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Metafรญsica y Persona. Filosofรญa, conocimiento y vida
Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy
Hegel, naturalismo y ๎losofรญa trascendental
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ ฑ๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉก
๎ฟ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎
๎๎ฏ๎๎ฏ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎๎๎ฏ๎๎
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ ๎ฉก๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉก
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎-
tem as conditional upon a synthesis of naturalism and transcendental philosophy, the
general features of which shall be elaborated. Despite his long-standing reputation as a
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
between philosophy and empirical science cannot be easily accommodated within the for-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฃ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
philosophical reason with a synthetic function which few contemporary naturalists would
recognise. As such, Hegelโs methodology combines features of philosophical persuasions
often considered fundamentally irreconcilable.
Such a synthesis of naturalism and transcendental philosophy is made possible by
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
an autonomous rational freedom, and his proposal that mind or Spirit be understood as
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ
conformity to rational principles of synthetic unity need not be explained as necessarily
conditional upon a priori criteria of intelligibility originating in a non-natural subject.
Rather, Hegel maintains, nature grounds the ontological possibility of a Spirit which
grounds the possibility of nature, so that nature and Spirit ground one another.
Keywords:๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
subjectivity, a priori, absolute idea, absolute idealism.
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ ๎ฉข๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎๎๎ ฑ
caracterรญsticas generales serรกn elaboradas. A pesar de su reputaciรณn de larga data como
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
๎๎ค๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ค๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
horizontes formalistas del trascendentalismo kantiano. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo,
1
๎ ฑ ๎๎๎
๎๎๎ฑ๎ ฑ๎๎ด๎๎๎ฑ๎ ฆ๎ ฆ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎๎๎๎ ฆ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ฑ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฆ๎๎๎ ฆ๎๎๎๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฑ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฆ๎๎๎ ฆ๎๎๎๎
Metafรญsica y persona. Filosofรญa, conocimiento y vida
Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
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๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ฃ๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ท๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎-
porรกneos reconocerรญan. Como tal, la metodologรญa de Hegel combina caracterรญsticas de las
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฃ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
Hegel de cualquier dicotomรญa kantiana entre una naturaleza animal heterรณnoma y una li-
bertad racional autรณnoma, y su propuesta de que la mente o el espรญritu se entiendan como
la โverdadโ o la autorrealizaciรณn de la naturaleza. en lugar de su antรญtesis. Para Hegel,
entonces, la conformidad de la naturaleza con los principios racionales de unidad sintรฉtica
no necesita explicarse como necesariamente condicionada a criterios a priori de inteligi-
bilidad que se originan en un sujeto no natural. Mรกs bien, sostiene Hegel, la naturaleza
fundamenta la posibilidad ontolรณgica de un Espรญritu que fundamenta la posibilidad de la
naturaleza, de modo que la naturaleza y el Espรญritu se fundamentan mutuamente.
Palabras clave: ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ฃ๎ ๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎-
tividad, a priori, idea absoluta, idealismo absoluto.
Introduction
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ด๎๎๎๎-
te to him a pre-Critical dogmatic metaphysics of almost comical grandiosity,
scholars of his thought remain divided over the extent to which he may be
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ ฑ ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ
which is vital to making sense of Hegelโs relevance to contemporary philoso-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
relationship between Hegel and the Critical philosophy. To those for whom
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ ๎
๎-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
tonomy with which the rational subject legislates to the object, Hegel is a more
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
๎ ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑNaturphilo-
sophie, which de-centres the constitutive function of the subject with respect to
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ด๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
subjectivity from objectivity. Any adequate treatment of his relation to the Cri-
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
understood as its organic self-development, or as the self-overcoming of its
own incomplete development. As such, it would seem, Hegel must understand
his own idealist position both ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ
more โembryonicโ transcendental philosophy, and as the refutation of trans-
25
Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy
cendentalism. For Hegel, then, transcendental philosophy must somehow be
something preserved, developed, and, at the same time, overcome.
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ก๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎-
phy is further complicated, however, by the related issue of his proximity to
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑProlegomena to any Future
Metaphysics ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ฐ
2
without, therefo-
re, needing to rest upon the a priori constitutive activity of the transcendental
subject. As a number of scholars, such as Pinkard and DeVries, have remarked,
Hegel shares much in common with certain forms of naturalism, particularly
in terms of his apparent commitment to the continuity of humanity with the
natural domain. However, insofar as naturalism is widely understood to be
antithetical to transcendental philosophy, it may seem that the closer Hegel
comes to either position, the further he must therefore depart from the other.
