51
Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida
Año 16, Núm. 32, Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699
DOI: 10.24310/metyper.32.2024.19429
The ontological status of moral reasons.
A critical assessment of Charles Larmore’s
Morality and metaphysics (2021)
El estatuto ontológico de las razones morales. Una evaluación
crítica de Morality and Metaphysics (2021) de Charles Larmore
-Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina/Universidad
Siglo 21, Argentina
matias.parmigiani@unc.edu.ar
In Morality and Metaphysics, Larmore outlines a metaphysical conception of normative rea-
with this conception, all reasons for thought and action would belong to an ontologically ob-
jective domain, insofar as their mode of existence would be, in Searle’s words, independent
of any perceiver or mental state. The main objective of the present paper is to criticize this
conception. To this end, it will be argued, on the one hand, that Larmore’s conception is totally
apparent in a clear Strawsonian vein, morality’s normative force would rest to a great extent
Keywords:
Strawson, Mind-Dependence.
En Morality and Metaphysics, Larmore presenta una concepción metafísica de las razones
1
Recepción del original: 15/03/2024
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699, DOI: 10.24310/metyper322024
52
pertenecerían a una dimensión de la realidad ontológicamente objetiva, en el sentido de que
su modo de existencia sería, en palabras de Searle, independiente de cualquier percepción
-
gumentará, por un lado, que la concepción de Larmore resulta completamente inadecuada
-
en términos ontológicos. Según se pondrá en evidencia desde un enfoque strawsoniano, la
fuerza normativa de la moralidad descansaría en gran medida sobre ciertas actitudes y dis-
posiciones de las que difícilmente podríamos prescindir como seres humanos.
Palabras clave:-
ividad, Strawson, Dependencia mental.
-
tency through time. For almost half a century, and throughout authentic philo-
sophical masterpieces such as Paerns of Morals Complexity
2
The Morals of
Modernity
3
and The Autonomy of Morality
4
Larmore has managed to
challenge not only our most common understanding of moral facts and moral
Morality and Metaphysics
5
his most recent publication.
-
ical objective realm of physical facts, a normative realm of reasons for thought
and action whose existence would stand on its own feet. But the novelty here
the nature of normative reasons in general, and moral reasons in particular,
-
more’s most distinctive contention is that our moral reality is not something
that we create or introduce into the world from without, as if it were a postulate
out there once
devoted to critically analyze this contention. Two lines of thoughts will clearly
2
Paerns of Morals Complexity,
3
The Morals of Modernity,
4
The Autonomy of Morality
5
Morality and Metaphysics,
53
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
emerge as the discussion proceeds. On the one hand, it will be argued that Lar-
more’s approach to normative reasons in general is totally inadequate to deal
reasons. And, on the other hand, it will be shown why moral reasons, often cast
in terms of impersonal or agent-neutral reasons, owe their very existence to
is an unavoidable participant stance we cannot do without as moral agents and
The paper is structured in seven sections. Section 1 presents Larmore’s gen-
with agent-relative reasons. Section 2 presents Larmore’s position on moral
as an outcome of this discussion it will be revealed that Larmore is led to a
will prove unconducive. Section 4, on its part, analyzes the ontological status
point that is present in Larmore’s analysis but that he does not capitalize in his
-
-
cal tradition. Finally, section 7 goes over the previous sections, to suggest that
-
1. Normative Reasons as Facts’ Relational Properties and
the Uncomfortable Place of Agent-Relative Reasons
-
thing strange. Quite the contrary, in recent days this has become a widely
Alvarez, one of its most competent defenders, for instance, says in that re-
6
not mention Alvarez’s contribution to the topic, but he brings up other rele-
6
, Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699, DOI: 10.24310/metyper322024
54
-
7
And anoth-
Although factualism has earned an important recognition in philoso-
phy, it has also raised important criticisms, especially in the epistemologi-
epistemic access to certain facts may justify the possession of certain be-
liefs, however false they could be all things considered.
9
Today, the debate
or have a word in any respect has turned out to be quite challenging. But,
fortunately, Larmore’s reservations against factualism are grounded in a
-
10
So, what are norma-
tive reasons after all for Larmore? Here is his straight answer:
that some might then dispute it actually possesses. Yet since the property is a
relational property, this just means that being a reason is essentially a relation
–the relation of justifying or counting in favor of– that an empirical fact (that it
11
12
count in favor of other
7
, Kinds of Reasons
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 29
9
See, for instance, , J. and J., C.
and Epistemic Norms
, M. and -
South African Journal of Philosophy
10
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 29.
