
of Twentieth-Century Philosophy,
Hegel,
-
Hegel tenía razón,
Real Essentialism,
Thinking about logic,
Tópicos,
Der Begri des Logischen und die Notwendigkeit universell-substantieller
Vernunft,
Hegels Analytische Philosophie. Die Wissenschaft der Logik
als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung,
Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object, -
Hegelian Metaphysics,
Hegel’s Epistemological Realism,
