Bibliographic Report on (Epistemic) Awareness Logic
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v24i3.7555Keywords:
Epistemic logic, explicit knowledge, awareness, epistemic action,Abstract
Awareness Logic is an extension of epistemic logic that solves the problem of logical omniscience by incorporating an awareness operator that separates the explicit knowledge from the implicit one. This report collects the most prominent works regarding the beginnings of this logic, as well as its developments in the past three decades. Specifically, it reviews the approaches from Dynamic Epistemic Logic, from the ones that combine other logics with Awareness Logic and those from Game Theory.
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