11
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 29
12
, Kinds of Reasons
55
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
facts similarly referred to in propositions. In Larmore’s opinion, however,
reasons are not the very empirical facts that count in favor of other empirical
facts, but the extrinsic or relational properties of these facts, insofar as they
relate to those other facts.
-
cially when he discusses Scanlon’s position, who also claims that normative
13
A normative reason, Scanlon says, is
p, x, c, ap, an agent x, a set
of conditions ca
14
In general terms, Larmore agrees
seem puzzling if we focus on reasons themselves, that is to say the states of
p
15
Reasonably,
16
If reasons are relational, this can only mean
p as such, but rather those facts
17
or relational properties do not possess this character. Consider, for instance,
Jessie’s dog’s being larger thanhaving the
potential to quench the thirst of human beings. Though typically relational, these
properties are not only characteristically empirical, but perfectly reducible to
-
ular structure, since these presumably are the intrinsic properties upon which
those relational properties supervene. Therefore, what is so distinctive about
On
What Maers
in the same way
13
Morality and Metaphysics, Being Realistic About
Reasons,
14
Morality and MetaphysicsBeing Realistic p. 31.
15
Morality and Metaphysics
16
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 156.
17
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 156.
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 154.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
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56
in some dierent sense
19
But Larmore objects that this view unconditionally surrenders to the prevail-
ing naturalistic conception that dominated the philosophical scene at least
since the Enlightenment, an objection that has its roots in Larmore’s previ-
20
In conclusion, besides being normative and relational, reasons
are as real-
dependently of whatever
21
.
-
-
whatever is not out there in the world, including all our thoughts, sentiments,
What would be the gains of proceeding in such a fashion? As will be seen later
normative facts about reasons,
which, in their irreducibility to things of a physical or psychological nature,
22
Therefore, based on this and many other passages,
other physical fact. But if this is so, then the ontological objectivity or mind-in-
dependence of any psychological state a singular human being might be in
possession of must be necessarily understood as relative to-
liefs of other human beings. It is in relation to them, and not to their possessors,
that all mental states would be ontologically independent or real.
this very sense, they are supposed to exist quite independently of this or that
So far, so good. But now suppose that there was a normative reason for Elon
-
more says, are also irreducible to things of a physical or psychological nature,
Nonetheless, how can it be possible for it to exist in such a way? Isn’t what
19
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 149.
20
The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 111-112.
21
Morality and Metaphysics-
sons that will become manifest in what follows but that somehow try to respond to reason-
able worries formulated by two anonymous reviewers.
22
Morality and Metaphysics
57
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
reasons are logical entities, and logical entities are ontologically irreducible to
-
ible.
23
as logic. And, from a semantical point of view, there seems to be all the dif-
-
search is that
favor of’, but it is only in the second case that this relation becomes transpar-
view, would nonetheless become semantically meaningless. And this is a dif-
ference that clearly has practical implications.
paradigmatic case of normative reasons that will come onto the stage in the
following section. If I say to you, without further ado, that you have a moral
reason to prevent an innocent person from being murdered by just pressing
-
al inquiries are simply out of place. On the other hand, imagine that you say
-
23
See, for instance, The Oxford Hand-
book of Reasons and Normativity
that, according to non-naturalism about normative reasons, the fact that the reason relation is
-
and the fact that I have a headache are typical examples of facts that are reasons, and they
reason relation and facts
about which other facts have the property of being reasons to be mind-independent and irreduc-
reason relation
meaningful or semantically transparent
in virtue of these very facts that allow its instantiation. And if these facts are crucial for the
it (Compendio de ética, Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
also section 2 below, and especially footnote 36.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699, DOI: 10.24310/metyper322024
ing what that reason is from your perspective? Moreover, suppose that you
tell me that it is not a moral consideration but something of a more personal
nature, something that concerns me in virtue of my own predilections and
-
to, and —what is here of the utmost importance— how it may move me to
Larmore’s proposition that normative reasons are real-
dependently of whatever
a total stranger to myself. What would be rather hard to swallow is that there
-
tudes I may have in that regard.
predicate R for agent p to act in a certain way, the reason will be agent-rela-
tive (or subjective
son, in correspondence with the following notation:
∀
the reason R will be agent-relative in virtue of the fact that the variable p
-
-
24
Typical
the one involved in the example, but they can also spring from our person-
promises or signing contracts. Formalities notwithstanding, there is an aspect
that almost all agent-relative reasons seem to have in common and which
does not seem to be prima facie
reasons, for instance. To put it bluntly, it is the fact that, were it not for cer-
us say, no one would have an agent-relative reason to act in a certain respect.
So, by way of illustration, it is just because you are in love with Jessica that you
your greatest passion that you have a reason to join the next auction.