Whereas transcendentalism is generally associated with a commitment to the
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
naturalism is frequently thought to champion the continuity of philosophical
and empirical modes of understanding and explanation. Transcendentalists
often lean towards a species of idealism and are dubious of the prospects avai-
lable for a naturalistic understanding of consciousness and representation,
whereas naturalists are typically inclined towards forms of realism and are
more willing to treat mind and meaning as natural phenomena. In these res-
pects and others, naturalism and transcendental philosophy appear entirely
incompatible, and to defy even Hegelโs impressive capacity for the synthetic
integration of apparently opposed positions.
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
integrate naturalist and transcendentalist themes within his overarching sys-
tem of absolute idealism. Special emphasis is given to how Hegel proposes
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎-
supposes an Absolute viewpoint which he does not properly make thematic.
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎-
ce between nature and subjectivity is overcome, so that there is no dramatic
separation between the naturalist and transcendentalist perspectives. Ultima-
๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ
transcendental project from within ๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
reason aspires may be achieved and the radical duality of subject and object
overcome in the unity of the Absolute Idea.
2
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉก๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉข๎ฉ๎ฉ, Prolegomena to Any Future Metapysics, translated by James W. Ellington,
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฆ๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฑ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ด๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ฏ
Metafรญsica y persona. Filosofรญa, conocimiento y vida
Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
26
1. Naturalistic Interpretations of Hegel
In a remarkable reversal of interpretations of his work standard, at least
amongst analytically-trained commentators, since the early twentieth cen-
๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
who renounces supernatural entities of every description and seeks to ac-
commodate rational norms, processes and ideals entirely within the scope of
the natural domain. Whereas Taylorโs landmark 1975 study is characteristic
of a period during which even those who were sympathetic to Hegel unders-
tood his idealism as a speculative metaphysical position which downgrades
the ontological status of natural phenomena to mere appearances ancillary
to the super-sensible process of an Absolute Mindโs self-articulation, such
โspirit monistโ interpretations are very much out of favour amongst contem-
porary Hegelians.
3
Far more representative of current trends in Hegel scho-
larship is Pinkardโs account of Hegelโs idealism as a naturalistic position
concerning the social and historical operations by which agents are able to
emerge from within the natural domain and develop a self-conception, all
without recourse to super-sensible agencies, whether divine or otherwise.
4
For Pinkard and other such โnaturalisticโ interpreters of his system, Hegel
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
to agents by means of sensible experience, nor does he recognise any demand
for noumenal or intelligible characteristics of the subject in order to account for
๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
intended to safeguard practical reason and moral agency against intrusions
from a deterministic natural domain, are redundant, it is maintained, given
๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
at least outside of his Critique of Judgement, and it is therefore unnecessary to
look elsewhere than to naturally- originating explanatory resources in order
to make sense of how freedom and responsibility are possible. According to
such naturalistic interpretations, nature need not be understood as a by-pro-
duct of an Absolute Mindโs self-contemplation in order for it to be recognised
as accommodating, rather than foreign to, reason and rational norms.
All the same, even the most enthusiastic champion of a naturalistic inter-
pretation of Hegel would acknowledge that Hegelโs naturalism is importantly
distinct from that which is standardly opposed to transcendental philosophy,
at least amongst contemporary analytic philosophers. Certainly, it is very mis-
leading, to say the least, to claim Hegel as an ancestor of Quine, whatever
3
๎๎ฉ๎ฉฆ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎
๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ , Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
4
See, for instance, ๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎ฏ, Hegelโs Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
27
Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎-
deed, where commentators have spoken of Hegelโs โnaturalismโ, they have
very often distinguished between โconservativeโ or โexclusiveโ and โliberalโ or
โinclusiveโ naturalist positions, identifying Quine with the former and Hegel
๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ฏ
5
According to McDowell, for instance, in terms of its anti-no-
minalistic and anti-scientistic credentials, Hegelโs naturalism has far more in
common with Aristotleโs than with Quineโs.
6
Even assuming that his naturalism is of a more inclusive and reconci-
liationist variety does not, however, by itself eliminate the aforementioned
concern about Hegelโs relationship to transcendental philosophy, for there
remain several issues upon which the transcendentalist and the liberal na-
turalist appear to be at odds and to resist the general Hegelian integrationist
strategy. One particular point of contention concerns the relation of philoso-
phy to the empirical sciences. As DeVries noted as long ago as 1988:
๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
and right Hegelians, which centred on religious and social issues, but a new
๎ป๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ผ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
pirical sciences. The disagreement is over whether philosophy itself emerges
out of them and depends on them in some real sense (this would be the po-
sition of the Hegelian left, I suppose) or comes to the empirical sciences from
outside, with a fund of knowledge both independent of and superior to that
of the empirical sciences (the position of the right).