24
The Possibility of Altruism,
also -
Utilitas
59
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
jumping into the water you can easily rescue her/him. But you are not aware
that s/he is drowning. For you to have a reason to rescue her/him it is not nec-
essary that you be in a certain mental state. Moreover, neither is it relevant
you in either case, existing quite independently of your current mental life. If
this were Larmore’s whole point, then he would be plainly right. However, it
is important to emphasize that this is not Larmore’s whole point. Rather, his
point seems to be that the ontological status of your reason as a father/mother
any kind of aitudinal stance
whatever beliefs
-
yours
DNA— but that you had never heard of her/him in your entire life. Would
you be under the same normative reason to save her/him from drowning?
There is no doubt that you wouldn’t, since the emotional and sentimental
mean that, all things considered, you may not still have a compelling reason
to jump into the water and try to rescue her/him. But that would not be an
agent-relative reason.
25
Much more would it be necessary to say in this regard to understand the
Larmore’s point that the irreducible reality of normative reasons implies that
whatever
be forced to conclude that they cannot represent at all authentic normative
reasons. But this conclusion would certainly be too rushed at this stage of the
discussion, wouldn’t it?
in which Larmore openly discusses agent-relative reasons happens when he
25
I owe this paragraph to a comment formulated by an anonymous reviewer, who fears that my
interpretation of Larmore’s position may not be as charitable as it could be. S/he says, for in-
stance, that the most conspicuous reconstruction of what Larmore would be trying to say is that
-
this respect and avoid possible misunderstandings in the following sections.
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60
criticizes Darwall’s intersubjective approach to moral reasons. And there he
seems to recognize the reality of these reasons. He says, for instance, that
-
ly agent-relative, since only those who voluntarily promise have a reason
26
However, he also says that this one as well as other
27
which is not agent-relative
but agent-neutral. Of course, Larmore is right in asserting that the moral va-
lidity of agent-relative reasons depends on a set of reasons that must exist
-
theless, what about those agent-relative reasons that play no role in morality,
when we assume that it is not morally objectionable? What are we supposed to
29
for instance? Why would anyone want to deny
30
for example, can also be part of a practical reasoning purported to justify an
action? What would be the gains of adopting such a restrictive view of nor-
mative reasons? Here I am not suggesting that this is necessarily Larmore’s
-
portant doubts may undermine the credibility of his metaphysical position
regarding agent-neutral or moral reasons.
2. Moral Reasons as Morons?
reasons into his relational account of normative reasons would be to review
Justice for Hedge-
hogs
the moral qualities of facts could be explained the same way in which our
-
26
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 49.
27
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 49.
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 49.
29
Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz.
30
61
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
31
Curiously enough, Lar-
32
-
33
-
about it, but this is neither the time nor the place to deal with all of this. For
-
31
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 95
32
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 100
33
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 100. Reasonably, an anonymous reviewer is in-
trigued by how Larmore characterizes motivation and the outcome of deliberation, a subject
that this paper cannot properly address but that certainly deserves closer examination. Al-
human action and motivation, such a role is clearly subordinated to the causal power that
to move us to action (Morality and Metaphysics
that already exist (Morality and Metaphysics
causal impact that normative reasons would have in our behavior via
motivational reasons’, tradition-
than our conception of the normative-
Morality and Metaphysics
instance every time we believe something that is not true, it would be this conception (namely
an apparent
truly or authentic
by the normative reason plus our right conception of it. However, as is evident, this would
introduce an explanatory asymmetry very hard to accept. Jonathan Dancy, for instance, tried
-
, Practical Reality. -
-
Synthese,
the challenge remains for Larmore to explain in what sense that explanatory asymmetry may
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62
relational properties of empirical, non-normative facts,
34
and moral reasons are
nothing more than a sub-class of normative reasons, therefore, on pain of in-
consistency, it would be reasonable to conclude that moral reasons must also
be relational properties of empirical, non-normative facts. Or, to complete the
the way that physical or psychological facts count in favor of certain possibil-
-
moral
facts (facts involving moral reasons)
category of facts, which would involve the presence of moral reasons. Here it
to in Larmore’s opinion, but we can just assume it to be a constituency rela-
tionship, as if moral reasons were the constituents of moral facts. Now, since
moral reasons are nothing more than a sub-class of normative reasons, which
are relational properties of empirical, non-normative facts, the question that
-
cal, non-normative facts, the implication is that moral facts will have to be
circularity previously noticed. Does this represent, however, a charitable
reading of Larmore’s thesis?
normative-
volve the presence of normative reasons.
35
Of course, examples do not abound
totality of all that exists, contains not only physical and psychological facts
but also normative facts about reasons, which, in their irreducibility to things
irreducible nature of the normative domain. For the time being, however,
-
tween physical and psychological facts, on the one hand, and normative facts
34
See, for instance, Morality and Metaphysics, pp. 154, 161, 164.
35
See Morality and Metaphysics
63
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
Intuitively, that an umbrella is made of a water-resistant material is a clear
or psychological in nature, is an entity which typically consists in a particular
normative
or justifying reasons
facts about normative reasons, which are relational properties of physical or/
and psychological facts, then, to abide by the parallelism, they will need to be
-
tive reasons as such, which is Larmore’s contention, but rather as involving
facts that, acting as particulars, instantiate those normative reasons as if they
were their relational or extrinsic properties.
Once things are conceptualized this way, it becomes much clearer what
-
ical, or non-normative, than the fact that an umbrella is made of plastic. But,
regreable, or morally wrong, as we
praiseworthy, or morally right. These, as
to become moral once they are described with the help of moral predicates.
-
-
-
sons as relational properties of empirical, non-normative facts. Hence, under
the guide of this approach, it seems that the most natural option to go with
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
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64
-
tive reasons relate to empirical facts as their relational properties. But here I
-
ternative to cope with moral reasons. Again, when couched in terms of a mor-
intrinsic property of such a norma-
relational property of an empirical, non-normative
factintrinsic property of a non-empirical, normative
fact. Both formulae are optional depending on the context of enunciation and
can be used interchangeably.
Be it as it may, what still craves for an answer is the question regarding
per se
-
-
chance that the property is plainly irreducible? Questionably. Imagine that
terms: for X to be larger than Y is for X to measure more than Y in relation to
irreducible as it is to a physical or psychological thing, a relational property
justifying or counting in favor of another fact or
thing of a physical or psychological nature is not the fact that instantiates the
reason but the relation of counting in favor of something else. How could it be
otherwise? After all, this is no more than a logical property, and logical prop-
-
65
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
is perfectly aware of these particularities and of the challenging metaphys-
ical questions they posit.
36
For no other reason, he analyzes Carnap as well
as Scanlon’s metaphysical internalism, for which the question of what exists
rational to conceive, what Larmore adopts in the end is a more comprehensive
metaphysical worldview. Naturalism, as he notices, does also represent such
a worldview. But whereas naturalism tends to see reasons and moral proper-
shall be recalled, is the name Larmore chooses to characterize his own posi-
37
Indeed, in
his opinion, both reasons and moral properties are real
Larmore spends a great deal of his time to explain why naturalism fails
to account for normative reasons in general, characterizing both Hume and
these philosophers have something in common, for all of them would be at
without, coloring the neutral face of nature with normative distinctions of
39
Clearly enough, if normative reasons in general, and
-
36
See footnote 23 above. There it was argued that non-naturalism has its problems when it tries
to account for the irreducibility of the reason relation from a semantic point of view. Now
a priori, the same does not happen with the former. Whether
a posteriori. Of course, this does not mean that there are some general aspects of the
a priori. However, since in
-
reduction that normative reasons are capable of, pace Larmore.
37
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 7.
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 179.
39
Morality and Metaphysics The Autonomy of Morali-
ty, p. 112.
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66
40
Larmore’s suspicions against naturalism would
be well grounded.
In The Sources of Normativity
createdconstructed by a procedure, the
41
would probably agree with him, that the order of factors is quite the oppo-
site. Rather than being adopted or created from our given practical identities,
the values and reasons that are most characteristic of the moral point of view
are not byproducts of those identities but precisely one of their sources.
42
As
it stands, the idea is not without obscurity. After all, why would my identity
Another way to put it would be to say that the reasons that I ultimately
in the sense of not being in contradiction with valid moral reasons. Under such
create or
construct from pre-existing non-moral perspectives such as those that we occu-
py just for being who we are, but rather things that we discover once we get to
appreciate the world from a more objective or impersonal viewpoint.
43
Still,
the problem is how to give credit of this perspective. For if, as we may put it in
Nagel’s terms, there is simply no way of viewing the world from nowhere, nei-
are things located out there in the world crying for discovery.
In more than a sense, Larmore’s platonistic account of moral reasons
seems to share Nagel’s realistic assumptions. But Larmore is much more ex-
40
Ethics without Principles,
41
and -
The Sources of Normativity, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
42
and The Sources of Normativity, ed. Cambridge:
43
67
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
plicit than Nagel when it comes to reveal what moral realism amounts to in
metaphysical terms. As previously seen, Larmore conceives normative rea-
sons as irreducible to things of a physical or psychological nature. For no
normative
truths he mentions about reasons.