7
After declaring for what he here presents as โthe Hegelian leftโ, DeVries
announces that โI read Hegel as a great naturalist, as one who saw man as
arising out of and continuous with nature and capable of being understood
๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ก๎๎ ๎ฏ
8
This, presumably, would leave a priori trans-
cendentalist interpretations of Hegelโs position with respect to the natural
sciences occupying what DeVries indicates to be โthe Hegelian rightโ. Cer-
๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎-
losophy of nature and its relation to his philosophy of spirit. Here Stoneโs
โstrong aprioristโ interpretation of Hegelโs philosophy of nature may be con-
trasted with Pinkardโs a posteriori approach for a helpful indication of the
5
See, for instance, ๎๎ฉ๎ ฑ๎
๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ฏ๎ ฑy๎ ฑ๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎๎ฉ๎ฉก๎ฉ๎ฉข๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ฏ, Naturalism in Question, Harvard, M.A.: Har-
vard University Press, 2008, for comparisons between naturalism of โconservativeโ and โlibe-
ralโ forms.
6
See, for instance, McDowell (1994) and McDowell (2009).
7
DeVries (1988) xii.
8
DeVries (1988) xii.
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Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
28
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎ฏ
9
Such disagreement might also serve
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
even within Hegelโs omnivorous system.
2. Hegel and Kant
Hegelโs debt to the Critical philosophy is well-captured in Mooreโs obser-
vation that:
Hegel believes, just as Fichte believed, that a bald naturalism cannot do jus-
tice to the phenomenon of subjectivity. For subjectivity cannot be understood
merely as an epiphenomenon of objectivity, certainly not of the objectivity
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
the objectivity of the natural world must itself be understood as grounded in
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ
The natural world is itself constituted in part, by the concepts that we use in
thinking about it. To deny this would in Hegelโs view be retrograde.
10
According to Moore (who describes Hegelโs metaphysics as โtranscen-
dentalism cum naturalismโ), Hegel applauds the object-constitutive function
๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
numental advance in the philosophical understanding of humanityโs awa-
reness of its own autonomous and self-determining status. What is more,
insofar as the concepts in terms of which the natural world is intelligible to
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
of a logic which precedes the philosophy of nature in Hegelโs system, this too
marks a point of continuity between Hegel and transcendentalism. As Stone
explains in her โstrong aprioristโ approach to Hegelโs philosophy of nature,
Hegel may be understood therefore as identifying certain a priori conceptual
forms to which natural phenomena must conform while remaining at liberty
to introduce into such outlines an a posteriori content of their own.
Moore is quick to point out, however, that the subjectivity in which the
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ
ascribed to that which is not limited by something โotherโ to itself than to
9
See ๎๎ฉก๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ฏ, Petri๎ed Intelligence: Nature in Hegelโs Philosophy, Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press,
2005; and ๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎ฏ, Hegelโs Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012.
10
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ, A.W., The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012, p. 167.
29
Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy
๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ฐ๎ ฑ
Hegel means for it to be understood as โincludingโ nature within itself, ra-
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ
Such an understanding of subject and object as non-oppositionally rela-
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
of how it might be possible for Hegel to integrate features of both natura-
lism and transcendentalism and how, depending upon the perspective from
which Hegelโs system is examined, he might be claimed either as a naturalist
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
is, for Hegel, a species of transcendentalism and a properly developed trans-
cendentalism is a species of naturalism. Whether one begins from the pers-
pective of the object or from that of the subject then, one shall, according to
Hegel, be naturally led to the other. Hegelโs philosophy of nature is inten-
ded, of course, to trace the logical process by which object-centred thought
becomes subject- centred, and hence of why one cannot properly conceive
of nature without giving an account of the subject. For Hegel, however, one
can no more give an account of the subject without giving an account of na-
ture than one can give an account of nature without giving an account of the
subject. Hence, it is important to make sense of why, according to Hegel,
the subject-centric perspective must transform itself into an object-centric
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
philosophy. This, however, is very close indeed to explaining why Hegel un-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ฏ
3. Hegelโs Idealism as the Self-Completion of Kantโs
It is a central commitment of the Critical philosophy that human reason
assigns itself tasks the solutions to which it is absolutely incapable of provi-
๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
predicament of seeking to determine the unconditional grounds of empirical
phenomena when the scope of its possible knowledge is necessarily restric-
ted to the domain of appearances conditioned by the subjectโs a priori forms
of sensible intuition. What is more, it is not because of any faulty reaso-
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฌ๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฌ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ด๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
it is precisely because of humanityโs capacity for reason that it experiences
the temptation to explain the ultimate conditions of the synthetic unity of
Metafรญsica y persona. Filosofรญa, conocimiento y vida
Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
30
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎-
๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
against its own boundaries. Reasonโs only consolation in the unenviable sce-
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎-
yment of its ideas of the unconditioned, and hence to think of the world โas
๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ
approximate an ideal of complete systematic unity, which must nonetheless
remain as a target to be approached but never reached.