44
But recall that he also calls them real,
45
-
46
two passages seem in line with each other. Nonetheless, what would happen
or agent-relative one? Would Larmore still hold that a fact by itself would
have to count in favor of a given option, apart from someone’s interests and
reasons, this would be plainly absurd.
So, as things now stand, Larmore seems to be at a crossroad: either he
or he
-
-
since the reality of normative reasons means that they exist independently of
order to include agent-relative reasons within his philosophical approach,
he will probably need to revise his second truth about normative reasons in
general, and moral reasons in particular. However, is it possible to conceive
the reality of impersonal or agent-neutral reasons as something that some-
to deny the very existence of agent-neutral reasons?
In section 4 I will try to answer these questions by starting to outline the
general aspects of a response-dependent approach to moral reasons, which
fortunately has many competent defenders. However, prior to that, in the fol-
-
44
Morality and Metaphysics
45
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 179.
46
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 37.
Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida. Año 16, Núm. 32,
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prove unconducive. But given Larmore’s silence on this topic, the alternative
seems worth analyzing.
3. Can Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Reasons Share
the Same Ontological Status?
-
-
ect-dependent reasons, and deontological restrictions, to argue that all of
them can be reformulated in terms of their impersonal or agent-neutral coun-
terparts.
47
He writes:
The agent-neutral counterpart to my agent-relative reason to save my son
-
-
agent-neutral.
reasons, such an understanding may help Larmore avoid some inconsisten-
49
includ-
Curiously enough, he does not say a word about the conditions that a goal,
or a project, must satisfy in order to become sharable. As will be shown in a
moment, the issue is not without importance, for plainly irrational goals such
as counting blades of grass do not seem to be in shape to even call our lowest
50
47
Philosophia, núm. 49, 2021, pp.
360-361.
49
50
See A Theory of Justice,# 65.
69
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
determine the normative reason that an agent has, but only its normative force
or signicance
it would be agent-neutral, on its part, if the understanding of its normative
force is not conditioned by elements of such a nature.
51
-
ments would be relevant to determine the normative force
the stamp plate on sale, but not the very normative reason-
is not only his but everybody else’s goal as well, anybody would have a nor-
however, seems unpalatable. Auctions, not to mention many other competitive
scenarios and zero-sum games, usually summon people who pursue colliding
may be no less important to stamp-collector Y, or T, or U. Why then would
-
-
who happen to be in love with the same woman, Roxane. There is simply no
way in which the fact that Roxane falls in love with Christian can be good for
Cyrano, and vice versa
agents –or, moreover, if its being good for one means that it is bad for the oth-
er– it is not possible for them to share the same normative reason.
4. Moral Reasons and the Ontological Implications of the
Reective Point of View
supra
envisaged for Larmore: either to deny the distinctive ontological status of
or
-
51
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70
-
52
53
Larmore has established the roots of
54
and
55
can be generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of
56
But Larmore cleverly notices that the same philosoph-
the starting non-moral perspective is not anchored in our simple desires
as such, but in our reasoned practical identities. To see myself as a source
be able to conceive of me as a human
this conception, which is already presupposed in my contingent practical
identity, is what ultimately forces me to see any other human being as an
equally respectable source of values and reasons, which would be the core
center of the moral point of view.
Both in The Autonomy of MoralityMorality and Metaphysics ,
for not recognizing the distinctive ontological status of the normative domain
to which all our reasons would belong. When explaining what a reason is, for
52
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 32.
53
The Autonomy of Morality.
54
The Autonomy of Morality, p. 103.
55
The Autonomy of Morality, p. 101.
56
Morals by Agreement, -
The Autonomy of Morality, p. 96.
71
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
57
In Larmore’s opinion, however, this would imply to put the
we conclude that such a desire deserves satisfaction since it represents a con-
stitutive part of our own conception of ourselves, carefully considered. Far
from solving the initial problem, this account merely reproduces it, for now
identity instead of another.
-
spond to normative reasons.
what to do, what to be, or what to value, that would be determined by the
reasons we manage to respond to, but whose existence must be presupposed
-
-
tudes we might adopt towards it. And moral reasons, as part of that domain,
speak for themselves once they are discovered.
59
-
ings, responsive not merely to the causal impress of the environment but to
60
-
tricity’ (Exzentrizität
61
Larmore
naturally approach the world in the light of the interests and allegiances
62
from within
57
Morality and Metaphysics
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 34.
59
See The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 103-5.
60
Morality and Metaphysics
61
, 2021, pp. 20-1.
62
ibid., p. 22.
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72
63
64
Nonetheless, if such an impersonal standpoint
clearly notices,
65
-
sists once more that the moral or impersonal reasons we get to appreciate
66
67
for it is in response to a circumstantial problem that
To appreciate why it cannot, it would be highly instructive to redirect
-
tive status of agent-relative reasons. As things now stand for him, it gives
the impression that an agent’s own personal or relative reasons would
-
of psychoanalytical therapy to discover them, in which case our current
personal perspective will not be relevant to determine the existence of our
truly agent-relative reasons. If that happens, however, the only thing it
would prove is that our agent-relative reasons do not ontologically depend
on the current
-
able in this case from a more enlightened personal perspective. Nonethe-
less, what perspective are we supposed to assume when it comes to assess
perspective will be of course of no help at all. But if a third-person (or a
the agent whose personal reasons are being assessed, for this would dis-
of fact to be personally important and what other people may be disposed
to recognize in our favor.
63
ibid., p. 22.
64
ibid, p. 22.
65
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 27.
66
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 27.
67
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 27.
73
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
-
such a project. But if we cannot have the slightest clue of what it means to be
of the agent-relative reasons in question. On the contrary, for stamp-collector
plate at auction are almost as transparent as her own agent-relative reasons
to do the same. The most common cases, of course, are in between these two
extremes. Understanding other people’s purposes is not always easy. When
value of her project, what can we do about it? Since the adoption of a project
few, one may be tempted to compare all this with our own dispositions and
But if that usually helps to arrive at a
-
Equality
and Tradition. Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory,
-
Equality and Tradition…
not admit such a thing, he believes, contra
prima facie
(cf. Equality and Tradition…,Value, Respect, and Aach-
ment,
in the valuable character of the things we value must be necessarily true. If this is not a
ignorance can only distort the distinctive value of those things. Consequently, if a belief
necessarily rest on facts whose ultimate nature is ontologically subjective (on this point see
The Construction of Social Reality,
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Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699, DOI: 10.24310/metyper322024
74
5. The Unavoidable Aitudinal Basis of the Moral Stance
69
And,
sometimes inconsistent, sometimes over-demanding, and sometimes even
indeterminate, what else could have been said in its place? Many institutions,
moral
-
70
-
much as she chooses to comply with them acting as a worker. This is in the end
as it may, we should not over-exaggerate the motivationally-blind demand-
ingness of moral obligations. For if I have a moral obligation to rescue my
drowning child from the swimming-pool, the fact that I want to do this more
stranger. And even when the drowning person were a total stranger to me,
the sole fact of not wanting to rescue her would add to the situation an el-
ement for moral concern. Utilitarians may naturally object that motivations
-
self we are perfectly aware of why this is simply unacceptable.
71
Morality is
also a peculiar institution because it tends to discourage what Williams calls
72
however important they may be to convince
the Hobbesian amoralist to adopt the moral point of view.
So, in the end, why not just to admit that the moral stance is ontologi-
his writings, Larmore admits on more than one occasion the relevance that
73
a relevance not al-
ways possessed by deliberation, for instance. When we are very young, Lar-
69
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,
70
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 195.
71
See, for instance, , J. C. and ,
B., Utilitarianism: For and Against,
72
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
73
The Autonomy of Morality, p. 126.
75
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
74
But if all this is so clear for him, why does he still refuse to recognize the in-
75
In the world of aesthetics, for instance, there is no mystery in this respect.
The untrained eye will frequently fail to appreciate the value of certain art
-
ly enough, the world of morals is not that complex. If it were, then it would
-
ture regarding properties, in the sense that neither moral nor aesthetic proper-
ties would be possessed by acts, objects, and even persons, without necessary
76
-
-
77
-
question, rather, is whether an analysis of moral qualities in terms of imper-
74
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 30.
75
and Thinking About Reasons. Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy,
76
Needs, Values, Truth-
Philosophical Explorations, vol. 20, núm. 3, 2017, pp. 261-275.
77
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 4.
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76
-
tivation. For even if it is true, as Larmore notices, that generous acts cannot
be reduced to the plain fact that they cause certain feelings of approval in
our motivational set, as some Humeans would simplistically put it, it is no
it not for the sentiments of gratitude that we usually develop towards their
authors. So, to bring Strawson’s account into focus, there are certain feelings
something that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for
79
-
including gratitude, of course, but also resent-
-
tude is the one that we tend to adopt towards agents who are under some sort
of mental abnormality, in which case we suspend our typical reactions, for
they would be quite inappropriate. Now, compare such an objective stance
with Larmore’s impersonal perspective, the one we would need to adopt for
assessing the existence of moral reasons. Aren’t they too similar in some re-
spect? Needless to say, Strawson’s paper is not concerned (or, at least, not di-
reasons. But it is certainly concerned with moral-
ity, even to the point of qualifying as moral
Indeed, it seems that it would be rather strange if, in accordance with his own
conceptual scheme, a reason to be generous, for instance, had nothing to do
he may fear that if my reason to be generous with my dearest cousin rests on
the love I feel towards him, then it could never be possible to have a similar rea-
son to be generous with someone for whom I have no such a feeling. However,
this would be a complete distortion of the phenomenon. Truly enough, nobody
F., Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays,
14.