For Hegel, of course, such an account of reasonโs predicament is wholly
inadmissible, and reason sets itself no tasks which it cannot accomplish. That
๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
when Hegel remarks, in the Science of Logic, that:
In reason, the highest stage of thought, one ought to have expected the No-
tion to lose the conditionedness in which it still appears at the stage of under-
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ด๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑdialectical,
and indeed takes the result of this dialectic to be the in๎nite nothing- just that
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
prived of the synthesis, and with it the beginning [โฆ] of a speculative, truly
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฒ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎-
tive unity of the systematic employment of the understanding. It is declared to be
an abuse when logic, which is supposed to be merely a canon of judgement, is
regarded as an organon for the production of objective insights. The notions
of reason in which we could not but have an intimation of a higher power
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑconstitutive character as
do the categories, they are mere Ideas; certainly we are quite at liberty to use
them, but by these intelligible entities in which all truth should be completely
revealed, we are to understand nothing more than hypotheses, and to ascribe
absolute truth to them would be the height of caprice and foolhardiness, for
they- do not occur in any experience.
11
For Hegel, it would seem, to admit for reason no more than a regulati-
ve status is to concede the impossibility of completing the task of synthesis
which conceptual thought assigns itself in the face of any manifold. The Ideas
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
in his view historically contingent representations but originate a priori in the
capacity for rational thought and form a part of the thinking subjectโs concep-
tual inventory because they are necessary to complete the work of synthesis
11
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ, G.W.F., Hegelโs Science of Logic, translated by A.V. Miller, Amherst, N.Y: Humanity
Books, 1969, pp. 589-90.
31
Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy
which begins with the faculties of sensibility and understanding. By refusing
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎-
ces a position which is, in Hegelโs view self- frustrating and a classic example
of the internal tensions which must befall any philosophical outlook short of
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎๎๎๎๎ฏ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
which it sets for itself. Thankfully, according to Hegel, the key to overcoming
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ
position, and needs only to be further developed and elaborated. Once this is
done, however, and it is seen how reason is not prevented from completing
its self- assigned tasks, transcendental philosophy need no longer be unders-
tood as necessarily opposed to naturalism.
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
Hegel, is to recognise that the very project of self-limitation by means of which
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎ ฑ
domain of which one can know nothing is itself self-undermining. In Hegelโs
view, the cognitive capacities by means of which a boundary is drawn between
the knowable and the unknowable cannot themselves fall within the boundary
in question, so that the very act of drawing such a boundary implies that one
must have done so from a perspective external to that boundary. Hence Hegel
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฒ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ
the in๎nite ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎ฏ
12
With the recognition, however, that reason can-
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
of metaphysical understanding there are no grounds to suppose that reason
is necessarily incapable of completing its self-assigned task of grounding the
synthetic unity of the system of nature in unconditional grounds.
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎-
rate within at a certain time and place must be the result of reasonโs not yet
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ก๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
yet being for-itself what it is in-itself.
With the achievement of such an absolute standpoint, however, and the
๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ
๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ฎ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ
transcendental philosopher, it enjoys in relation to the object, both being
12
๎๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ๎ฉ, G.W.F., Hegelโs Philosophy of Nature, translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1970, p. 385.
Metafรญsica y persona. Filosofรญa, conocimiento y vida
Aรฑo 13, Nรบm. 26, Julio-Diciembre, 2021, ISSN: 2007-9699
32
grounded in a deeper source of synthetic unity. Contrary to the allegations
๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ฐ๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ฑ
transcendental idealism not by resorting to a pre-critical dogmatic metaphy-
sics but rather by seeing the transcendental project through to completion in
๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฌ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎ฏ
๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎-
timately realised in Hegelโs own system is not therefore, according to He-
gel, a spirit monism which eliminates the independence of nature. Rather,
๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎ ๎๎๎๎๎๎ข๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎ ฑ ๎๎๎๎๎๎๎๎ ฑ๎๎๎ ฑ
overcome from within and its unity with nature grasped as grounded in the
unconditioned Idea. Indeed, according to Hegel, the supposed dichotomy
between naturalism and transcendental philosophy is, like that alleged to ob-
tain between liberalism and communitarianism, a mere appearance resulting
from the failure to recognise the unconditional grounds of the synthetic unity
of two positions which, viewed independently of such grounds must seem
incompatible with one another. Far from belonging to an antiquated era of
speculative metaphysical excess then, Hegel is directly relevant to on-going
debates between naturalists and transcendental philosophers and, it might
be hoped, be able to contribute much of value in mediating a viable reconci-
liation between contemporary forms of naturalism and transcendentalism.
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