79
F., Freedom and Resentment…, p. 10.
F., Freedom and Resentment…, p. 13.
F., Freedom and Resentment…, p. 10.
See, for instance, F., Freedom and Resentment…, p. 21.
77
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
-
es, demands of generosity are simply out of place. But if less generous acts are
as when someone is drowning in a swimming-pool and I am the only person
who can help, surely this cannot be because I have no feelings at all. A primitive
this situation, though moral accountability involves many other aspects.
-
timent is not enough to eliminate the moral reason in place to jump into the
water. However, the only thing that this would prove is that moral reasons, in
order to exist as such, do not depend on who we currently are. Yet, they would
still depend on moral agency, and moral agency, be it mine, yours, hers, ours,
-
-
might become, as they certainly apply to human
beings who already share these feelings. On the contrary, imagine a world only
-
will not be possible either. In other words, they would be inexistent.
-
Larmore probably fears that
such an understanding of moral reasons may put them on an equal foot-
ing with personal or agent-relative reasons, and particularly with relation-
a part of morality in which agent-relative reasons play an essential role.
It is only because you promised me to water my plants that you ought to
-
In any case, what is it that he pretends to infer from this?
in accounting for the impersonal point of view? If it were, it could hardly
Morality and Metaphysics
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 49.
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to those who have developed the capacity to feel what a betrayed person
people’s emotional capacities were such that they did not care about and
-
will need to cover them all, or at least a substantial part of them.
6. Testing a Mind-Dependent Approach to Moral Reasons:
The Case of Respect
Unsurprisingly, what lies behind these critical considerations is a re-
that moral facts, or facts about moral reasons (see supra-
of constraint were indeed of Larmore’s taste, it would not survive even a
-
tions, for instance, have no business at all in explaining the moral wrongness
of certain actions, which is plainly absurd.
Larmore is perfectly aware of this fatal consequence, as he explains at
author’s intentions in an adequate ethics of reading. So, what he could say
are of the utmost importance to determine the moral character of a deed,
that happens precisely because there is a moral reason that explains it, but a
the meaning of a text ultimately rests on the objective existence of a general
and
The Routledge Handbook of Mataethics
The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism,
79
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
duty of respect for people.
as is usually
recognized in the literature? This seems undeniable. But if this is so, then the
information about typical disrespectful treatments among human beings, or
people’s dignity, will be no more than an empty shell.
Surely much more would it be necessary to say in all regards to under-
succeed. Of course, mind-dependent theories in this area are manifold and it
for instance, in Michael Smith’s dispositional theory of value, a clear exponent
90
Since moral reasons for acting one way or another appear in
this theory as the byproduct of what we all would converge in desiring were
we to rationally deliberate from a set of desires that is maximally informed,
91
the moral reason to respect a person can never be
person possesses, on condition that it is maximally informed, coherent, and
to mention just a few. But once this is done, wouldn’t it be much simpler
general obligation, it is beyond doubt that respect cannot be confused with
what each occasion particularly requires to comply with it. So, in that sense,
there is no choice but to recognize its independent status. However, what
an ontological one.
may dare to approach a distant culture to show respect for the life of its
-
See, for instance, Morality and Metaphysics
Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
90
See and and
The Routledge Handbook of Mataethics
91
See The Moral Problem,
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Julio-Diciembre, 2024, ISSN: 2007-9699, DOI: 10.24310/metyper322024
only impede that our own bias and prejudices get in the middle. And, as
At one point, and especially as days pass by and our need to interact with
these people becomes more stringent, more positive ways of approaching
them will need to be envisaged. If we discover, for instance, that they are
or they react with anger or contempt to some of our acts and gestures, the
circumstances may not only require that we detach from certain aspects
-
childhood to adulthood, though it may be far less revisionist. It need not
But if they could be momentarily suspended until we start dealing again
As I said, even if what lies behind all these requirements is a general moral
obligation to respect people, whoever they are, this is something that only
-
and did in the past might have caused other people to react in certain ways,
not to mention which of the things that other people said and did might have
-
ness and experiential growth that we progressively reach a more trustable
the content of an abstract and general obligation, certainly irreducible to its
many diverse instantiations. But this is just a logical result, generally crystal-
who must interact between each other in a complex world disturbed by in-
-
spect is nothing before and beyond
The same verdict would also apply to the whole universe of norms, obliga-
tions, moral facts, and moral reasons that populate our otherwise natural,
non-normative world.
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
7. Final Remarks
relational properties that certain facts bear to our possibilities of thought and
action.
92
However, what is supposed to count for a person as a real possibility
us and among which we must decide have to be possibilities that in our view
93
This is of course pure common
open to us for the sole reason of being factually available are also personally
compelling moral reasons to go to England and join the Free French Forces,
and this option probably was a perfectly realizable possibility. But if the love
for his mother was too strong to turn it away, or if his mother’s despair was
enough to put upon his shoulders a weight too heavy to bear alone, then it
may be that such a possibility was not as conceivable as it might have been
-
which he judges too fuzzy to serve as reliable guides of conduct.
94
However,
is this always the case? It does not seem so.
all those actions we cannot bring ourselves to perform, not just because of
the overwhelming aversion we may develop towards them, but because of
our conscious endorsement of this aversion.
95
96
we typically tend to see our-
selves as unable to act in certain regards, even if –and this point is crucial
in the present context– there is no factual impediment for so acting. The
-
-
92
See for instance Morality and Metaphysics
93
Morality and Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 5,
1140a 23-1140b 30.
94
See Existentialism and Humanism,
95
The Importance of What We Care About
96
The Importance of What We Care About
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97
In Habermas’s terms,
it may also function as an ethical category,
99
Of course, some of
are normatively inert.
-
-
ing would not be a normative reason unless there was a possibility of thought
-
mative force than the one we may be willing to confer upon a non-trivial rea-
son, though its normativity would still be out of question. However, consider
again Sartre’s student. What help would it be to tell him that, in the light of
the possibilities of action that are open to him, he has at least two normative
reasons: a normative reason to join the Free French Forces as well as a nor-
to discount, as Dancy would put it,
100
we manage to evaluate the relative normative force that each of them may
-
his mother represents to him may advise him to join the army, with all the
negative consequences this may cause to his life.
In consequence, even if it is true that normative reasons are, as Larmore
of thought and action, the role that such possibilities play when deciding
surely be factually possible for you. Yet only a few of them would be strictly
relevant to evaluate, depending on your desires, of course, but also on your
interests, mood, company, previous touristic experiences, and so on and so
forth. Therefore, it is the meaning that our real possibilities of thought and
97
The Importance of What We Care About
Aclaraciones a la ética del discurso,
99
The Importance of What We Care About
100
, 2004a, pp. 113-114.
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
action have for ourselves rather than these possibilities per se what is usually
-
ters.
101
From an ethical, agent-relative perspective, this seems easy to under-
stand. But even from a moral, agent-neutral perspective, things cannot be all
102
what else could be more basic
from the moral point of view than showing respect for people? Even so, in
feelings, and dispositions of the persons we may happen to deal with. For
And even if it is far from being humanly possible, or remotely desirable, to
try to live up to everybody’s expectations, certain general principles may be
useful to bring some peace. Obtaining a person’s consent usually represents a
convenient mechanism to avoid hurting her feelings, but there may be others.
Be it as it may, one thing is for sure: since the normative force of both our eth-
-
ground of feelings and emotions, as Strawson has noticed, Larmore’s conten-
tion that the reality of normative reasons implies that they exist independently
-
ine that he tries somehow to untie the reality of reasons from their normative
force. He might say, for instance, that whereas the normative reasons that an
that are objectively open to her, the variable normative force of those reasons, in
contrast, is something to be assessed by examining the universe conformed by
revise his position regarding the reality of normative reasons, since now there
But what if he decided to embrace objectivism all the way down? That is,
on the normative force of normative reasons, be they agent-neutral or agent-rel-
101
For a similar contention, see Making Sense of Humanity, -
102
The Autonomy of Morality
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he says, for instance, that the truth of a value judgment that supports a norma-
true
with what it purports to be about
103
which is the value itself. Does anything of
this mean, however, that values would still exist in a universe devoid of human
104
Even more, when he discusses Darwall’s intersub-
105
-
cordingly.
106
Nonetheless, insofar as such a feeling has a role to play in deter-
goal that could be accomplished, for instance, if we are wise enough to ap-
107
Larmore
-
-
Republic and the Symposium, among many other dia-
detailed explanation of how far is too far in these domains. Until then, howev-
those interested in the intricacies that connect moral theory to metaphysics.
103
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 97.
104
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 37.
105
Morality and Metaphysics, pp. 50-51.
106
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 51.
107
Morality and Metaphysics, p. 51.
See The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.
The ontological status of moral reasons. A critical assessment
of Charles Larmor’s Morality and metaphysics (2021)
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